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ABSTRACT 
  Conventional histories of the Constitution largely omit Natives. 
This Article challenges this absence and argues that Indian affairs 
played a key role in the Constitution’s creation, drafting, and 
ratification. It traces two constitutional narratives about Indians: a 
Madisonian and a Hamiltonian perspective. Both views arose from 
the failure of Indian policy under the Articles of Confederation, when 
explicit national authority could not constrain states, squatters, or 
Native nations. Nationalists agreed that this failure underscored the 
need for a stronger federal state, but disagreed about the explanation. 
Madisonians blamed interference with federal treaties, whereas the 
Hamiltonians argued the federal military was too weak to overawe the 
“savages.” 
  Both accounts resulted in constitutional remedies. More important 
than the Indian Commerce Clause, new provisions secured by the 
Madisonians declared federal treaties supreme law, barred state 
treatymaking, and provided exclusive federal power over western 
territories. But expansionist states won concessions guaranteeing 
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federal protection and western land claims, while other provisions 
created a fiscal-military state committed to western expansion. 
  The two narratives fared differently during ratification. While few 
embraced centralization, many Federalists repeatedly invoked 
“savages” to justify a stronger federal state and a standing army. This 
argument swayed Georgia, which ratified to secure federal aid in its 
ongoing war with the Creek Indians. But it also elevated the 
dispossession of Natives into a constitutional principle. The Article 
concludes by exploring this history’s interpretive implications. It 
suggests the Indian affairs context unsettles conventional 
understandings of the Constitution as intended to restrain the power 
of the state, and challenges both originalist and progressive 
assumptions about constitutional history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Only two speeches at the Constitutional Convention discussed 
Indians.1 On June 19, 1787, James Madison argued for expanded 
federal authority, emphasizing that Georgia had “directly” violated 
the Articles of Confederation when it “made war with the Indians, 
and concluded treaties.”2 A day earlier, Alexander Hamilton, in a 
lengthy speech arguing for a much-strengthened federal government, 
listed three “important objects, which must necessarily engage the 
attention of a national government.”3 “You have to protect your 
rights against Canada on the north, Spain on the south, and your 
western frontier against the savages,” he warned.4 
The text the Convention produced also mentioned Indians twice: 
once to exclude “Indians not taxed” from the apportionment of 
 
 1. A note on terminology: I use the words “Indian” and “Native” interchangeably to 
describe the indigenous peoples of North America. I also use the terms “tribe” and “nation” to 
describe Native polities of the late eighteenth century. Native political organization was diverse 
and complex, and Anglo-American abstractions often fit poorly onto “a world of villages, bands, 
and clans.” COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY: CRISIS 
AND DIVERSITY IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 8–9 (1995); see RICHARD WHITE, THE 
MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–
1815, at 1–49 (1991). But I nonetheless use these terms both because they correspond with how 
Anglo-Americans viewed Natives at the time and because long-standing Native interaction with 
Europeans had helped construct Native nations that were more than simply European 
inventions. CALLOWAY, supra, at 8–9. See generally STEVEN C. HAHN, THE INVENTION OF THE 
CREEK NATION, 1670–1763 (2004) (describing the historical construction of concepts of Creek 
nationhood). When possible and clear, I use the term “Anglo-American” to refer to the non-
Native inhabitants of the United States, even though many were not English; as Daniel Richter 
has observed, the fact that “in the new nation Whites were the ones entitled to be called 
‘Americans’” rejected earlier practice and implicitly erased the continent’s Native past. DANIEL 
K. RICHTER, FACING EAST FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: A NATIVE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICA 
2–3, 252 (2003). Finally, I use the terms “national government” and “federal government” 
interchangeably to describe the government created by the Articles and, later, the Constitution. 
This is consistent with historical usage, although these terms were not uncontested, and early 
Americans most frequently used the now archaic-sounding “general government.” For instances 
of these usages, see infra notes 3, 324, 336, 422, 426, 447, 470 and accompanying text. 
 2. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 326 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 3. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 198 (Harold Coffin Syrett ed., 1961). 
Hamilton’s speech, which proposed an elective monarch who would serve for life, had little 
subsequent impact on the Convention; the delegates described it “praised by every body” but 
“supported by none.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, 
at 363; see also RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230–35 (2004) (describing Hamilton’s 
speech as one of the “flagrant errors” of Hamilton’s career).  
 4. 4 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 198.  
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representation in the House of Representatives,5 and once to grant 
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian 
Tribes.”6 Neither provision occasioned any recorded debate.7 
Histories of the Constitution, even very recent ones, assume this 
absence reflects Indians’ irrelevance, and so almost entirely omit 
Natives.8 
This Article reexamines this history and contends that debates 
over Indians played an important role in the Constitution’s creation, 
drafting, and ratification, particularly in the push for a stronger 
federal state. It situates Madison and Hamilton’s speeches at the 
Convention as exemplars of two contrasting strains of constitutional 
thinking about relations between Indians, the national government, 
and the states—one that stressed paternalism, the other that 
embraced militarism. And it argues that the conquest and 
dispossession of Native peoples were integral to the Constitution’s 
ratification, shaping subsequent events. 
Current scholarship offers two accounts of Indians and the 
Constitution. Some have advanced the unpersuasive claim that the 
Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy served as a primary model 
for American federalism.9 But most writing on the topic has focused 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Fourteenth Amendment repeats this language in its 
repeal of the Three-Fifths Clause. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.  
 6. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. For instance, a comprehensive recent narrative history of the Convention contains no 
index entries for either Indians or Native Americans—although it does contain eight entries for 
the “Indian Queen,” the tavern where many delegates stayed. RICHARD R. BEEMAN, PLAIN, 
HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 503 (2009). The most recent 
work on ratification mentions Indians five times in the course of a nearly five hundred page 
narrative. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788, at 570 (2010). Professor Akhil Amar’s “biography” of the Constitution contains brief and 
scattered references to Indians, primarily in the context of western expansion, the Commerce 
Clause, and Fourteenth Amendment debates over citizenship. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107–08, 270–72, 430, 439 (2005). For arguments that Indians 
were largely absent from constitutional history, see DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING 
EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC 
WORLD, 1664–1830, at 217 (2005); DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED GENTLEMEN & WHITE 
SAVAGES: INDIANS, FEDERALISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER ON THE AMERICAN 
FRONTIER 93 (2008); 1 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A 
COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 363–65 (2005).  
 9. For works advancing this claim, see DONALD A. GRINDE, JR. & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, 
EXEMPLAR OF LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY (1991); 
Robert J. Miller, American Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and Its Framers, 
18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133 (1993); Gregory Schaaf, From the Great Law of Peace to the 
Constitution of the United States: A Revision of America’s Democratic Roots, 14 AM. INDIAN L. 
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on legal doctrine, particularly the interpretation of the Indian 
Commerce Clause and the legitimacy of federal plenary power over 
Indians.10 This approach, while important, banishes the topic to the 
specialized field of federal Indian law, reflecting the dominant 
twenty-first-century perspective of Indian relations as a minor and 
technical area of governance.11 Projecting this view backward onto the 
Constitution’s drafting makes the absence of Indians from 
constitutional history seem unsurprising. 
But in the eighteenth century, Indians were not a political 
afterthought. When the Constitution was written, powerful Native 
nations owned and governed much of the territory mapmakers 
 
REV. 323 (1989). For works critical of the “Iroquois Influence” hypothesis, see Erik M. Jensen, 
The Imaginary Connection Between the Great Law of Peace and the United States Constitution: 
A Reply to Professor Schaaf, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 25 (1991); Elisabeth Tooker, The United 
States Constitution and the Iroquois League, 35 ETHNOHISTORY 305 (1988); Gordon S. Wood, 
Federalism from the Bottom Up, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 705–06 (2011) (book review). An entire 
forum in the William and Mary Quarterly was devoted to this question, with two critiques of the 
evidence, followed by a rebuttal by Professors Donald Grinde and Bruce Johansen. See Philip 
A. Levy, Exemplars of Taking Liberties: The Iroquois Influence Thesis and the Problem of 
Evidence, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 588 (1996); Samuel B. Payne, Jr., The Iroquois League, the 
Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 605 (1996); Donald A. 
Grinde, Jr. & Bruce E. Johansen, Sauce for the Goose: Demand and Definitions for “Proof” 
Regarding the Iroquois and Democracy, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 621 (1996). In my view, the critics 
come out the stronger in this exchange: Professors Philip Levy and Samuel Payne convincingly 
demonstrate that Grinde and Johansen present partial, distorted, and misleading readings of the 
historical evidence. 
 10. For works in this vein, see VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, 
TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (1999); EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: 
DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Oren R. Lyons & John C. 
Mohawk eds., 1992); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009); Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 
CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 510 (2007); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of 
Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153 (2008); Miller, supra note 9; Robert G. Natelson, The 
Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007); Nell 
Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 195 (1984); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069 
(2004); Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 62 (1991). 
 11. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993) (describing the 
widespread view of Indian relations as “a tiny backwater of law inhabited by impenetrably 
complex and dull issues”). Professor Philip Frickey also cites purported comments from 
Supreme Court Justices describing Indian law cases as “peewee” and “chickenshit.” Id. (quoting 
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 58, 
359 (1979)).  
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labeled “United States.”12 Indians had shaped Anglo-American 
identity and politics for over two hundred years.13 Concerns over 
“Indian affairs”—a catch-all analog of “foreign affairs” that 
encompassed treatymaking, land title, trade, and war and peace with 
Native nations—drove Anglo-Americans’ earliest efforts toward 
confederation14 and helped instigate the American Revolution.15 
Relations with Indians consumed much of day-to-day federal 
 
 12. The Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution transferred all British territory 
east of the Mississippi River to the United States, yet only the land along the eastern seaboard 
had been purchased from the Indians. In 1787, nearly all territory west of the Appalachians 
(except portions of present-day Kentucky and eastern Tennessee) remained Indian country, 
both de facto and de jure. See REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN 
POLICY, 1783–1812, at 4–15 (1967); see also infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.  
 13. See, e.g., COLIN G. CALLOWAY, NEW WORLDS FOR ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND 
THE REMAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 196 (1997) (“[T]he Indian presence in America’s past 
profoundly shaped the ways in which early American history unfolded. Europeans had to take 
account of Indians in their wars, diplomacy, and daily lives. They lived alongside Indians and 
had to know something about them.”); JILL LEPORE, THE NAME OF WAR: KING PHILIP’S WAR 
AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY (1998) (emphasizing how struggles against the 
Indians in seventeenth-century New England helped create an American identity); RICHTER, 
supra note 1, at 252 (stressing that the United States “was born in a revolution against Indians as 
well as against the crown, that its prosperity was based on the expropriation of Native land, 
[and] that its participatory politics rested on racial exclusion”); PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE 
NEIGHBORS: HOW INDIAN WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA xviii (2008) (describing how 
Indian wars in the mid-Atlantic helped produce “a democratic revolution and the dignifying of 
ordinary people; a commitment to toleration, or at least a deep hostility to bigotry between 
Europeans; and, in time, most of the American republic’s institutional beginnings”). See 
generally CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, THIS VIOLENT EMPIRE: THE BIRTH OF AN 
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 191–287 (2010) (relating how portrayals of Natives were 
“[e]ssential to the production of an American national identity”). 
 14. See The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of New England—1643–
1684, in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 77, 77–81 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) 
(establishing an agreement between the New England colonies “for offence and defence, 
mutual advice and succor” because “the natives have formerly committed sundry insolence and 
outrages upon several Plantations of the English and have of late combined themselves against 
us”); Plan of a Proposd Union of the Several Colonies of Masachusets-bay, New Hampshire, 
Coneticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jerseys, Pensilvania, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina, For their Mutual Defence and Security, and for Extending the 
British Settlements in North America (July 10, 1754), in 5 PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 
387, 387–92 (Leonard W. Labaree & Whitfield J. Bell, Jr. eds., 1962) [hereinafter Albany Plan 
of Union] (proposing a colonial union to “hold or direct all Indian treaties” and “make all 
purchases . . . from Indians for the crown”); see also TIMOTHY J. SHANNON, INDIANS AND 
COLONISTS AT THE CROSSROADS OF EMPIRE: THE ALBANY CONGRESS OF 1754 (2000) 
(describing the creation of the Albany Plan of Union in the context of Indian diplomacy). 
 15. WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 5–40 (1999); RICHTER, supra note 1, at 
216–20. 
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governance under both the Articles and the new Constitution,16 and 
provoked some of the nation’s earliest constitutional crises.17 In the 
Constitution’s historical context, then, the apparent absence of 
Indians is a striking anomaly. It is also, this Article contends, wrong. 
Part of the problem is that Indians were inseparable from other 
critical constitutional issues. As Hamilton’s Convention speech 
highlights, Indian affairs quickly implicated foreign relations: the 
Constitution’s drafters feared Indians would ally with the British and 
Spanish in the contest for continental control. The question of Indians 
also lurked behind the recurrent and fraught issues of western land, 
territory, and statehood. Historians have focused on these aspects of 
the Constitution but made Indians peripheral, touching on them only 
in passing.18 This Article reverses this presumption and emphasizes 
Indian affairs, discussing other aspects when relevant. 
 
 16. See, e.g., BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF 
NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 11, 197–200, 205–11 (2009) 
(“Relations with Indians for much of the nineteenth century demonstrated the integral 
connection between the federal government, national security, territorial expansion, and the 
economy.”); STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 2 (2010) (“[I]n each major era of Indian policy, and in each region 
into which the United States moved, ‘the Indian question’ existed near the center of concerns 
about the nation’s future. Indian affairs were absolutely critical to virtually all calculations of 
interest, of politics, of economy, of social situation, and of national survival and future 
development.”); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 123–32 (2009) (“Nothing preoccupied the Federalist [Washington] 
administration more than having to deal with . . . native peoples.”).  
 17. Numerous constitutional conflicts arose from Indian affairs. One such conflict was the 
Yazoo land fraud. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); C. PETER MAGRATH, 
YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966). 
Another involved questions of state sovereign immunity. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 378 (1798). And Indian removal occasioned one of the most significant constitutional 
confrontations in the antebellum United States. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832); see also LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836, at 108–20 (2010) (“[T]he new federal constitution 
lodged Indian diplomacy and Indian land rights at the center of contests over state’s rights.”). 
See generally JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND 
POLITICS (1996); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
53 DUKE L.J. 875 (2003) (arguing for the influence of Worcester on the drafting of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 18. A number of recent works have emphasized the international context for the 
Constitution. See generally, e.g., ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH: THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE (2012); DAVID C. 
HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2003); David 
M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the 
Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010). 
There have been fewer works on the question of western expansion and the Constitution. The 
foundational work remains PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: 
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To appreciate the influence of Indian affairs on the Constitution, 
we must begin with the Articles. After the Revolution, national 
Indian policy was both vital and disastrous. The impoverished 
Continental Congress desperately needed both peace with Indians 
and western land to retire its debt. It got neither. Instead, by 1787, it 
confronted two looming wars it could not afford against powerful 
Native confederacies. 
Nationalists such as Madison and Hamilton agreed on the 
problem: Congress was too weak to exercise the authority it enjoyed 
on paper. Indian affairs thus propelled the creation of a more 
powerful national state—one that, in Madison’s words, would possess 
the “ability to effect what it is proper [it] should do.”19 The new 
government, its proponents hoped, would have the power to govern 
not merely in principle but “in reality,” as Secretary at War Henry 
Knox wrote about Indian affairs.20 
A strengthened federal state, however, did not mean the same 
thing to all the Constitution’s proponents. As his comments at the 
Convention suggest, Madison, the delegate most interested in Indian 
relations,21 blamed the disasters of national Indian policy on state 
intrusions on national authority, particularly the treatymaking 
power.22 The Madisonian23 constitutional solution for Indian affairs 
 
JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775–1787 (1983). One important 
work that places Indians in the context of foreign diplomacy during the era of the Constitution’s 
creation is LEONARD J. SADOSKY, REVOLUTIONARY NEGOTIATIONS: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND 
DIPLOMATS IN THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA (2009). 
 19. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 18 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 24, 28 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1995).  
 20. Report of the Secretary of War on the Southern Indians (July 18, 1787), in 18 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607–1789: REVOLUTION AND 
CONFEDERATION 449, 450 (Alden T. Vaughan gen. ed., Colin G. Calloway ed., 1994) 
[hereinafter EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS]. Knox’s position was labeled as 
“Secretary at War” under the Articles. See 19 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, 
at 126 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1912) (establishing under the Articles of 
Confederation the position of “Secretary at War”). He was appointed to the new position of 
“Secretary of War” in September 1789. See HARRY M. WARD, THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR, 
1781–1795, at 101–02 (1962); see also Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (establishing the 
Department of War and the office of Secretary of War, a position invested with “such duties as 
shall be enjoined on, or entrusted to him by the President of the United States . . . relative to 
Indian Affairs”). 
 21. See Jacob T. Levy, Indians in Madison’s Constitutional Order, in JAMES MADISON AND 
THE FUTURE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT 121, 121–25 (John Samples ed., 2002). 
 22. This concern over state excesses under the Articles characterized much of Madison’s 
thinking at the time of the Constitution’s drafting. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for 
ABLAVSKY IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2014  10:45 AM 
2014] THE SAVAGE CONSTITUTION 1007 
accordingly recrafted federalism to ensure federal supremacy—partly 
through the Indian Commerce Clause, but more significantly through 
the Treaty, Compact, Supremacy, and Property Clauses. The 
Madisonian approach, briefly summarized, was paternalist: it 
envisioned a strengthened federal government that would protect and 
restrain Indians and states alike. 
The Hamiltonian take was different. Hamilton had little interest 
in Indian affairs, but his concern over external threats dovetailed with 
the views of many on the frontier, who blamed the Articles’ failure on 
national military weakness against Native power. The “savages” 
Hamilton referenced at the Convention were thus both impetus and 
justification for the creation of a federal standing army supported 
through direct taxation. This militarist constitutional solution to 
Indian affairs sought a fiscal-military state that would possess the 
means to dominate the borderlands at Indians’ expense.24 
Little discussed at the Convention, these two constitutional 
solutions to the challenges of Indian affairs appeared more fully in 
the ratification debates, where they suffered divergent fates. While 
Madison’s argument for centralization languished, Hamiltonian 
invocation of the “savage” threat, embraced partly out of expediency, 
became an important part of Federalist rhetoric. And it worked to 
great effect, securing the ratification of an otherwise skeptical 
 
Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 
462–63 (2010); see also CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: 
THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2005); infra notes 202–203 and 
accompanying text. 
 23. I have borrowed the distinction between the Madisonian and other Federalist views on 
the Constitution from Professor Max Edling. See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR 
OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
STATE 3–11 (2003). I apply the labels “Madisonian” and “Hamiltonian” to these two 
perspectives on Indian affairs to reflect their respective roles in propounding these views both at 
the Convention and in The Federalist. But, although the two views diverged, they were not 
mutually exclusive; Madison and Hamilton, as well as many other nationalists, embraced 
elements of both perspectives at various points.  
 24. I also borrow the term “fiscal-military state” from Edling, who adopts it from the 
historical literature on British state formation, in which the term refers to “a state primarily 
designed for war.” EDLING, supra note 23, at 47–49. As Edling argues, the United States did not 
adopt the British model wholesale; instead, the Constitution created a national government that 
was “light, and inconspicuous,” but which “held the full powers of the ‘fiscal-military state’ in 
reserve.” Id. at 47, 227. Historians use the term “borderlands” to describe “the contested 
boundaries between colonial domains,” where sovereignty and authority were ill-defined and 
uneven. Jeremy Adelman & Stephen Aron, From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-
States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History, 104 AM. HIST. REV. 814, 816 
(1999); Pekka Hämäläinen & Samuel Truett, On Borderlands, 98 J. AM. HIST. 338, 351–61 
(2011).  
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Georgia anxious for federal military aid. Had Georgia failed to ratify, 
the Constitution’s eventual success would have been much more 
tenuous. 
But using Indians to justify the power of the new national state 
came with a cost: it elevated conquest of Indians to a constitutional 
principle. Although few Federalists were rabid Indian-haters of the 
sort common on the frontier,25 they had sold the Constitution by 
promising to use federal power against Indians rather than, as 
Madison had anticipated, to restrain states. Expansionist states and 
white settlers held the federal government to its bargain. The history 
of national violence against Indians that followed ratification fulfilled 
the Hamiltonian vision, as the dispossession and settlement of 
western lands became one of the central projects of the new federal 
state. 
The historical narrative presented by this Article underscores the 
importance of Indian affairs in creating the Constitution, particularly 
provisions concerning federalism and the fiscal-military state, and 
highlights how ratification created a document intended to conquer 
Indians. In addition to revising historical understandings of the 
Constitution, this account has theoretical and normative implications, 
but these depend on one’s perspective. From an originalist 
standpoint, it recounts how multiple and even divergent intents 
among the Constitution’s drafters became, through ratification, 
something akin to the document’s “original public meaning.” From 
the perspective of popular constitutionalism, the “people themselves” 
ultimately determined what the Constitution would mean for Indian 
affairs.26 In short, both the Constitution’s drafters and “the people” 
worked to create a document committed in part to the violent 
expropriation of the western borderlands from Indians. This outcome 
was not a failure of the political process. It was, rather, the cost of the 
Constitution’s embrace of democracy and union. 
To support these interpretive insights, this Article is divided into 
four parts. Part I recounts the failure of national Indian policy under 
the Articles, and reviews the nationalists’ explanations for this failure 
in the weaknesses of the federal state. Part II describes how 
provisions of the Constitution offered potential solutions for these 
difficulties. Part III explores ratification debates over Indian affairs, 
 
 25. See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.  
 26. On popular constitutionalism, see generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
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and demonstrates how the Hamiltonian emphasis on national military 
power proved critical in securing ratification, but also solidified the 
document’s subsequent meaning. Finally, Part IV explores some of 
the implications of this history for interpreting the Constitution, 
including considering the document’s commitment to dispossessing 
Natives alongside its entrenchment of chattel slavery. 
I.  THE ARTICLES’ FAILURES 
In 1783, the newly created “citizens of America” were 
optimistic.27 Victory in the Revolution had rendered the nation, in 
George Washington’s words, “the sole Lords and Proprietors of a 
vast tract of continent.”28 Four years later, hope had turned to 
despondence, as the Continental Congress, with an empty treasury 
and a barely extant military, confronted looming wars against 
powerful Indian confederacies on the northern and southern 
borderlands. 
This Part explores the causes and meaning of this failure. Part 
I.A details the struggles over state and national authority over Indian 
affairs in drafting the Articles. Part I.B recounts the creation of 
national Indian policy from 1783 to 1784. Part I.C traces the failure of 
that policy in complex negotiations on the northern and southern 
borderlands, where the national government proved unable to 
constrain states, squatters, or Indians. Part I.D considers the lessons 
nationalists drew from these failures. Though the Madisonians and 
Hamiltonians agreed on the need for a strengthened national state, 
they diverged in their explanations: Madisonians focused on the 
national inability to control states, whereas Hamiltonians fixed on the 
military weaknesses that made the country unable to counter Native 
power. 
A. Drafting the Articles 
Indian affairs mattered in early America because Natives were 
ubiquitous. Although their numbers had declined significantly since 
contact with Europeans, as many as 150,000 Indians lived in the trans-
 
 27. GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE LAST OFFICIAL ADDRESS, OF HIS EXCELLENCY 
GENERAL WASHINGTON, TO THE LEGISLATURES OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (Hartford, Hudson 
& Goodwin 1783). 
 28. Id. 
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Appalachian West in 1783.29 The population of the United States was 
much larger—3.9 million by the time of the 1790 census—but heavily 
concentrated along the coast between New England and Virginia.30 
Further west and south, Anglo-American settlement, although 
rapidly growing, remained sparse and scattered.31 
Trade with Native nations also remained important. Anglo-
American traders competed with the British and Spanish for the 
Native-controlled deerskin and fur trades,32 but trade was even more 
vital for securing cross-cultural alliances: as George Washington 
stated, “[T]he trade of the Indians is a main mean of their political 
management.”33 Natives’ most important economic resource, though, 
was land. Gripped by what one scholar has dubbed “the great land 
rush,” Anglo-Americans speculated wildly in western lands.34 Land 
 
 29. Determining historical Native population numbers is difficult and imprecise. For an 
estimate of 150,000, see James H. Merrell, Declarations of Independence: Indian-White Relations 
in the New Nation, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 197, 201 
(Jack P. Greene ed., 1987); for an estimate of 100,000, see WOOD, supra note 16, at 123; Letter 
from Col. Arthur Campbell to Gov. Randolph (Dec. 5, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA 
STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS FROM JAN. 1, 1785, TO JULY 2, 1789, PRESERVED IN 
THE CAPITOL AT RICHMOND 363, 364 (William P. Palmer ed., Richmond, Rush U. Derr 1884) 
[hereinafter CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS] (projecting a population of 100,000 for 
the Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws combined). For additional background on 
Native demographics, see generally 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT ch. Ag (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., millennial ed. 2006); 
RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: POPULATION 
HISTORY SINCE 1492, at 60–90 (1987); Edward Countryman, Indians, the Colonial Order, and 
the Social Significance of the American Revolution, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 342, 347–48 (1996).  
 30. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 1-26 tbl.Aa1–5. The population density is 
best understood visually. See 1790 Population Map, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.
gov/history/www/reference/maps/1790_population_map.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
 31. The 1790 census recorded roughly 82,500 inhabitants in Georgia and 73,500 inhabitants 
in Kentucky—then part of Virginia and one of the only areas settled by Anglo-Americans west 
of the Appalachians. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 1-244 tbl.Aa3644-3744, 1-217 
tbl.Aa3097-3197. Given the very rapid growth rate of Georgia and Kentucky during this period, 
the states’ populations during the 1780s would have been considerably smaller. Note that Native 
American populations were not recorded in the census, and, although I refer to Anglo-
American settlement, both Georgia and Kentucky contained large numbers of enslaved 
Africans. See id. (recording 29,662 and 12,544 black inhabitants in Georgia and Kentucky, 
respectively). 
 32. KATHRYN E. HOLLAND BRAUND, DEERSKINS AND DUFFELS: THE CREEK INDIAN 
TRADE WITH ANGLO-AMERICA, 1685–1815, at 164–88 (1993); WHITE, supra note 1, at 476–85. 
 33. Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate (Aug. 4, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 188, 189 (Mark A. Mastromarino et al. eds., 
1996). 
 34. JOHN C. WEAVER, THE GREAT LAND RUSH AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
WORLD, 1650–1900, at 96–116 (2003); see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN 
IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 249–51 (1990). 
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companies mushroomed, buying and selling dubious claims to vast 
tracts of Native territory while drawing heavy investment from the 
new nation’s political elite.35 Indians, in short, possessed the most 
valuable commodity in early America.36 
Given the interests at stake, properly governing Indian affairs 
was critical. Yet the United States had inherited a divided legacy from 
the British Empire. On the one hand, individual colonies had long 
made treaties and regulated trade with tribes.37 On the other hand, 
imperial officials, frustrated by colonies’ uncoordinated actions, 
fitfully sought to impose a centralized regime.38 These efforts became 
more serious after 1754, when the Albany Congress proposed a “Plan 
of Union” among the colonies that included a grand council with 
powers over Indian affairs, the military, and western settlement.39 This 
Plan failed, but it signaled further centralizing reforms: the creation of 
two imperial superintendents responsible for managing relations with 
tribes,40 the assertion of Britain’s sole right of preemption of Indian 
lands,41 and, in the Proclamation of 1763, a settlement boundary 
reserving territory west of the Appalachian crest for Indian nations.42 
These reforms angered colonists, who resented imperial interference 
in lucrative land speculations; they simply flouted the Proclamation 
and similar restrictions.43  
 
 35. On the rise of the land companies, see STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST 
THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 104–21 (2005); PATRICK GRIFFIN, 
AMERICAN LEVIATHAN: EMPIRE, NATION, AND REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER 46–71 (2007); 
HOLTON, supra note 15, at 3–38. See generally ALFRED P. JAMES, THE OHIO COMPANY: ITS 
INNER HISTORY (1959). 
 36. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 29, at 357–60.  
 37. See generally 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20 (recording the 
diplomatic and legal relations of individual states with Indians). 
 38. Clinton, supra note 10, at 1066–79. 
 39. Albany Plan of Union, supra note 14, at 387–92. See generally SHANNON, supra note 14 
(providing background on the Albany Congress and the Plan of Union) 
 40. See generally DANIEL K RICHTER, The Plan of 1764: Native Americans and the British 
Empire That Never Was, in TRADE, LAND, POWER: THE STRUGGLE FOR EASTERN NORTH 
AMERICA 177 (2013); John R. Alden, The Albany Congress and the Creation of the Indian 
Superintendencies, 27 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 193 (1940). 
 41. BANNER, supra note 35, at 104–05. 
 42. COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN: 1763 AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
NORTH AMERICA 92–98 (2006); Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude 
to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 329, 354–56 (1989). 
 43. See BANNER, supra note 35, at 98–104 (noting the prevalence of illegal settlement and 
purchase of lands guaranteed to the Indians by the Proclamation); HOLTON, supra note 15, at 30 
(“The Proclamation of 1763 was anathema to every Virginia land speculator . . . .”). 
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After independence, centralized governance and its challenges 
became the responsibility of the Continental Congress. The first 
drafts of a plan for the new government largely recapitulated imperial 
Indian policy: no colony could engage in offensive war against 
Natives without congressional consent; the United States would enter 
into an alliance with the Six Nations; and the Continental Congress 
would retain the right of preemption of all Native land while 
guaranteeing Indian title to unpurchased territory.44 But these 
provisions largely evaporated in subsequent drafts.45 
The most contentious remaining provision was the proposal in 
the Articles’ second draft that Congress be granted “sole and 
exclusive right and power of . . . Regulating the Trade, and managing 
all Affairs with the Indians.”46 Most delegates supported this 
addition.47 James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued that “[n]o lasting 
peace will be [made] with the Indians, unless made by some one 
body,” and insisted that the United States should have the sole power 
to make treaties with the Indians.48 But Virginia’s delegates wanted 
authority over Indians within state borders, and the South Carolina 
delegation “very passionately” opposed the measure, stressing the 
importance of its Indian trade.49 The next draft compromised, 
granting the national government “sole and exclusive” power only 
over affairs with Indians “not members of any of the States.”50 Some 
evidently thought this was inadequate; a year later Congress added 
 
 44. See 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 195–98 
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905). 
 45. See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 679–89 
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906). The exclusive war power remained, but was qualified 
in the event a state faced imminent Indian attack. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, 
art. VI, para. 5 (“No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in 
Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received 
certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and 
the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled 
can be consulted . . . .”). 
 46. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 45, at 681–82.  
 47. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 1077–79 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906). Delegates from Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Georgia, and Maryland 
spoke in favor of the provision, while delegates from Virginia conditionally endorsed it; only 
delegates from South Carolina were strongly opposed. 
 48. Id. at 1078–79 (alteration in original). 
 49. Id.  
 50. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 45, at 681–82.  
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language further protecting states’ rights.51 As finally ratified, Article 
IX of the Articles granted Congress the “sole and exclusive right and 
power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the 
Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the 
legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or 
violated.”52 
This compromise undoubtedly deserved James Madison’s later 
criticism as “obscure and contradictory.”53 But its inconsistencies were 
not a product of infelicitous drafting. Article IX attempted to 
reconcile centralized authority over Indian affairs with the competing 
legacy of state preeminence, an impulse heightened by hostility to 
earlier imperial policy. States with sufficient clout to write qualifying 
language into the Articles would not acquiesce to congressional 
supremacy, no matter how phrased. As delegate Thomas Stone of 
Maryland put it during the debates over Article IX, “What is the 
meaning of this superintendency [over Indian affairs]? Colonies will 
claim the right first. . . . Disputes will arise when Congress shall 
interpose.”54 Subsequent events proved Stone’s prescience. 
B. The Creation of Congressional Indian Policy 
The Revolution bequeathed another legacy to the United States: 
Indian hating. Deeply divided Native nations had sought to maintain 
neutrality during the war, but factions from many tribes sided with 
the British. The result was brutal and chaotic violence. Anglo-
Americans—long accustomed to viewing Natives, in the words of the 
Declaration of Independence, as “merciless Indian Savages, whose 
known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished Destruction, of all 
Ages, Sexes and Conditions”55—pillaged Indian country, ravaging 
Native villages.56 As attitudes toward Indians hardened, frontier 
 
 51. See 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 844–45 
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1907) (adding “provided, that the legislative right of any 
State, within its own limits be not infringed or violated” to the congressional power over Indian 
affairs). 
 52. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4.  
 53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 54. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 47, at 1079. 
 55. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776); see also John R. Wunder, 
“Merciless Indian Savages” and the Declaration of Independence: Native Americans Translate the 
Ecunnaunuxulgee Document, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65, 65–73 (2000) (discussing Indians’ 
likely responses to the Declaration of Independence). 
 56. For background on the fierce struggles between Anglo-American colonists and Native 
nations during the Revolution, and the virulent hatred of Indians this fighting engendered 
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settlers increasingly spoke of “extirpating” Natives.57 “The Country 
taulks of Nothing but killing Indians, & taking posession of thier 
lands,” reported one visitor to western Pennsylvania.58 The full depths 
of frontier fury against Indians were revealed in 1782, when 
Pennsylvania militia indiscriminately slaughtered nearly one hundred 
pacifist Christianized Natives upon suspicion they had aided attacks 
by British-allied Indians.59 
The year after the butchery known as the Gnadenhütten 
massacre, the United States reached a peace agreement with Great 
Britain. The resulting Treaty of Paris of 1783 acknowledged 
American independence and ceded the nation all British territory 
east of the Mississippi River, a tremendous swath far larger than 
existing Anglo-American settlements.60 But Native nations, excluded 
from the treaty and still at war with the United States, owned this 
land.61 Indian affairs and western expansion were thus intimately 
intertwined: as George Washington wrote, “[T]he settlem[en]t of the 
Western Country, and making a Peace with the Indians, are so 
analogous, that there can be no definition of the one, without 
involving considerations of the other.”62 
The peace that the congressional Committee on Indian Affairs 
proposed reflected the anger against Indians born of years of 
violence. According to the Committee’s report, the Indians were the 
“aggressors in the war, without even a pretence of provocation,” and 
had “wantonly desolated our villages and settlements, and destroyed 
 
among white settlers, see CALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 25–31, 292–301; RICHTER, supra note 1, 
at 218–23; SILVER, supra note 13, at 230–92. 
 57. See, e.g., CALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 132–33, 292–301 (quoting a Seneca leader’s 
statement that the Americans “wish for nothing more, than to extirpate us from the Earth, that 
they may possess our Lands”); SILVER, supra note 13, at 263–83 (noting the prevalence of the 
“language of exterminatory anti-Indianism” during and after the Revolution, and citing several 
instances when Anglo-Americans demanded Indians’ “extirpation”); Merrell, supra note 29, at 
199 (reporting one English visitor’s comment that “[t]he white American have the most 
rancorous antipathy to the whole race of Indians and nothing is more common than to hear 
them talk of extirpating them from the face of the earth, men, women, and children”). 
 58. SILVER, supra note 13, at 276. 
 59. Id. at 267–76; Rob Harper, Looking the Other Way: The Gnadenhutten Massacre and 
the Contextual Interpretation of Violence, 64 WM. & MARY Q. 621 (2007).  
 60. Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 2, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 81–82. 
 61. CALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 275–91. 
 62. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in 10 THE WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 303, 311 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., N.Y., G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons 1891). 
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our citizens.”63 Now purportedly conquered,64 Native nations should 
“make atonement for . . . their wanton barbarity” with the only means 
available to them: their land.65 The United States, the Committee 
urged, should hold treaty sessions with the hostile tribes, forgo the 
long-standing diplomatic custom of purchasing Native title, and 
inform the Indians that “Great Britain has . . . relinquished to the 
United States all claim to the country.”66 Then the United States 
should take nearly all of present-day Ohio, none of which had been 
previously purchased.67 
The Committee’s bluster concealed Congress’s fundamental 
weakness. Congress had to claim Indian land by conquest because it 
lacked the funds to purchase it.68 An empty purse also meant the 
United States desired peace as much as the Indians did: the country 
could not afford to keep fighting, which, the Committee 
acknowledged, would be both expensive and ineffective.69 The 
national government needed western land still more desperately. The 
country was saddled with an enormous war debt, and, with few 
sources of revenue available, many congressional delegates viewed 
western lands as “[t]he only adequate fund” for repayment.70 
 
 63. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 683 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1922). 
 64. See Letter from the Pennsylvania Delegates to the Pennsylvania Assembly (Sept. 25, 
1783), in 20 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 710, 710 (Paul H. Smith ed., 
1993) (“It is intended to insist as Part of the Terms of Peace that the Savages should without 
Compensation abandon Part of their Country to the United States who claim it by Conquest & 
as a Retribution for the Expence & Damages incurred by the hostile & cruel Conduct of the 
Savages contrary to the Advice & Injunctions of the United States.”).  
 65. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 683–94. 
 66. Id. at 684; see also SILVER, supra note 13, at 288–89 (describing the Committee on 
Indian Affairs report in the context of revolutionary-era anti-Indian rhetoric). 
 67. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 686. 
 68. See id. at 682 (“[T]he public finances do not admit of any considerable expenditure to 
extinguish the Indian claims upon such [western] lands.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Letter from Arthur Lee to John Adams (May 11, 1784), in 21 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 
TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 607, 607–08 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1994); see Letter from William 
Ellery to Francis Dana (Dec. 3, 1783), in 21 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, 
supra, at 173, 177 (noting that the value of a land cession may be “sufficient to discharge our 
whole public debt”); Letter from David Howell to Jabez Bown (Mar. 23, 1784), in 21 LETTERS 
OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra, at 453, 454 (“The Western Country is 
considered by the present Congress as a capital resource for the payment of our debts—the 
more it is explored the more it rises in our estimation.”).  
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Congress had already begun granting as-yet unceded land to veterans 
of the Continental Army that Congress was too poor to pay.71 
But the United States was not the only claimant of lands Indians 
owned. Many states inherited colonial charters that purportedly 
extended their boundaries to the Pacific.72 These vague grants 
frequently overlapped, leading to internecine jurisdictional conflicts.73 
Some states in turn sold these expansive but nominal claims to 
competing speculators;74 other states used the land to pay their own 
revolutionary veterans.75 Congress ostensibly had the power under the 
Articles to reconcile these interests through a convoluted quasi-
judicial process,76 yet it rarely exercised this role.77 Congress instead 
urged states to cede their claims to the national government, but such 
suasion often went unheeded, as states zealously pursued self-
interest.78 
State competition made the work of the Committee on Indian 
Affairs, in the words of one delegate, a “delicate Business,” since any 
resolution would affect state claims.79 Even the selection of 
congressional commissioners to negotiate the proposed treaties 
erupted into a fierce struggle between Massachusetts, New York, 
Maryland, and Rhode Island, which congressional president Charles 
Thomson likened to “the fable of the hunters quarreling about the 
bear skin, before they had killed the bear.”80 “The whole scene,” he 
wrote, “was to me another strong symptom of the approaching 
 
 71. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 681–94. 
 72. ONUF, supra note 18, at 3–20. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see also Peter Onuf, Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands, 
34 WM. & MARY Q. 353, 370–73 (1977) (describing the struggles over various company claims to 
western lands). 
 75. See, e.g., J. David Lehman, The End of the Iroquois Mystique: The Oneida Land 
Cession Treaties of the 1780s, 47 WM. & MARY Q. 523, 533 (1990) (describing New York’s policy 
of granting Indian territory as bounty lands). 
 76. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 2. 
 77. See ONUF, supra note 18, at 19–20 (noting the cumbersome nature of Article IX and 
stressing that “Congress’s record as an active agent in interstate conflict resolution was not 
distinguished”). 
 78. See Onuf, supra note 74, at 369–71 (describing states’ resistance of congressional calls 
for cession).  
 79. Letter from Samuel Osgood to John Adams (Jan. 14, 1784), in 21 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 70, at 276, 278. 
 80. Letter from Charles Thomson to Hannah Thomson (Oct. 21, 1783), in 21 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 70, at 86, 87. 
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dissolution of the Union.”81 The Committee had no desire to entangle 
itself in these disputes; it ducked the entire question by resolving that 
its actions “shall not be construed to affect the territorial claims of 
any of the states, or their legislative rights within their limits.”82 These 
concessions did not alter congressional policy, but would, the 
Committee hoped, placate the states. 
Western land hunger had also infected swarms of Anglo-
American settlers.83 They cared little for jurisdictional niceties and 
squatted on lands regardless of formal title.84 Their hatred of Indians, 
born of wartime suffering, led them to reject Native land ownership, 
and so they had no compunction occupying territory guaranteed to 
Indian nations under successive treaties.85 
Policymakers disdained these squatters as “Lawless Banditti,”86 
and feared that their influx would create “fresh discontent and 
hostilities” among the Indians,87 resulting in “a great deal of 
bloodshed.”88 The Committee on Indian Affairs urged that 
congressional commissioners “signify to them the displeasure of 
Congress.”89 Citing Article IX, Congress subsequently prohibited all 
settlement on Indian land and required congressional approval for all 
sales outside state territory.90 
In short, as the Committee on Indian Affairs’ report reveals, any 
consideration of Indian affairs implicated a labyrinth of competing 
interests: the Committee had to make peace with Natives, restrain 
illegal settlement, and conciliate state assertions of sovereignty, all 
with limited funds and while seizing the land necessary to repay the 
national debt.91 The Committee’s proposed solutions demonstrated an 
 
 81. Id. at 87–88.  
 82. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 693. 
 83. See GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 3–16, 181–211.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 181–211. See generally SILVER, supra note 13. 
 86. Letter from James Manning to Hezekiah Smith (May 17, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 293, 294 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1995). 
 87. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 682. 
 88. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 62, at 304. 
 89. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 689. 
 90. Id. at 602.  
 91. Cf. Peter S. Onuf, Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of the West in the 1780s, 43 
WM. & MARY Q. 179, 181 (1986) (“The challenge [facing Congress] was to regulate the 
westward thrust of settlement in ways that would strengthen the union, preserve peace with the 
Indians and neighboring imperial powers, and pay the public debt while permitting enterprising 
settlers to pursue their own goals.”). 
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extraordinary faith in the power of its formal authority to restrain 
competing actors. Indians would yield their land because the Treaty 
of Paris granted it to the United States. States’ jurisdictional concerns 
would be mollified by reiterating the qualifying language of Article 
IX. And swarms of illegal squatters would defer to congressional 
proclamations of authority over Indian affairs. 
As a question of law, Congress’s interpretation of its powers 
under the Articles was persuasive.92 But there were few institutions to 
compel compliance. Congress evidently expected that documents 
could control reality. Squatter defiance, Indian independence, and 
state intractability quickly shattered this illusion and revealed the 
inadequacy of the federal government’s paper authority. 
C. The Failure of Congressional Indian Policy 
It did not take long for Congress to discover the limits of its 
power. Expressions of “the displeasure of Congress,” for instance, 
had little effect on Anglo-American settlers illegally squatting on 
Indian land.93 When George Washington visited territory north of the 
Ohio in 1784, he found the “rage” for land speculation unabated. “In 
defiance of the proclamation of Congress,” he lamented, 
“[speculators] roam over the Country on the Indian side of the 
Ohio—mark out Lands—Survey—and even settle them. This gives 
great discontent to the Indians, and will unless measures are taken in 
time to prevent it, inevitably produce a war with the western 
Tribes.”94 Washington proposed that Congress make illegal settlement 
a felony “if there is power for the purpose.”95 Congress instead 
instructed the commander of the makeshift national army, Josiah 
Harmar, to expel the settlers.96 Harmar had little success. He 
 
 92. By contrast, Congress’s aggressive reading of the Treaty of Paris had considerably less 
grounding in the law of the time. Its decision to reject Native title and adopt a theory of 
conquest represented a dramatic break from earlier practice and legal theory, and was soon 
retracted. BANNER, supra note 35, at 112–49; Merrell, supra note 29, at 200–05. 
 93. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text; see also 25 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 689.  
 94. Letter from George Washington to Jacob Read (Nov. 3, 1784), in 2 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES, 118, 119–20 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy 
Twohig eds., 1992). 
 95. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 62, at 307. 
 96. See 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 472 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).  
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discovered the settlers either did not know their actions were illegal,97 
or disagreed: one group in 1785 argued that, under the Articles, 
“Congress is not empowered to forbid” their settlement and sought to 
create their own government.98 Harmar repeatedly removed small 
handfuls of the “immense” number of settlers, but many more 
returned.99 It would be “impossible” to prevent such encroachment 
without more forceful measures, Harmar concluded.100 
Harmar’s struggles mirrored difficulties elsewhere. As the 
Continental Congress quickly learned, neither states nor Natives had 
any more respect for Congress’s claims to authority than the unruly 
squatters. Two sets of borderland negotiations—on the northwestern 
and southern frontiers, respectively—underscore this point. 
1. The North.  Iroquoia and the Ohio Country—present-day 
upstate New York and Ohio, respectively—were the most fought-
over ground in eighteenth-century North America. The French and 
British had battled to control the region for decades, a struggle that 
precipitated the global conflict known as the Seven Years War.101 The 
outcome of these imperial wars hinged on the allegiances of Native 
nations, foremost among them the Six Nations, “the Fiercest and 
most Formidable People in North America,”102 who had long been the 
focus of diplomacy in Indian country.103 
 
 97. See, e.g., Letter from Brigadier-Gen. Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (Aug. 7, 
1787), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 26, 28 (William Henry Smith ed., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke 
& Co. 1882) (describing how the posting of the congressional proclamation ordering removal 
“amazed the inhabitants [of the western territories] exceedingly, particularly those who style 
themselves Americans”). 
 98. Letter from Colonel Harmar to the President of Congress (May 1, 1785), in 2 THE ST. 
CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 3, 5. 
 99. Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (June 1, 1785), in 2 THE ST. 
CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 6, 6; see Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of 
War (July 12, 1786), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 14, 14. 
 100. Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (June 1, 1785), supra note 
99, at 6. 
 101. FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR AND THE FATE OF 
EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754–1766, at xviii, 11–32, 36–38 (2000). 
 102. CADWALLADER COLDEN, THE HISTORY OF THE FIVE INDIAN NATIONS xxi (Cornell 
Univ. Press ed. 1958) (1727). 
 103. See generally FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE: THE 
COVENANT CHAIN CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN TRIBES WITH ENGLISH COLONIES FROM ITS 
BEGINNINGS TO THE LANCASTER TREATY OF 1744 (1984); DANIEL K. RICHTER, THE ORDEAL 
OF THE LONGHOUSE: THE PEOPLES OF THE IROQUOIS LEAGUE IN THE ERA OF EUROPEAN 
COLONIZATION (1992). I use the term Iroquois rather than Haudenosaunee, which many tribe 
members use, to assist nonspecialist readers. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, PEN AND INK 
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The Revolution engulfed the region in war yet again. The Six 
Nations had struggled to maintain neutrality, but ultimately divided—
the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, and Cayugas sided with the 
British, while the Oneidas and Tuscaroras allied with the 
Americans.104 The ensuing violence devastated Iroquois communities 
on both sides.105 
New York, anxious to extend its jurisdiction over Iroquois lands 
also claimed by Massachusetts, saw Iroquois “defeat” as an 
opportunity to obtain Indian title.106 To fend off potential 
congressional interference, New Yorkers argued that the Six Nations 
were members of the state within their jurisdiction, “the Management 
of whom Congress have no concern.”107 The New York legislature 
even considered a resolution that would have prohibited 
congressional commissioners from negotiating with the Iroquois 
without the legislature’s “express permission.”108 These actions led 
Washington to fear the state would expel the Six Nations altogether, 
which he predicted “will end in another Indian War.”109 
Washington’s anxiety stemmed from his recognition that Indians 
“will not suffer their Country . . . to be wrested from them,”110 for they 
were not the prostrate peoples Congress portrayed.111 The Six Nations 
and other tribes did not regard themselves as conquered and refused 
to “submit to be treated as Dependents.”112 They instead insisted 
upon the sanctity of earlier boundary lines, leading Anglo-Americans 
to lament that the tribes, instead of showing “Contrition for their 
perfidious Behaviour, seem ever to consider themselves as the Party 
courted and sollicited for Reconciliation and Favour.”113 Such 
 
WITCHCRAFT: TREATIES AND TREATY MAKING IN AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY xii (2013) 
(discussing this question of terminology). 
 104. See BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 100–01 
(1972). 
 105. See generally CALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 108–57; GRAYMONT, supra note 104, at 129–
56. 
 106. See Lehman, supra note 75, at 533. 
 107. James Duane’s Views on Indian Negotiations (July/Aug. 1784), in 18 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 299, 299. 
 108. Lehman, supra note 75, at 533. 
 109. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 62, at 306. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Merrell, supra note 29, at 203 (“The Indian nations insisted that they were 
sovereign, that American independence did not mean native American dependence, and the 
United States was unable to make them change their minds.”). 
 112. Duane, supra note 107, at 299. 
 113. Id. 
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defiance found support in the British: threatened by the Iroquois with 
war if they abandoned their forts on the Great Lakes, the British 
opted to violate the Treaty of Paris and remain, supplying arms and 
tacit encouragement to Native resisters.114 
Washington recommended negotiation with the Six Nations for 
the cession of only a small part of their land.115 Congress adopted this 
suggestion,116 but New York wanted more, and discouraged any treaty 
that would recognize any Iroquois title within the state. New York 
Governor George Clinton told the congressional commissioners 
appointed to secure the treaty that he would regard any agreement 
with Indians “residing within the Jurisdiction of this State” as an 
infringement of New York’s sovereign rights.117 As outraged 
congressional delegate Jacob Read reported to Washington, Clinton 
then held “a treaty of [his] own Authority with the Six Nations in 
defiance of our Resolves and the Clause of the Confederation 
restricting the Individual states.”118 Read feared that Clinton’s action 
would “be Attended with worse Consequences With respect to the 
Indians than almost any other that state Cou’d take . . . . If this 
Conduct is to be pursued our Commissioners are rendered useless.”119 
Read’s despair was premature. The Iroquois, aware of the 
divisions between Congress and the state, refused to give Clinton any 
land, electing instead to wait for Congress.120 Yet the subsequent 
treaty session at Fort Stanwix between congressional commissioners 
 
 114. See ALAN TAYLOR, THE DIVIDED GROUND: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE 
NORTHERN BORDERLAND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 111–19 (2006) (“Far from 
intimidating the Indians, the British troops and their posts were hostages that enabled the 
Indians to compel concessions. . . . Interpenetrated and interdependent with the Six Nations, the 
British could not afford a rupture with their native allies.”). See generally COLIN G. CALLOWAY, 
CROWN AND CALUMET: BRITISH-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1783–1815 (1987). 
 115. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 62, at 306. 
 116. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 686–87. 
 117. See Letter from Governor Clinton to the U.S. Indian Comm’rs (Aug. 13, 1784), in 18 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 301, 301 (“I . . . expect[] however 
and positively stipulat[e] that no long agreement . . . be entered into with Indians residing within 
the Jurisdiction of this State, with whom only I mean to treat, prejudicial to its rights.”).  
 118. Letter from Jacob Read to George Washington (Aug. 13, 1784), in 21 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES, supra note 70, at 768, 768–69.  
 119. Id. at 769.  
 120. See Extracts from the Proceedings of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix Between New York 
and the Six Nations, in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 305, 307; 
see also HORSMAN, supra note 12, at 17 (“The Six Nations replied shrewdly to [New York’s] 
offer. Joseph Brant, the well-educated, articulate Mohawk chief, attempted to draw the federal 
government into the negotiations.”). 
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and representatives of the Six Nations only exacerbated the struggle 
for jurisdiction. The commissioners assured the Six Nations that they, 
not New York, had the “full authority” to negotiate, because 
“without the authority of Congress no business can be valid that may 
be attempted by particular people or States.”121 But Clinton disagreed. 
He secretly instructed an agent, Peter Schuyler, to observe the treaty 
negotiations and, if anything harmful to New York’s interests was 
discussed, to “use your most undivided influence to Counteract and 
frustrate” them.122 Schuyler plied the Indians with rum to forestall 
negotiations.123 When the commissioners threatened to remove him, 
he presented his credentials as a state officer, revealing to the 
shocked commissioners that “the Governor and People of N[ew] 
York have, from sinister Views, done everything in their power to 
oppose us.”124 The angered commissioners then had federal troops 
seize the disputed liquor, whereupon Schuyler had the county sheriff 
arrest the officers for theft.125 Finally, the commissioners drove off the 
sheriff, Schuyler, and his agents, and continued the treaty 
negotiations.126 
Remarkably, even after this debacle, the United States managed 
to secure a favorable treaty with the Six Nations,127 a reflection of the 
Iroquois’ constrained choices more than congressional strength.128 But 
this did not comfort observers. Congressional delegate Richard 
Henry Lee thought the jurisdictional strife would encourage the 
 
 121. Proceedings of the United States and the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, in 18 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 313, 313. 
 122. Instructions for Major Peter Schuyler (Sept. 10, 1784), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN 
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 312, 312. 
 123. HENRY S. MANLEY, THE TREATY OF FORT STANWIX: 1784, 82–86 (1932). 
 124. TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 159 (alteration in original); see Proceedings of the United 
States and the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, supra note 121, at 315 (finding Schuyler responsible 
for “various direct and indirect means counteracting [the Commissioners’] negotiations” that 
were “highly injurious to the service of the United States”). 
 125. MANLEY, supra note 123, at 82–86. 
 126. Id.; see TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 158–59. A suit against the congressional 
commissioner Arthur Lee for confiscating the disputed liquor nonetheless proceeded, dragging 
on until September 1787. See Letter from Charles Thomson to Robert R. Livingston (Apr. 13, 
1786), in 23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 236, 236 & 
n.2.  
 127. Treaty of Fort Stanwix, U.S.-Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15. 
 128. See SADOSKY, supra note 18, at 137–38.  
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country’s opponents.129 James Monroe, present for the treaty 
negotiations as part of an excursion throughout the Northwest, was 
alarmed by the impression that “the variance which had taken place 
between the Indian Commissioners of the U. States, & those of New 
York . . . . hath made with the Indians & in the Court of G. Britain 
respecting us.”130 Writing to James Madison, who also had been at 
Fort Stanwix for the beginning of the treaty session, Monroe 
questioned whether the Six Nations could “even in the most qualified 
sense” be considered “members of a State” merely because they lived 
within its borders.131 Authority over such Indians, Monroe argued, “is 
committed by the confideration to the U.S. in Congress assembled,” 
but he also concluded that, even if “the right of Congress hath been 
contraven’d,” there was no effective remedy for the offense.132 
Madison agreed with Monroe, strongly criticizing New York’s 
construction of the Articles. If Article IX were “taken in its full 
latitude,” he argued, it “must destroy the authority of Congress 
altogether, since no act of Congs. within the limits of a State can be 
conceived which will not in some way or other encroach upon the 
authority [of the] States.”133 But Madison, too, felt that “whatever 
may be the true boundary between the authority of Congs. & that of 
N. Y.,” the best course of action was inaction.134 Monroe and Madison 
understood that the national government was too weak to enforce its 
legal authority on recalcitrant states.135 
Such federal weakness turned Congress’s qualified success in 
securing the Treaty of Fort Stanwix into failure. Unable to defeat the 
treaty, New York ignored it. The following year, Governor Clinton 
demanded a land cession from the Oneidas, one of the Six Nations, 
even though the treaty guaranteed their title.136 The Oneidas refused, 
on the ground that “[t]he United States have informed Us that the 
soil of our Lands was our own,” and declined to sell “until the 
 
 129. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Washington (Nov. 20, 1784), in 7 LETTERS 
OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 613, 613 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., Peter Smith 
reprt. 1963) (1934). 
 130. Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (Nov. 15, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 140, 140 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 27, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 130, at 156, 156 (alteration in original). 
 134. Id. at 157. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Lehman, supra note 75, at 537–38. 
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Commissioners of the United States express the same Sentiment.”137 
But the tribe’s appeals to the national government were unavailing,138 
and Clinton cajoled, threatened, and bribed the Oneidas into 
submission.139 Clinton later repeated the process by tricking the Six 
Nations into a cession he misrepresented as a lease.140 
Congress’s success at securing Iroquois land through bluster 
proved similarly short-lived. As word spread in Indian country that 
the Treaty of Paris contained nothing about Native title,141 discontent 
over the Treaty of Fort Stanwix grew: the Council of the Six Nations 
refused to ratify it, and several Iroquois representatives repudiated 
it.142  
Events further west proceeded similarly. At Fort McIntosh and 
Fort Finney, Congress dictated treaties of conquest claiming much of 
the Ohio Country to small delegations of the Shawnees, Delawares, 
Wyandots, Chippewas, and Ottawas.143 Although lands north of the 
Ohio River were federal territory after 1784,144 bands of Kentucky 
settlers defied congressional authority and raided the region, 
indiscriminately killing any Natives they encountered in revenge for 
 
 137. Extracts from the Proceedings of the Treaty at Fort Herkimer Between New York and 
the Oneidas and Tuscaroras (June 23, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 332, 334–35.  
 138. The Oneidas twice sent delegations to Congress seeking support and protesting New 
York’s seizure of land. TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 161. The Committee on Indian Affairs 
promised the Oneidas “that congress will preserve inviolate the Treaty of Fort Stanwix” and 
recommended sending an agent for this purpose, but nothing came of this recommendation. 29 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 806 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933). 
As historian Alan Taylor notes, “Hamstrung by the weak Articles of Confederation, Congress 
lacked the funds and the leadership to fulfill its treaty promises to the Oneidas.” TAYLOR, supra 
note 114, at 161. 
 139. TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 162–66; Lehman, supra note 75, at 537–38. 
 140. Lehman, supra note 75, at 543–45.  
 141. See Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (July 16, 1785), in 2 THE 
ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 7, 7–8 & n.4. 
 142. 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 280; see NICHOLS, supra 
note 8, at 31–32; see also Letter from David Howell to William Greene (Aug. 23, 1785), in 22 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 586, 588 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1995) 
(noting that “several of the Sachems of the six nations” had requested “to take back the original 
instruments of the two late Treaties”). 
 143. Treaty of Fort Finney, U.S.-Shawnee Nation, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26; Treaty of Fort 
McIntosh, U.S.-Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa and Ottawa Nations, Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16; see 
CALLOWAY, supra note 103, at 102–03. 
 144. Virginia ceded its territorial claims north of the Ohio River to the federal government 
in 1784. Onuf, supra note 74, at 353. Kentucky remained part of Virginia. See id. at 372–73.  
ABLAVSKY IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2014  10:45 AM 
2014] THE SAVAGE CONSTITUTION 1025 
purported Indian attacks.145 Federal treaties did little to stop the 
raids—Kentucky militia “shot down” a Shawnee chief brandishing a 
copy of the Treaty of Fort Finney and flying the American flag146—
leading the Indians to conclude that, if they made an agreement with 
the federal government, “the Kentuck poeple would brake it 
immediatly.”147 But the treaties did have one concrete effect. As one 
American military commander reported in alarm of the Treaty of 
Fort McIntosh, “This treaty, and the one at Fort Stanwix . . . have had 
the effect to unite the Indians, and induce them to make a common 
cause of what they suppose their present grievances.”148 
Soon, rumors trickled in that the Indians were constructing a 
confederacy of their own and threatening war.149 “On my arrival [in 
October 1786],” Massachusetts delegate Rufus King wrote, “I found 
congress deeply impressed with the Danger arising from a very 
extensive combination of savages.”150 Events soon confirmed these 
fears. Congress received an ultimatum from the “United Indian 
 
 145. See, e.g., EBENEZER DENNY, MILITARY JOURNAL OF MAJOR EBENEZER DENNY, AN 
OFFICER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AND INDIAN WARS 93–94 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & 
Co. 1859) (describing a raid by Kentucky militia that “found none but old men, women and 
children in the [Indian] towns; they made no resistance; the men were literally murdered”). For 
background on the raids and counterraids that turned the Ohio River Valley into a “dark and 
bloody ground” in the 1780s, see STEPHEN ARON, HOW THE WEST WAS LOST: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF KENTUCKY FROM DANIEL BOONE TO HENRY CLAY 29–57 (1996); 
GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 153–211; NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 37–44, 57–68. On the political 
debates in Congress over the violence in Kentucky, see Clinton, supra note 10, at 1124–27. One 
particularly telling incident occurred when Major John Hamtramck, commanding federal forces 
along the Ohio River, proclaimed to an invading Kentucky militia leader that Congress alone 
could “order a war with the Indians; in co[n]sequence of which I ordered him in the name of the 
United States to depart immediatly, and told him I should report him.” Letter from John 
Hamtramck to Josiah Harmar (Aug. 31, 1788), in OUTPOST ON THE WABASH, 1787–1791, at 
114, 114–15 (Gayle Thornbrough ed., 1957) (alteration in original). The Kentuckians, insisting 
on their own independent authority, defied Hamtramck, stole his canoes, and then killed 
friendly Indians serving the U.S. Army and took their horses. Id. at 115–16. “Never was my 
feeling so much wonded before,” the “humiliat[ed]” Hamtramck reported, “But what could I 
do? I had but nine men fit for duty.” Id. Although this contretemps occurred in 1788, it is 
indicative of the broader struggle for authority in the region prior to June 1787. 
 146. Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (Nov. 15, 1786), in 2 THE 
ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 18, 19.  
 147. Letter from John Hamtramck to Josiah Harmar, supra note 145, at 119. 
 148. Letter from Captain John Doughty to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (Oct. 21, 1785), in 2 
THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 9, 9–10. 
 149. See, e.g., id.; see also Letter from James Manning to Nicholas Brown (July 15, 1786), in 
23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 399, 401 (“The Alarms 
of an Indian War are growing more & more serious . . . .”). 
 150. Letter from Rufus King to James Bowdoin (Oct. 20, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 606, 606. 
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Nations,” consisting of the Iroquois, Cherokees, and numerous Ohio 
Country tribes.151 Blaming Congress for the “mischief and confusion” 
in the borderlands, the nations demanded Congress treat with the 
entire Indian confederacy.152 The Natives insisted they would hold “all 
partial treaties as void and of no effect,”153 and, should “fresh ruptures 
ensue . . . [we] shall most assuredly, with our united force, be obliged 
to defend those rights and privileges which have been transmitted to 
us by our ancestors.”154 
This pan-Indian union to defend Native land and sovereignty 
profoundly threatened the United States.155 Not only were their 
numbers “very formidable,”156 but the prospect of war came as the 
public purse was “intirely empty”; Congress was so impoverished it 
had to borrow sixteen dollars to reimburse a delegation of Indians.157 
“With an exhausted Treasury,” one delegate despaired, Indian war 
would be “a calamitous event.”158 Secretary at War Henry Knox put it 
more diplomatically. Reporting to Congress in July 1787, he observed 
“that the finances of the United States . . . render them utterly unable 
to maintain an Indian war with any dignity or prospect of success.”159 
The only option, Knox advised, was to return to the customary 
practice of paying for Indian lands.160 Congress acquiesced: “[I]nstead 
of a language of superiority and command; may it not be politic and 
Just to treat with the Indians more on a footing of equality . . . ?” the 
 
 151. Speech of the United Indian Nations to Congress (Dec. 18, 1786), in 18 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 356, 356–58. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 357. 
 154. Id. at 358. 
 155. See GREGORY EVANS DOWD, A SPIRITED RESISTANCE: THE NORTH AMERICAN 
INDIAN STRUGGLE FOR UNITY, 1745–1815, at 90–94 (1992). 
 156. Letter from Captain John Doughty to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War, supra note 148, at 10. 
 157. Letter from James Manning to Nicholas Brown (June 9, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 345, 345–46. 
 158. Letter from James Manning to Nicholas Brown, supra note 149, at 401. For other 
comments by delegates that Congress was ill-prepared to fight the looming Indian war, see 
Letter from William Grayson to Beverley Randolph (June 25, 1787), in 24 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 341, 341 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1996); Letter from James 
Manning to Jabez Bowen (June 9, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–
1789, supra note 86, at 343, 344; Letter from James Manning to Hezekiah Smith, supra note 86, 
at 294.  
 159. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 388 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 
1936). 
 160. Id. at 388–89. 
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Committee on Indian Affairs inquired as it recommended “fairly 
purchasing” Native land.161 
Congress’s newfound commitment to diplomacy reflected the 
hard lessons of congressional weakness. Unable to restrain New 
York’s land hunger or overawe the Indian confederacy, Congress had 
to placate Natives to avoid a war it could not afford. This shift came 
too late; the arrogance of congressional policy had caused irrevocable 
damage. But in the summer of 1787, the delegates were distracted not 
only by the Convention, but by another Indian war on the southern 
frontier, where federal Indian policy failed even more dramatically. 
2. The South.  With its focus on the Six Nations, Congress’s aims 
for southern Indian affairs were more modest: treaties would draw a 
clear boundary between the United States and the Creeks, 
Cherokees, Chickasaws, and other southern Indian nations, based 
largely on existing claims.162 State purchases would be considered 
valid only if they were “perfectly consistent with the design of the 
Treaties now proposed to be held.”163 
The clear property line Congress envisioned was all but 
unattainable in the postrevolutionary southern borderlands, where 
states were eagerly engrossing Native land. The Creek word for 
Georgians summed up the situation: they called them 
“Ecunnaunuxulgee”—“People greedily grasping after the lands of the 
red people.”164 Georgia quickly sought to conclude treaties with 
handfuls of Creeks and Cherokees to cede the state huge chunks of 
Native territory.165 When suasion or bribes failed to sway these 
nominal Native leaders, the Georgians reportedly resorted to death 
threats to compel agreement.166 Equally avaricious for Indian land, 
North Carolina dispensed with diplomacy altogether; its legislature 
 
 161. Id. at 479–80; see Merrell, supra note 29, at 204. 
 162. See 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 453–64 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., 1928) (describing congressional plans to “establish a boundary line between us and 
[the Indians]” while taking care “neither to yield nor require too much”); see also HORSMAN, 
supra note 12, at 27 (“Congress would be content with peace and the status quo in the 
South . . . .”). 
 163. 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 162, at 459. 
 164. Merrell, supra note 29, at 200 (quotation marks omitted). 
 165. E.g., Treaty of Augusta with the Cherokees (May 31, 1783), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN 
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 368, 368–69; Treaty of Augusta with the Creeks (Nov. 1, 
1783), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 372, 372–73. 
 166. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Governor Estevan Miró (May 1, 1786), in JOHN 
WALTON CAUGHEY, MCGILLIVRAY OF THE CREEKS 106, 106–07 (1938). 
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confiscated most of the Indian lands within state borders by statute.167 
The little land the state reserved for the Cherokees was in turn 
claimed by western North Carolinians, who concluded highly dubious 
Indian treaties of their own on behalf of their would-be secessionist 
state of Franklin.168 
The states’ arrogant demands for Indian lands dramatically 
overreached. Like the Six Nations, the Creeks, Cherokees, and 
Choctaws were not defeated nations.169 And like the northern tribes, 
southern Natives exploited their location—in their case, bordering 
the Spanish-held Gulf Coast—to secure European patronage. 
Alexander McGillivray, the Charleston-educated son of a Scottish 
trader and Creek mother well-versed in the niceties of European 
diplomacy, solicited Spanish protection for the Creek nation he 
claimed to represent.170 McGillivray successfully concluded formal 
treaties with the Spanish that guaranteed Creek territories against 
incursions;171 other Indian nations threatened to do the same.172 
Bolstered by Spanish arms and support, the Native nations of the 
Southeast refused to tolerate Anglo-American infringement of their 
territory and vowed to remove offending squatters themselves.173 
 
 167. Act of Apr. 18, 1783, ch. 2, 1783 N.C. Sess. Laws 322, 322–25. The law set aside a small 
parcel for the Cherokees. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., Treaty of Dumplin Creek (June 10, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 386, 386–87. Franklin, located in present-day eastern Tennessee, 
was created in 1784 when white settlers seceded from North Carolina after it revoked its cession 
of western lands to the federal government. Franklin tried, and failed, to secure entry as a state 
from the Continental Congress, and the short-lived separatist movement petered out by 1788, 
shortly before the region became part of the newly created Southwest Territory under federal 
control. See generally KEVIN T. BARKSDALE, THE LOST STATE OF FRANKLIN: AMERICA’S 
FIRST SECESSION (2009). 
 169. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens (Sept. 5, 1785), in 18 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 387, 388 (rejecting Georgians’ 
assertions of the Creeks’ “supposed distressed situation” and insisting that “we know our own 
limits, . . . and, as a free nation . . . we shall pay no regard to any limits that may prejudice our 
claims, that were drawn by an American, and confirmed by a British negotiator”). 
 170. For background on McGillivray, see generally CAUGHEY, supra note 166, at 3–53; 
CLAUDIO SAUNT, A NEW ORDER OF THINGS: PROPERTY, POWER, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CREEK INDIANS, 1733–1816, at 67–89 (1999).  
 171. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens, supra note 169, at 388. 
 172. See Talk from Chickasaw Chiefs to the President of Congress (July 28, 1783), in 18 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 370, 370 (“The Spaniards are sending 
talks among us and inviting our young men to Trade with them.”). 
 173. See Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens, supra note 169, at 388 
(reporting Creek determination to “remove [infringing] people and effects from off the lands in 
question, in the most peaceable manner possible”). 
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Southern Indian policy accordingly forced the United States to 
navigate between aggressively expansionist states and assertive, 
powerful Native nations. Congressional commissioners attempted to 
conciliate both sides at Hopewell in 1785, where they concluded 
treaties with the Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws.174 The 
treaties assuaged Indian complaints of encroachments on their lands 
by creating a boundary between tribes and Anglo-American 
settlement.175 Infringing squatters would be removed within six 
months, the commissioners promised, or else they would “forfeit the 
protection of the United States” and be left for the Indians to punish 
“as they please.”176 
Yet these concessions enraged the states, particularly because 
the treaties did not recognize their purported purchases. Before the 
treaties were signed, the North Carolinians and Georgians in 
attendance protested federal interference in their land policy.177 
William Blount, a North Carolina delegate to Congress, subsequently 
mailed the commissioners the state’s constitution outlining its 
borders—which, he pointed out, predated the Articles—and informed 
them that the state regarded the treaty with the Cherokees as “a 
violation and infringement upon her legislative rights.”178 The state’s 
governor told Congress that the treaties “are so repugnant to our Bill 
of Rights and Constitution, and so great an infringement on the 
Rights of the Legislature of this State that it becomes my duty to 
require that you do not by any means consent to the Ratification.”179 
Georgia’s assembly went further. Infuriated by this “manifest and 
 
 174. HORSMAN, supra note 12, at 29–30. Too few Creeks attended to secure an agreement. 
Letter from Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin & Lachlan McIntosh, U.S. 
Indian Comm’rs, to Congress (Nov. 17, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 392, 392. For further background on the Treaties of Hopewell, see CALLOWAY, 
supra note 103, at 103–05; NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 46–54. See generally Greg O’Brien, The 
Conqueror Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-Revolutionary 
Southern Frontier, 67 J. S. HIST. 39 (2001). 
 175. Proceedings of the Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, in 18 EARLY AMERICAN 
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 393, 395–99. 
 176. Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.-Chickasaws, art IV, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24, 25; Treaty of 
Hopewell, U.S.-Choctaws, art. IV, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, 22; Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.-
Cherokees, art. V, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, 19.  
 177. Proceedings of the Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, supra note 175, at 401. 
 178. Letter from William Blount to Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin & 
Lachlan McIntosh, U.S. Indian Comm’rs (Nov. 28, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 402, 403. 
 179. Governor Richard Caswell to the Delegates in Congress (Apr. 3, 1786), in 18 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 428, 428. 
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direct attempt to violate the retained sovereignty and legislative right 
of this State,” it legislated “[t]hat all and every act and thing done, or 
intended to be done, within the limits and jurisdiction of this State, by 
the said commissioners . . . shall be . . . null and void.”180 Congress 
accepted the treaties anyway.181 
These internecine squabbles destroyed Congress’s credibility 
among Natives. McGillivray’s informants told him that at the 
negotiations with the Creeks, “the Commissioners & Gov. of Georgia 
quarrelld & thereby rendered themselves Completely ridiculous, in 
the eyes of the Indians.”182 Moreover, because enforcement of the 
treaties depended on state cooperation, states’ hostility would, as the 
commissioners wrote, “render [them] ineffectual.”183 
Their fear was soon realized. The predictable failure to remove 
squatters eroded Indian confidence in Congress. “We have held 
several treaties with the Americans,” Chief Tassel of the Cherokees 
lamented, “when Bounds was always fixt and fair promises always 
made that the white people Should not come over, but we always find 
that after a treaty they Settle much faster than before.”184 Earlier, 
“when we treated with Congress we made no doubt but we should 
have Justice”; now the Cherokees began to credit rumors “that the 
Americans only ment to deceive us” and buy time “till all our lands is 
 
 180. Extract from the Minutes of the Georgia General Assembly (Feb. 11, 1786), in 18 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 427, 428.  
 181. 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 187–95 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934). The Articles made no provision for treaties’ ratification, but a 
congressional motion by North Carolina’s delegates to disavow the Treaty of Hopewell with the 
Cherokees was tabled and evidently never voted on. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 237–38 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).  
 182. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill (Feb. 10, 1786), in 
CAUGHEY, supra note 166, at 102, 103. 
 183. See Letter from Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin & Lachlan 
McIntosh, U.S. Indian Comm’rs, to Congress (Dec. 2, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 408, 409. 
 184. Talks from Cherokees to Colonel Martin (Mar. 24, 1787), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN 
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 444, 444; see also Talk from William Elders to General 
Joseph Martin (Oct. 1788), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 475, 
475 (“We well remember, whenever we are invited into a treaty, as observed by us at that time, 
and bounds are fixed, that the white people settle much faster on our lands than they did 
before.”).  
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Settled.”185 These suspicions of congressional duplicity rapidly became 
“universal through the Indians.”186 
Despairing of Congress, the Natives turned to self-help. Refusing 
to negotiate with Georgia, the Creeks drove Anglo-American settlers 
off their territory.187 Bloodshed ensued. As both sides prepared for 
war, Congress appointed James White as a congressional agent to 
conciliate the parties.188 But the ineffective White “might as well have 
not Come into our Nation,” said Creeks disillusioned by his 
powerlessness.189 Violence resumed, for which Georgia blamed 
Congress: it had “interfere[d] with treaties of the State” and conveyed 
to the Indians “that in a war with the State, they should not have the 
strength of the Union to fear.”190 In fact, the Indians did not believe 
that there was much to fear from the United States, because White’s 
efforts had persuaded them “that the [A]mericans were afraid.”191 
Secretary at War Henry Knox watched these developments with 
alarm. Reporting to Congress in July 1787, Knox blamed the violence 
on states’ “flagrant[] . . . usurpation of the lands” guaranteed by the 
treaties.192 Yet state power precluded “all effectual interference of the 
United States” in the resulting disputes.193 “[I]t is apparent from every 
representation,” Knox lamented, “that unless the United States do in 
reality possess the power ‘to manage all affairs with the independent 
 
 185. Talks from Cherokees to Colonel Martin, supra note 184, at 444, 444. 
 186. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Generals Richard Winn, Andrew Pickens & 
George Mathews, U.S. Indian Comm’rs (Sept. 15, 1788), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 471, 471.  
 187. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to John Habersham (Sept. 18, 1786), in CAUGHEY, 
supra note 166, at 130, 130–31.  
 188. 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 747 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934).  
 189. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill (Apr. 18, 1787), in 
CAUGHEY, supra note 166, at 149, 149. 
 190. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 24 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair 
Clarke eds., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1832).  
 191. Letter from McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill, supra note 189, at 149. White’s 
speech urged the Creeks to reject British and Spanish overtures, 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 22, persuading the Creek chiefs that the possibility they 
might ally with “some power” was the source of the Anglo-Americans’ fear, Letter from 
McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill, supra note 189, at 149. 
 192. Report of the Secretary of War on the Southern Indians, supra note 20, at 450.  
 193. See id. at 449. 
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tribes of indians’ to observe and enforce all treaties made by the 
authority of the union that a general indian war may be expected.”194 
A month later, Congress’s Committee on Southern Indians 
similarly blamed the “confusion, disputes and embarrassments” in 
Indian affairs on Georgia and North Carolina’s interpretation of 
Article IX.195 “The construction contended for by those States,” the 
Committee noted, “leave[s] the federal powers, in this case, a mere 
nullity . . . [yet] [t]he States . . . have actually pursued measures in 
conformity to it. North Carolina has undertaken to assign land to the 
Cherokees, and Georgia has proceeded to treat with the Creeks 
concerning peace[] [and] lands.”196 The Committee, however, 
maintained that before the Revolution the power over Indian 
affairs—to make treaties, purchase Indian lands, and evict illegal 
settlers—had been “possessed by the King, and exercised by him nor 
did they interfere with the legislative right of the colony within its 
limits.”197 Regarding these powers as “indivisible,” the Committee 
members reasoned that the parties to the confederation “must have 
intended to give them entire to the Union.”198 
The report concluded by stressing that Congress would not fight 
unless it would have “the sole direction” over the war and any peace 
terms.199 But the Committee on Southern Indians’ resolutions never 
got a vote. Even though fifteen of the twenty delegates present 
supported the proposals, Georgia was able to use the Articles’ 
convoluted voting procedures to defeat this supermajority and scuttle 
the report.200 
By the summer of 1787, then, Congress confronted failure on the 
southern as well as the northern borderlands. On both frontiers, the 
 
 194. Id. at 450. Secretary Knox appears to have been quoting, albeit inaccurately, Article 
IX, paragraph 4 of the Articles of Confederation.  
 195. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 159, at 457–58.  
 196. Id. at 457. 
 197. Id. at 458. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 462. 
 200. Because Georgia made a preemptive motion, a motion to postpone was required in 
order to take up the Committee on Southern Indians’ report. Id. at 463. This motion needed 
seven state votes to pass. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 6. In practice 
however, because only seven states were present and able to vote, the motion had to pass 
unanimously. The motion failed when the Virginia and North Carolina delegations divided. 33 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 159, at 463. Georgia itself 
could not vote because it lacked the required two delegates. See id.; cf. ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2. 
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states, anxious to seize Indian land, first fought and then ignored 
congressional treaties. Disillusioned tribes turned away from the 
United States, first toward Britain and Spain, and then toward 
violence as the only effective check on Anglo-American expansion. 
As the Convention gathered in Philadelphia, the nation confronted 
two Indian wars of its own making it could ill-afford. “[A] protracted 
Indian war,” Knox feared, “would be destruction to the republic, 
under its present circumstance.”201 
D. Lessons of Failure 
In April 1787, James Madison catalogued the “Vices of the 
Political System of the U[nited] States.”202 It was a lengthy list: states’ 
reckless printing of paper money, Daniel Shays’s uprising of indebted 
farmers in Massachusetts, and violations of the Treaty of Paris with 
Great Britain all pointed to the inadequacy of the current regime.203 
In this context, the failure of national Indian policy and the prospect 
of “war with the savages” represented “an additional evil to our many 
evils.”204 
But there were two reasons the Articles’ shortcomings in Indian 
affairs were particularly glaring. First, like earlier efforts at 
confederation, the Articles reflected the view that external affairs 
were the basic purpose and responsibility of a national government: 
Article III stressed that the purpose of this “firm league of 
friendship” was to protect each other from external attacks,205 and 
Article IX granted Congress “sole and exclusive right and power” 
over war and peace, ambassadors, military officers, and the resolution 
of territorial disputes, as well as Indian affairs.206 And nearly all the 
nation’s external affairs—relations with Britain and Spain, issues of 
war and peace, even national credit—hinged on western expansion. 
 
 201. Letter from Henry Knox, Sec’y of War, to Governor Arthur St. Clair (Dec. 8, 1788), in 
2 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 165, 166 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 
1934). Although Knox wrote in 1788, the situation that led to his dire warning was little altered 
from the previous year. See HORSMAN, supra note 12, at 47–52 (observing that the “breakdown 
of American Indian policy northwest of the Ohio River” continued into 1788–89, and that 
“Indian affairs in the South were also in a state of chaos from 1787 to 1789”). 
 202. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 345, 348 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975).  
 203. Id. at 348–57. 
 204. Letter from Henry Lee to James Madison (Feb. 16, 1786), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 130, at 493, 493. 
 205. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III, para. 1. 
 206. Id. art. IX, para. 1. 
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By 1787, the states had largely acknowledged the federal 
government’s paramount role in the West: all except North Carolina 
and Georgia had ceded the national government their extravagant 
land claims.207 Congress subsequently created a template for orderly, 
regulated western settlement through successive land ordinances.208 
But this success was hollow as long as Indians controlled the lands in 
question.209 Surveyors’ attempts to draw the tidy property lines 
envisioned by Congress consistently met Native resistance.210 In short, 
as George Washington had earlier acknowledged,211 the West could 
not be settled without addressing Indian affairs. 
Second, the cause for the failure of national Indian policy 
differed from many of the nation’s other challenges. Many ills 
stemmed from the Articles’ silences, for the document included 
nothing about state commercial regulations or internal rebellions.212 
But, with justification, Congress believed it possessed expansive 
powers to control relations with Natives. As western Virginian 
Robert Rutherford would later write to Madison, the Continental 
Congress was “really fully impowered” to address “three subjects of 
the first & last importance[:] Mony, Indian affairs and settling new 
 
 207. ONUF, supra note 18, at 149–72. Under its cession, Virginia retained control over lands 
south of the Ohio River known at the time as the “Kentucky District.” Id. at 161. 
 208. See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST 
ORDINANCE 21–66 (1987) (discussing the Land Ordinance of 1785); see also Land Ordinance of 
1785, reprinted in 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 375, 375–
81. 
 209. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary at War to Congress (July 10, 1787), in 2 THE 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 201, at 31, 32 (“[T]he whole western 
territory, is liable to be wrested out of the hands of the Union, by lawless adventurers, or by the 
savages . . . .”) 
 210. See, e.g., Letter from William Grayson to George Washington (May 27, 1786), in 4 THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 81, 82 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy 
Twohig eds., 1995) (“[T]he Geographer & surveyers have directions to proceed without delay to 
carry the Ordinance into execution, which I presume they will execute provided the Indians will 
permit them, of which however I have very great doubts.”); Letter from Colonel Harmar to 
Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (Oct. 10, 1786), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 18, 18 
(describing the retreat of surveyors because of the “very just apprehensions of danger” of 
Indian attack); see also GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 191 (describing the effects of Indian attacks 
on surveyors). 
 211. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
 212. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 202, at 350 (noting that “the confederation is silent” on 
the issue of internal state violence). 
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states.”213 Nonetheless, “in all [these] Very great Concerns,” Congress 
had failed, “wanting in Common prudence & attention.”214 
Indian affairs thus forced nationalists to confront the Continental 
Congress’s shortcomings notwithstanding the grant of authority under 
the Articles. They blamed Congress’s failure on the weakness of the 
national state, particularly, as Madison put it, “[the] want . . . of 
coercion in the Government of the Confederacy.”215 But they had 
different views about who, exactly, needed to be coerced. While many 
blamed the inability of the federal government to enforce treaties and 
restrain states and squatters, others argued the fundamental problem 
was the national government’s military impotence, which allowed 
Natives to challenge it with impunity. 
1. The Madisonian Reading.  Near the top of Madison’s list of the 
Articles’ deficiencies were state encroachments on federal authority, 
the first example of which was “the wars and Treaties of Georgia with 
the Indians.”216 This was a common view among nationalists in 1787. 
Like Secretary at War Henry Knox and the congressional Committee 
on Indian Affairs, they attributed the disastrous course of Indian 
affairs to state and squatter interference with federal policy.217 
Indians, they believed, were generally “well behaved” and could be 
placated through sensible treaties, which many Indians “faithfully 
Observed.”218 But states and squatters did not share this commitment, 
and their repeated violations of national treaties destroyed federal 
credibility. “When treaties are made and promises given without 
seeing them fullfilld,” one prominent western Virginian wrote, “[i]t 
naturally gives the Savages an unfavourable Opinion of us and our 
Government.”219 In the absence of promised federal protection, state 
 
 213. Letter from Robert Rutherford to James Madison (Aug. 22, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 350, 351 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). By “Mony,” 
Rutherford presumably meant the “sole and exclusive right and power” granted Congress in 
Article IX of the Articles to “regulat[e] the alloy and value of coin struck by their own 
authority, or by that of the respective States.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, 
para. 4. 
 214. Letter from Robert Rutherford to James Madison, supra note 213, at 351. 
 215. Madison, supra note 202, at 351.  
 216. Id. at 348. 
 217. See supra notes 192–201 and accompanying text. 
 218. Letter from Adam Stephen to James Madison (Nov. 25, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 271, 271 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). Although this 
letter postdates the Convention by two months, it nicely summarizes the views of the 
Madisonians, which had deeper roots.  
 219. Id. 
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and squatter incursions “force[d]” the Indians to fight.220 The prime 
example, as the nationalists read it, was Georgia: the state’s “bloody 
War” was a “consequence of their own violations of the Treaties held 
by the Commissioners of the United States with the Indians.”221 
State interference in Indian affairs had several causes. One was 
the ambiguous compromise on Indian affairs in Article IX: as the 
nationalists lamented, the clause’s concessions to state sovereignty 
allowed expansive readings that undermined congressional 
jurisdiction and federal treaties.222 But the fundamental problem was 
not the text. Nationalists who had examined the provision had all 
concluded that the reading proposed by New York, North Carolina, 
and Georgia was “absurd” and would render the clause 
meaningless.223 And, as evidenced in congressional votes, nearly all 
the other states agreed.224 The more basic problem, as many 
commentators recognized,225 was that the Articles provided no means 
to resolve jurisdictional disputes of this sort. The only viable national 
institution was Congress, but its cramped rules and protections for 
state sovereignty foiled every attempt to coerce state cooperation on 
Indian affairs. 
Even more important was the question of sanction. Unable to 
enforce federal Indian treaties directly, the national government was 
reduced to appeals to states to ensure a “due observance” of treaty 
provisions, even as interested states denied the treaties’ legitimacy 
 
 220. Id.; see also Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 14, 1786), in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MAIN SERIES 596, 599 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954) (“In my 
Opinion our Indian Affairs have been ill managed. . . . Indians have been murdered by our 
People in cold Blood and no satisfaction given, nor are they pleased with the avidity with which 
we seek to acquire their Lands.” (footnote omitted)).  
 221. Letter from Virginia Delegates to Edmund Randolph (Dec. 11, 1787), in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 218, at 319, 320.  
 222. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 53, at 264 (James Madison) (“[The] 
limitations in the articles of Confederation . . . render the provision [on Indian affairs] obscure 
and contradictory. . . . What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State is not 
yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal 
councils.”); Clinton, supra note 10, at 1139 (“Saddled with an ambiguous compromise in the 
Indian affairs clause of Article 9, the Continental Congress was never really able to assert the 
sole and exclusive power over all Indian affairs.”); supra notes 195–198 and accompanying text.  
 223. See supra notes 131–135, 192–198 and accompanying text.  
 224. Clinton, supra note 10, at 1110, 1122–24; see supra notes 131–135, 192–198 and 
accompanying text.  
 225. See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text; see also Report of the Secretary of 
War on the Southern Indians, supra note 20, at 449–50. 
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altogether.226 Nothing barred states’ pursuit of their own treaties and 
Indian policy. And policing treaty boundaries through occasional 
expeditions of the nation’s miniscule military had proved a temporary 
and ineffectual solution.227 
Drawing on a lengthy tradition, the Madisonians believed 
centralization would resolve conflict over Indian affairs. Only a 
scrupulous adherence to treaty promises and their rigorous 
enforcement against states and squatters, they concluded, could avoid 
the costly wars that had resulted from national weakness under the 
Articles. 
2. The Hamiltonian Reading.  But there was a different 
interpretation of the causes of the failure of national Indian policy 
under the Articles. Diverging from Madison, many nationalists 
blamed the inability of the United States to overawe the Native 
nations that controlled the borderlands. In this view, Indian hostility 
was the product of British and Spanish intrigue, not encroachment on 
Native lands. “I have not the smallest doubt,” wrote George 
Washington of the British, “but that every secret engine in their 
power is continually at work to inflame the Indian mind, with a view 
to keep it at variance with these States for the purpose of retarding 
our settlements to the Westward.”228 
The conclusion was clear: “[T]he Indians can only be restrained 
by fear.”229 Treaties could not placate them, “for their Interest, and of 
consequence their friendship, is on the other side.”230 Nor would mere 
assertions of conquest suffice, for, as one congressional delegate 
 
 226. Letter from Charles Thomson, Sec’y of Congress, to the States (Apr. 22, 1786), in 23 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 250, 250.  
 227. Cf. Letter from Barthelemi Tardiveau to Josiah Harmar (Aug. 6, 1787), in OUTPOST 
ON THE WABASH, supra note 145, at 26, 30–32 (“[N]o treaty of peace, likely to be lasting, can be 
made with the Indians except you are invested with powers energetick enough to keep the 
whites under subjection & call them to a severe account if, by any misconduct of theirs, 
differences shou’d arise with the savages; and I think that you ought to lay this matter before 
Congress.”).  
 228. Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (May 10, 1786), in 4 THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES, supra note 210, at 41, 43.  
 229. Letter from Caleb Wallace to James Madison (Nov. 12, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 218, at 249, 250; see also Letter from Arthur Lee to Thomas 
Mifflin (Nov. 19, 1784), available at http://wardepartmentpapers.org/docimage.php?id=680&
docColID=698&page=2 (reporting from the Fort Stanwix negotiations that “they [the Indians] 
are Animals that must be subdued [and] kept in awe or they will be mischievous, [and] fear 
alone will effect this submission”). 
 230. Letter from Caleb Wallace to James Madison, supra note 229, at 250.  
ABLAVSKY IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2014  10:45 AM 
1038 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:999 
observed, “[T]he Indians will hardly be prevailed on, by seeing only 
paper & parchments, to believe that the U. States are in fact the 
Sovereigns of that Country.”231 And current military arrangements 
were inadequate to this end. “[T]he few continental troops” under the 
Articles, nationalists feared, had merely been “an object of contempt 
and not of terror to the inimicable Tribes, with which we are 
surrounded.”232 Overwhelming force alone seemed the solution to the 
problems of Indian affairs. 
Privately, Alexander Hamilton did not share the views of this 
inchoate coalition of expansionist state officials, backcountry settlers, 
and local nabobs of frontier counties.233 Yet at the Convention and in 
The Federalist, he became the primary proponent for their diagnosis 
of the state of Indian affairs. Like the Madisonians’ perspective, the 
position advocated by Hamilton insisted on the need for a stronger 
federal government. But in this vision, the strengthened national state 
would not restrain states and squatters. Rather, the key constitutional 
solution for Indian affairs was an expanded national military that 
would strike fear into tribes—the “natural enemies” of the United 
States, as Hamilton would later describe them.234 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
In Indian affairs, the Constitution was a wartime document. 
Meeting as Congress and Secretary at War Henry Knox were drafting 
their foreboding reports,235 the Convention’s delegates speculated 
about the prospect of an all-out Indian war in anxious letters.236 “The 
 
 231. Letter from David Howell to William Greene, supra note 142, at 588.  
 232. Letter from Caleb Wallace to James Madison, supra note 229, at 250. 
 233. In the rare instances Hamilton discussed Indians in his correspondence, he largely 
embraced views similar to Madison’s. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George 
Clinton (Oct. 3, 1783), in 3 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 464, 468 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 
1962) (“[The] friendship [of the Indian nations] alone can keep our frontiers in peace. . . . The 
attempt at the total expulsion of so desultory a people is as chimerical as it would be 
pernicious.”). 
 234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 53, at 157, 161 (Alexander Hamilton); see infra 
notes 374, 395 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text; see also HORSMAN, supra note 12, at 
39 (“Congress was deluged with bad news regarding Indian affairs in July and August 
1787 . . . .”). 
 236. See, e.g., Letter from William Blount to Richard Caswell (July 19, 1787), in 1 THE JOHN 
GRAY BLOUNT PAPERS 321, 323 (Alice Barnwell Keith ed., 1952); Letter from James Madison 
to Edmund Pendleton (Apr. 22, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 202, at 
394, 396; Letter from Edmund Randolph to Virginia Delegates (Apr. 4, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 202, at 366, 366–67; cf. Letter from John Jay to Thomas 
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newspapers Every day were almost filled with . . . the Danger we were 
in from the Indians on our Borders,” the Anti-Federalist Abraham 
Yates, Jr. later cynically recorded of the Convention.237 “Matters were 
brought about by that Confusion . . . that now Everybody could see 
that it was become Necessary (no Matter how) that something should 
be done, that it was evident Congress had not sufficient 
powers . . . .”238 In some respects, war had already begun: Indians 
reportedly killed or captured as many as three thousand Anglo-
Americans between 1783 and 1790—two-thirds as many as had died 
fighting in the Revolution.239 
This Part examines the solutions the Constitution offered for this 
crisis. Parts II.A and II.B explore how the Madisonian and 
Hamiltonian assessments of the Articles’ failure in Indian affairs 
respectively translated into constitutional text. 
A. The Madisonian Convention 
Federal power over Indian affairs was not discussed until late in 
the Convention.240 In August 1787, James Madison first proposed 
 
Jefferson (July 24, 1787), in 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MAIN SERIES 618, 619 
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) (“The Convention is sitting, but their Proceedings are secret. Our 
Indian Affairs in the West still give us Uneasiness, and so I fear they will continue to do for 
Reasons which you will not be at a Loss to conjecture.”). A Cherokee chief actually visited 
Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph in Philadelphia as he was sitting as a delegate in the 
Convention. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Beverley Randolph, Lieutenant Governor (July 
12, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 315, 315. 
 237. Staughton Lynd, Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States 
Constitution, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 223, 241 (1963) (footnote omitted). Full-text database 
searches support Yates’s assertion: early American newspapers in the Readex American 
Historical Newspapers database made 345 references to “savages” and 1,978 references to 
“Indians” during 1787. See America’s Historical Newspapers, READEX, http://www.readex.com/
content/americas-historical-newspapers (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). Many of these references 
stemmed from dispatches from Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and other western locations, 
reporting on Indian attacks.  
 238. Lynd, supra note 237, at 241. 
 239. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 343–44 (1834). Four thousand thirty-five Anglo-American soldiers 
died in the Revolution. 5 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 5-350 tbl.Ed1-5. 
 240. The first mention of Indians came when Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson proposed 
on June 11, 1787, that representation in the lower house be based on the number of white and 
other free inhabitants, as well as “three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the 
foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes in each State.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 193. Wilson adopted this language directly 
from a failed proposal to apportion revenue owed by each state under the Articles, which likely 
explains the reference to taxation. See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–
1789, at 214–15 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (“[A]ll charges of war and all other expences that 
have been or shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the 
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what became the Indian Commerce Clause.241 To abrogate the 
qualifiers of Article IX, he urged that Congress have the power to 
“regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits 
of the U[nited] States.”242 This proposition went back to the 
Committee of Detail,243 which instead suggested adding “and with 
Indians, within the Limits of any State, not subject to the laws 
thereof”244 to the clause it had already drafted giving Congress the 
authority “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among 
the several States.”245 This recommendation ended up with another 
 
United States in Congress assembled, . . . shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which 
shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the whole number of free inhabitants, 
and three-fifths of the number of all other inhabitants of every sex and condition, except Indians 
not paying taxes in each State . . . .”). “[T]hree fifths of all other persons” referred to slaves and 
provoked heated arguments lasting over two months. For the most comprehensive recent 
treatments of this debate, see GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: 
SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 103–42 
(2010); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO 
RATIFICATION 77–90 (2009); Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little 
Gained, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 427–30 (2001). By contrast, the exclusion of “Indians not 
taxed” from representation was not discussed at all, appearing in each successive draft until 
becoming part of Article I, Section 2. The Committee of Style subsequently modified the 
language from Wilson’s proposal to read “excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
persons.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 590; see 
also Savage, supra note 10, at 64–72 (providing a detailed drafting history of this provision). 
 241. Neither the Virginia nor New Jersey plans for the new federal government addressed 
relations with Indians; only the less prominent Pinckney plan granted the legislature the 
“exclusive power . . . of regulating Indian Affairs.” 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 607. In mid-July, the Committee of Detail, tasked with 
creating a constitutional draft from the Convention’s resolutions, enumerated congressional 
powers. In the Committee’s first draft, “Indian Affairs” was scrawled in the margin in the hand 
of John Rutledge, South Carolina delegate and chair of the Committee. See 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 143; Committee of Detail Documents, 135 
PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 239, 273 (2011). But the draft the Committee presented to the 
Convention at the beginning of August omitted this addition. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 181–82 (reporting the enumerated powers 
without Indian affairs). 
 242. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 321, 324. 
Madison included this proposal in a lengthy list of congressional powers he wished included in 
the Constitution. Id. at 324–25. By explicitly providing federal power within states, Madison’s 
language eliminated the Articles’ limitation of federal authority to Indians “not members of any 
of the States,” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5, a qualification which 
had led to aggressive claims of state authority over Native nations within states’ nominal 
borders, see supra Part I.C. 
 243. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 325. 
 244. Id. at 367. 
 245. Id. at 181. 
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committee, the Committee on Postponed Parts,246 which simply added 
“and with the Indian tribes” at the end of the Commerce Clause.247 
The Convention adopted the proposal248 and the Committee of Style 
included it in its September 12 draft.249 It remained unaltered when 
the Convention adjourned on September 17.250 
The Indian Commerce Clause as adopted was an ambiguous 
success for Madison. It removed the confusing limitations of Article 
IX and avoided the Committee of Detail’s effort to reintroduce 
complex jurisdictional divisions. But, unlike Madison’s original 
proposal, it did not explicitly endorse federal supremacy over Indian 
relations. And neither Madison nor any other delegate seemed to 
consider the implications of the shift from “Indian affairs” to 
“Commerce,” a change that later interpreters would read as limiting 
federal authority.251  
Fixating on the phrasing of the Indian Commerce Clause, 
however, would miss the lesson of the Articles that formal legal 
authority, however phrased, would not constrain states. Other 
provisions of the Constitution that reflected this experience were 
considerably more important for Indian affairs. 
This was particularly true of treaties, where the struggles under 
the Articles lurked in the background. Occasionally, these disputes 
erupted, as when, late in the Convention on September 8, the 
Committee of Eleven proposed exempting peace treaties from the 
requirement of two-thirds approval from the Senate. The Committee 
explained that it feared “that the exposed States, as S. Carolina or 
Georgia, would urge an improper war for the Western Territory.”252 
Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina united with several 
northern states to remove the provision.253 These three states then 
voted as a block for several provisions intended to make it harder to 
 
 246. See BEEMAN, supra note 8, at 297–305 (describing the membership and work of the 
Committee on Postponed Parts). 
 247. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 493, 497, 
503. 
 248. Id. at 495.  
 249. Id. at 595. 
 250. Id. at 655, 665–66. 
 251. See e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565–71 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937, 939 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834) (No. 14,495); 
Natelson, supra note 10, at 215; Prakash, supra note 10, at 1088–89. 
 252. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 548. 
 253. Id. at 546–50. 
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ratify treaties.254 But none of the heightened requirements passed; the 
three southern states were often their lone proponents.255 
These votes were typical: the Madisonians were remarkably 
successful in strengthening the enforcement of federal treaties. 
Perhaps the most important addition was the inclusion of federal 
Indian treaties as the “supreme Law of the Land” in the Supremacy 
Clause.256 At Madison’s urging, the Clause explicitly enumerated 
treaties “made . . . under the Authority of the United States” as well 
as future agreements257 to “obviate all doubt concerning the force of 
treaties prëexisting”—including the Treaties of Fort Stanwix and 
Hopewell.258 Moreover, under the Clause’s provisions, states could not 
attempt to invalidate federal treaties,259 as New York, North Carolina, 
and Georgia had done by enacting contrary laws or claiming that the 
treaties violated state constitutions.260 Article VI further required that 
state executive, judicial, and legislative officers swear fidelity to this 
new constitutional order.261 
State power over Indian affairs was also limited by a slight 
change in terminology. Article VI of the Articles had prohibited the 
states from “enter[ing] into any conference, agreement, alliance or 
treaty with any King, Prince or State” without congressional 
consent.262 But the Constitution omitted these restrictions, providing 
simply, “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation . . . .”263 By eliminating the qualifiers in the Articles 
 
 254. Among these restrictions were requiring support from two-thirds of all Senators, not 
simply those present; requiring at least two-thirds of the Senate to be present; and mandating 
that no treaty be made “before all the members of the Senate are summoned & shall have time 
to attend.” Id. at 544, 546. New York was absent, so it is impossible to determine whether the 
state would have also supported these proposals. See id. at 546. 
 255. Id. 
 256. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 257. Id. 
 258. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 417; see also 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (“The constitution, by declaring treaties 
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and 
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations . . . .”). 
 259. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (making federal law supreme “any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”). 
 260. See supra notes 107–108, 178–180 and accompanying text.  
 261. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  
 262. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1. 
 263. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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that seemed to exclude Indian treaties from this restriction,264 the 
plain text of this provision prohibited the sort of state treatymaking 
that had been so problematic under the Articles.265 
Other provisions expanded the federal government’s 
institutional power to enforce treaties. Article I, Section 8 originally 
gave Congress the power to “call forth” state militias “to execute the 
Laws of the Union, [and] enforce treaties”;266 “enforce treaties” was 
subsequently removed as “superfluous since treaties were to be 
‘laws,’” but the intended meaning did not change.267 Still more 
importantly, the new federal judiciary provided a forum both to 
resolve jurisdictional disputes between the state and federal 
governments268 and to ensure judicial enforcement of federal treaties: 
Article III empowered federal courts to hear cases “arising 
under . . . [the] Treaties made, or which shall be made” by the United 
 
 264. It is unlikely that the words “King, Prince or State” were understood to encompass 
Indian tribes. Although the precise diplomatic status of Native nations remained ambiguous, 
Anglo-Americans had abandoned the practice of referring to Native leaders as princes or kings, 
and few would have considered Native polities “states.” Cf. GREGORY EVANS DOWD, WAR 
UNDER HEAVEN: PONTIAC, THE INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE 174–212 (2002) 
(arguing that colonists and British officials regarded Indians as “domestic, dependent nations” 
in the 1760s (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831))). Moreover, the 
drafting history suggests a European focus, as the phrasing originally referred to “the King or 
Kingdom of Great Britain, or any foreign Prince or State.” 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 45, at 675.  
 265. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring) 
(“Under the constitution, no state can enter into any treaty; and it is believed that, since its 
adoption, no state, under its own authority, has held a treaty with the Indians.”); Duncan B. 
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 769–72 (2009) (attributing the 
development of the Compact Clause to the difficulties occasioned by state treatymaking with 
Indian nations). An additional wrinkle is that the Articles gave Congress the sole and exclusive 
power of “entering into treaties and alliances,” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, 
para. 1, which would seem to overlap with the provision in Article VI. But as Professor Duncan 
Hollis notes, the creation of a separate Indian affairs power that reserved significant rights to 
states seemed to supplant this restriction with respect to Indian treaties. Hollis, supra, at 771 
n.144. Unlike the equivalent constitutional provision, this clause was evidently never cited to bar 
state involvement with Indian affairs; on the contrary, even Madison conceded that states had 
the right to treat with Indians for land under the Articles. See Letter from James Madison to 
James Monroe, supra note 133, at 156–57.  
 266. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 182. 
 267. Id. at 389–90. 
 268. This is the central argument in ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010). As Professor LaCroix states: “[T]he combined efforts of the 
delegates at Philadelphia produced a judicial mode of organizing federalism that was altogether 
different from previous approaches to the problem of multiple authorities. . . . This judicially 
driven federalism was a new species of government, embracing multiplicity and giving it an 
institutional home in the judicial branches . . . .” Id. at 173–74. 
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States.269 It also replaced the Articles’ convoluted quasi-judicial 
process for resolving western land claims by providing original 
Supreme Court jurisdiction over state border controversies and 
competing state land grants.270 
Outside of the provisions concerning treaties, the most important 
addition was the Property Clause. At the same time he proposed 
federal authority over Indian affairs, Madison urged that Congress 
have the power to “dispose” the western lands of the United States.271 
This ultimately became a provision granting Congress the power to 
“make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory . . . belonging to the United States.”272 The Property Clause 
ensured that Congress would have exclusive jurisdiction over most of 
the West until it admitted the territories as new states.273 It also 
enabled Congress finally to criminalize illegal settlement on Indian 
lands274 and, under Article III, to prosecute violators in new federal 
courts far from sympathetic local juries.275 
The delegates well understood the implications of this grant: one 
of the Property Clause’s key purposes was to provide explicit 
authority for the legally dubious Northwest Ordinance,276 which the 
Continental Congress had enacted the previous month to govern all 
national territory north of the Ohio River.277 A “compact” that would 
“forever remain unalterable,” the quasi-constitutional Ordinance 
coincided with the Convention and established fundamental 
 
 269. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 270. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, 
para. 2. 
 271. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 321. 
 272. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 273. I am indebted to Peter Onuf for drawing my attention to this point. 
 274. Washington had earlier questioned whether Congress possessed this power under the 
Articles. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 275. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Violators could be tried “at such Place or Places as the 
Congress may by Law have directed.” Id. 
 276. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 53, at 239 (James Madison) (describing the 
Northwest Ordinance as being enacted “without the least color of constitutional authority”). 
The First Congress subsequently reenacted the Ordinance. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50; 
see also Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 96 (1850) (noting that the provisions of the 
Northwest Ordinance owed “their legal validity and force, after the Constitution was adopted 
and while the territorial government continued, to the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, which 
adopted and continued the Ordinance of 1787”). 
 277. See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 181, at 334. 
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structures and principles of territorial governance.278 Many of the 
rights the Ordinance guaranteed prefigured protections written into 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.279 
The Northwest Ordinance strongly reflected the Madisonian 
vision for the West, securing “peace and good order” through the rule 
of law.280 Article III dictated the “fundamental principles” of the 
territory’s Indian policy, providing: 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, 
their lands and property shall never be taken from them without 
their consent; and, in their property, rights and liberty, they shall 
never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars 
authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity 
shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done 
to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.281 
This provision of the Northwest Ordinance epitomized the 
paternalist solution for Indian affairs. But its emphasis on federal 
control and restraint of western land hunger were also implicit in the 
Constitution. The Indian Commerce Clause removed the ambiguous 
qualifiers that existed in the Articles. Declaring and enforcing federal 
treaties as the supreme law of the land remade federalism. And the 
Property Clause ensured that Congress, not the states, would govern 
westward expansion through statutes such as the Northwest 
Ordinance. For those who claimed the national government’s failure 
to restrain states and squatters had produced the calamities of federal 
Indian policy, the Constitution provided much cause for optimism. 
 
 278. Id. at 339–40; see also ONUF, supra note 208, at xiii–xxi (“[T]he Ordinance was treated 
as a constitutional document.”); cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 258–61 (2012) (describing the 
Ordinance as part of the “symbolic constitution”).  
 279. See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 181, at 340–43 
(providing for, among other protections, the writ of habeas corpus, freedom of worship, jury 
trial, and the prohibition of “cruel or unusual punishments”). See generally Matthew J. 
Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Northwest 
Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 1820 (2010) 
(discussing the Ordinance’s effect on subsequent constitutional law, particularly the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  
 280. See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 181, at 340–43.  
 281. Id. at 340–41. 
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B. The Hamiltonian Convention 
Yet if Madison’s goal was to create a federal government that 
could pursue national interests free from state parochialism, he 
achieved imperfect success. Despite frequent talk of abolishing states 
altogether during the Convention,282 the thirteen states retained 
independence and sovereignty under the Constitution. And through 
the creation of the Senate, the supermajority requirement for treaties, 
and the Electoral College, the states could exert considerable 
influence over federal policy even when the Constitution explicitly 
limited state authority. 
This was certainly true in Indian affairs, where, despite the 
Madisonians’ reforms, states retained significant control. Although 
the Constitution sharply restricted states’ treaty powers, it did little to 
constrain states’ authority over lands within their borders. And those 
borders remained capacious. Toward the end of the Convention, 
delegates from states without claims to western territory demanded 
that the Constitution guarantee national ownership of western lands, 
requiring that North Carolina and Georgia cede their claims.283 North 
Carolina’s delegation objected that “attempts at compulsion was not 
the policy of the U.S.,” and Abraham Baldwin of Georgia argued in 
favor of adding explicit language to protect state claims.284 In the end, 
the delegates agreed to a proviso to the Property Clause specifying, 
“[N]othing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice 
any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”285 The 
Constitution also barred the dismemberment of these gargantuan 
states by prohibiting the formation of a new state within the 
jurisdiction of an existing state without legislative consent.286 In short, 
the territory of Georgia and North Carolina, still extending to the 
Mississippi River, was now constitutionally guaranteed, and the 
federal government’s Property Clause power could not reach south of 
the Ohio River until cession occurred. The most important Native 
 
 282. E.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 24, 
136–37, 152–53, 202, 323, 337, 340, 355–57.  
 283. 2 id. at 462.  
 284. Id. at 462–65.  
 285. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 286. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia 
Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 332–95 (2002) (discussing the text and history of 
Article IV, Section 3). 
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nations remained within states’ external borders and arguably under 
state jurisdiction. 
The expansionist states won another significant concession in the 
Guarantee Clause, which promised that the “United States . . . shall 
protect each [state] against Invasion.”287 More definitive than its 
predecessor in the Articles,288 the Guarantee Clause mandated, in the 
later words of treatise writer St. George Tucker, that “every state 
which may be invaded must be protected by the united force of the 
confederacy.”289 The Clause had initially specified that the invasion 
must be “foreign,” but the Convention subsequently removed this 
qualifier.290 This constitutional commitment abrogated the 
Continental Congress’s earlier refusal to intervene in Georgia’s 
military struggles.291 The language of the provision instead required 
federal military intercession if Indians attacked, even when the state 
had instigated the conflict. 
But the greatest success for land-hungry states and speculators 
was the pervasive assumption throughout the Convention that the 
country would expand inexorably westward. The delegates regarded 
this prospect with attitudes ranging from anticipation to alarm. The 
southern states consistently favored admitting new western states on 
principles of equality.292 By contrast, some of the northern states 
 
 287. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 288. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III (“The said States . . . bind[] themselves 
to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on 
account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.”). 
 289. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA app. note D, 140, 367 (St. George Tucker ed., Phila., William Young Birch & 
Abraham Small 1803).  
 290. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 459, 466. 
Although this language was omitted because it was “superfluous,” id. at 466, its removal also 
eliminated any doubt whether the clause required intervention in Indian wars, as it was an open 
question whether an attack by Indians would have been a “foreign” invasion, cf. Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19–20 (1831) (holding that the Cherokee Nation was not a 
“foreign” nation for the purposes of Article III’s case or controversy requirement). 
 291. See 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 159, at 
455–62; see also supra note 200 and accompanying text.  
 292. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 584 
(reporting Madison’s statement that “[w]ith regard to the Western States, he was clear & firm in 
opinion that no unfavorable distinctions were admissible either in point of justice or policy”); cf. 
id. at 372 (quoting North Carolina delegate Hugh Williamson arguing that the “new States to 
the Westward” should not be required “to pay the expences of men who would be employed in 
thwarting their measures & interests”). 
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viewed the “rage for emigration . . . to the Western Country” with 
trepidation.293 Western expansion, they believed, would be “suicide on 
the old States,”294 and they proposed various methods to restrain the 
West’s political and economic power in the Union.295 None passed. 
But even the Convention’s most outspoken proponent of limiting 
western power, Pennsylvania delegate Gouverneur Morris,296 did not 
intend to repeat the Proclamation of 1763 and attempt to halt western 
expansion altogether.297 At the Convention, Morris acknowledged 
that such a move would be “impossible.”298 He subsequently 
reminisced: “I knew as well then, as I do now, that all North America 
must at length be annexed to us.”299 
In part, the Constitution’s commitment to expansion stemmed 
from its republican nature: the inclusion of democratic elements as 
well as the process of ratification required negotiating with the views 
of the “people out of doors”300 who were infected with “lust of 
dominion.”301 “It would, therefore, have been perfectly Utopian,” 
Morris later explained, “to oppose a paper restriction [on settlement] 
to the violence of popular sentiment in a popular government.”302 But 
 
 293. 2 id. at 3. 
 294. Id. at 442. 
 295. See, e.g., 1 id. at 570–71 (proposing that the legislature ought to control the power of 
apportionment to avoid shifting power to the future western states); id. at 582–84 (proposing 
that, to diminish western influence, representation be based on property as well as population); 
2 id. at 3 (proposing to limit the number of new states to the number of existing “Atlantic 
States”). 
 296. See, e.g., id. at 583 (“[T]he Western Country . . . would not be able to furnish men 
equally enlightened, to share in the administration of our common interests. . . . If the Western 
people get the power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests. The Back members 
are always most averse to the best measures.”). 
 297. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Nov. 25, 1803), in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, app. A at 401 (“I am very 
certain that I had it not in contemplation to insert a decree de coercendo imperio [restraining 
settlement] in the Constitution of America.”). 
 298. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 454. 
 299. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston, supra note 297, at 401. Morris 
had contemplated excluding Louisiana and subsequently gained territories from statehood, 
governing them as imperial provinces instead. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. 
Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra 
note 2, app. A at 404 [hereinafter Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 
4, 1803)].  
 300. Alfred F. Young, The Framers of the Constitution and the “Genius” of the People, 42 
RADICAL HIST. REV. 7, 7–47 (1988); see WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 200–12 (2007).  
 301. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston, supra note 297, at 401. 
 302. Id. 
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the Constitution did not merely acquiesce in expansion, for, unlike 
Morris, most delegates celebrated westward growth.303 Many agreed 
with South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney’s comment at the 
Convention that there would be “more equality of rank and fortune 
in America than in any other country under the sun . . . as long as the 
unappropriated western lands remain unsettled.”304 Others had more 
personal reasons to support expansion. North Carolina delegate 
Hugh Williamson later wrote, “[H]aving claims to a considerable 
Quantity of Land in the Western Country I am fully persuaded that 
the Value of those Lands must be increased by an efficient federal 
Govt.”305 Though few would have put it so baldly, many other 
delegates also had substantial western investments.306 
For most delegates, then, securing westward expansion, far from 
a source of anxiety, was one of the most important purposes of a 
strengthened federal government.307 This faith in inevitable expansion 
made no mention of the Native nations who owned and governed this 
vast territory. Only the Northwest Ordinance, consistent with its 
paternalist approach, acknowledged that “from time to 
time . . . [I]ndian titles shall have been extinguished.”308 But the 
Convention’s vision of continental supremacy entailed an unspoken 
commitment to colonizing and dispossessing Native peoples.309 
Williamson’s hope for an “efficient” government hinted at how 
this would be accomplished. The Constitution provided the United 
States with powerful new tools for dominating the borderlands that 
reflected the document’s wartime context. It authorized Congress to 
create a standing national army310 and to organize, arm, and command 
 
 303. Indeed, Morris stated that, had he expressed his views on expansion more “pointedly,” 
“a strong opposition would have been made.” Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. 
Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), supra note 299, at 404. 
 304. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 410. 
 305. Letter from Hugh Williamson to James Madison (June 2, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 71, 71–72 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). 
 306. CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 23, 49–50, 176 (1925). 
 307. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 199 
(reporting Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman’s statement that frequent legislative meetings 
would be required because “[t]he Western Country . . . will supply objects” requiring 
legislation). 
 308. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 181, at 337. 
 309. On the continental vision of the Constitution’s drafters and advocates, see generally 
JAMES D. DRAKE, THE NATION’S NATURE: HOW CONTINENTAL PRESUMPTIONS GAVE RISE 
TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 260–316 (2011). 
 310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 13–14. 
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the state militias.311 It also created an executive with substantial power 
over military and diplomatic affairs, including as commander in chief 
over the national military and state militias.312 Even more importantly, 
given the constant lack of funds under the Articles, Congress could 
now tax directly to “provide for the common Defence.”313 
These provisions remedied the weaknesses that had plagued the 
United States in its earlier dealings with Natives. The federal 
government could purchase Indian lands if necessary, and could 
supply tribes with “presents” that might wean them from British and 
Spanish influence. Most significantly, the government could now 
support the high-handed demands and threats it made to Native 
nations. Rather than constantly placating Indians to avoid wars it 
could not afford, the United States could turn to arms if necessary. 
The new national government would be a much strengthened fiscal-
military state314 capable of instilling the “fear” and “terror” necessary 
to control the borderlands.315 
In short, the Constitution created a national state that was 
simultaneously weak and strong—too dependent on the states and 
the people to resist “the violence of popular sentiment”316 but capable 
of organizing and sustaining a military far more daunting than any 
state militia. This was precisely what the expansionist states and 
Anglo-American settlers wanted. Their libertarian streak ran only as 
far as self-interest, for they welcomed a strengthened federal state as 
long as it was an imperialist one, focused on projecting power against 
the Indians rather than against its citizens.317 The Hamiltonians would 
solve the problem of Indian affairs by committing the federal state to 
empowering, not restraining, the inexorable westward tide. 
III.  THE RATIFICATION DEBATES 
The Constitution submitted to the states for ratification 
proposed two distinct solutions for Indian affairs. The Madisonian 
 
 311. Id. cl. 16. 
 312. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 313. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 314. EDLING, supra note 23, at 47–49, 227–29. 
 315. See supra notes 229–232 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
 317. Cf. HULSEBOSCH, supra note 8, at 219–20 (“An important manifestation of popular 
constitutionalism was . . . migration beyond existing jurisdictions and into Indian 
country. . . . Before, during, and after the ratification campaign, settlers voted with their 
feet. . . . [T]he hard fact of mobility conditioned the making of the Constitution.”). 
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perspective restrained states by ensuring the supremacy of federal 
diplomacy. The Hamiltonian approach embraced expansion and 
considered the federal military a powerful tool to defeat Native 
nations. This Part traces the course of these discourses during the 
nation’s hard-fought ratification contests, “the first national election” 
that engaged the public in debating the Constitution through a torrent 
of print and popular politics.318 Unlike at the Convention, discussions 
of the Constitution’s likely effect on Indian affairs figured 
prominently in ratification, appearing in newspaper articles, 
pamphlets, letters, speeches, and even public toasts.319 
In this wide-ranging debate, the two constitutional perspectives 
fared differently. As Part III.A traces, James Madison and other 
Federalists occasionally argued in favor of the centralization of Indian 
affairs, but their arguments served primarily as fodder for Anti-
Federalist critiques of constitutional overreach. By contrast, as 
detailed in Part III.B, the invocation of federal military power as a 
check on the “savages” became a standard part of Federalist rhetoric. 
This proved successful: in Georgia, Part III.C suggests, the prospect 
of federal military aid against the Creeks secured ratification. But this 
process also ensured that the Hamiltonian construction would 
become the dominant understanding of the Constitution in the 
ensuing years, as Part III.D explores. 
 
 318. For background on the ratification debates, see generally MAIER, supra note 8; 
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989); 
Critical Forum, Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788, 69 WM. & 
MARY Q. 361 (2012). Until recently, ratification was an afterthought in most constitutional 
histories. See MAIER, supra note 8, at ix–xi (noting the overwhelming body of work on the 
Convention, whereas ratification is neglected or relegated to “a chapter or two that give a quick 
summary of the ratification process”); Forrest McDonald, Foreword to RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra, at ix, ix (noting “the paucity of historical accounts of ratification”). The 
exception to this generalization is The Federalist, which has spawned a “small industry” of 
interpretation. MAIER, supra note 8, at ix–xi. As Professor Pauline Maier notes, The Federalist 
is usually examined outside of its ratification context as “a dispassionate, objective analysis of 
the Constitution” rather than as the “partisan statement written in the midst of a desperate fight 
in a critical state” that it was. Id. at xi; see also McDonald, supra, at ix (noting that the “The 
Federalist . . . though written as propaganda in support of ratification in New York, is rarely 
dealt with as such”). This narrow focus obscures the tremendous outpouring of public 
statements on the Constitution. See KRAMER, supra note 26, at 78 (“Thoughts expressed by the 
Framers behind closed doors in Philadelphia are ultimately of less interest than the public 
debate that took place over ratification. . . . Understandings expressed during the discussions 
about whether to ratify . . . are what matter most.”); MAIER, supra note 8, at ix–xvi (“Debate 
over the Constitution raged in newspapers, taverns, coffeehouses, and over dinner tables as well 
as in the Confederation Congress, state legislatures, and state ratifying conventions.”).  
 319. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
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A. Madisonian Ratification 
For many Federalists, the “mighty difference” between the 
Articles and the Constitution lay not in Congress’s constitutionally 
enumerated powers, many of which mirrored those in the Articles, 
but in the means granted to accomplish those ends.320 As Madison 
wrote in Federalist No. 45, “If the new Constitution be examined with 
accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it 
proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the 
Union than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS.”321 
One of the powers the Articles had granted Congress was “that 
they shall regulate Indian affairs.”322 But experience had underscored 
that this authority alone was insufficient, “there being no sanctions to 
it.”323 States had routinely flouted federal jurisdiction, with disastrous 
results. “Not a single Indian war has yet been produced by 
aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is,” John 
Jay argued in Federalist No. 3.324 “[B]ut there are several instances of 
Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of 
individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish 
offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent 
inhabitants.”325 
Federalist No. 42 presented Madison’s solution. There, he 
examined constitutional provisions intended to “provide for the 
harmony and proper intercourse among the States,”326 one of which 
was the Indian Commerce Clause. The Clause, he argued, was “very 
properly unfettered from two limitations in the Articles of 
Confederation, which render the provision obscure and 
contradictory.”327 First, the Clause was no longer limited to Indians 
“not members of any of the States,” a vague restriction whose scope 
 
 320. Editorial, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Mass.), Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MASSACHUSETTS 
245, 246 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1997).  
 321. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 53, at 293 (James Madison); see also Editorial, 
supra note 320, at 245 (“The Confederation points out what positive powers the Congress ought 
to have: the fœderal Constitution points out what positive powers the Congress actually shall 
have.”). 
 322. Editorial, supra note 320, at 246. 
 323. Id. at 245. 
 324. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 53, at 44 (John Jay). 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. NO. 42 at 267 (James Madison). 
 327. Id. at 268.  
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had “been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the 
federal councils.”328 Second, the Clause contained no language 
reserving states’ legislative rights. “[H]ow the trade with Indians,” 
Madison wrote, “though not members of a State, yet residing within 
its legislative jurisdiction can be regulated by an external authority, 
without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is 
absolutely incomprehensible”—a glaring instance, to Madison, of 
how the Articles had sought “to accomplish impossibilities; to 
reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete 
sovereignty in the States.”329 Federalist No. 42 thus read Madison’s 
qualified success in recasting the Indian Commerce Clause as a clear 
endorsement of federal supremacy. 
A far more negative assessment of federal power over Indian 
affairs appeared in a New York Journal article by Anti-Federalist 
Abraham Yates, Jr. under the pseudonym Sydney.330 Yates argued 
ratification would “render[] nugatory” much of New York’s 
constitution, including provisions granting it authority over Indian 
affairs.331 Yates condemned “the whole history of . . . the measures 
taken by Congress respecting the Indian affairs in this state” as “a 
series of violations” of the state’s constitution and the restrictions of 
the Articles.332 He particularly attacked the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 
including the commissioners’ “defiance [of] the civil authority of the 
county of Montgomery.”333 Yates continued: 
  If this was the conduct of Congress and their officers, when 
possessed of powers which were declared by them to be insufficient 
for the purposes of government, what have we reasonably to expect 
will be their conduct when possessed of the powers “to regulate 
 
 328. Id. at 268–69. 
 329. Id. at 269. 
 330. Sydney, To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, reprinted in 
20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK 
1153 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004). Although earlier scholarship attributed the “Sydney” 
essays to Robert Yates, the most thorough histories of ratification cite evidence overwhelmingly 
suggesting that Abraham Yates, Jr. authored the pieces. See id. (citing Abraham Yates’s 
personal correspondence); Sidney, Essay, N.Y.J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 19 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK 115, 115 
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003) (citing draft essays in Abraham Yates’s hand, contemporary 
correspondence, and Yates’s own claim of authorship); see also MAIER, supra note 8, at 343 
(attributing the Sydney essays to Abraham Yates). 
 331. Id. at 1156. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 1157; see also supra notes 121–127 and accompanying text.  
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commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian tribes,” when they are armed with legislative, 
executive and judicial powers, and their laws the supreme laws of 
the land . . . and all such laws subject to the revision and controul of 
Congress. 
  It is therefore evident that this state, by adopting the new 
government, will enervate their legislative rights, and totally 
surrender into the hands of Congress the management and 
regulation of the Indian affairs . . . .334 
Yates and Madison agreed that ratification would result in federal 
supremacy over Indian affairs. Yates also understood, perhaps better 
than Madison, the broad panoply of powers given the new 
government, particularly the Supremacy Clause, that would yield this 
result. But Yates, an “extreme” Anti-Federalist,335 construed 
Madison’s centralizing scheme for Indian affairs as a fundamental 
attack on New York’s autonomy. And he evidently believed other 
New Yorkers would feel similarly. 
But neither Madison’s nor Yates’s discussion of federal 
supremacy and Indian affairs was representative. They were the only 
two authors to mention the Indian Commerce Clause or seriously 
consider the broader issue of federal authority over relations with the 
Indians. Part of this silence stemmed from the agreement by at least 
some Anti-Federalists that the new federal government should have 
power over external matters, including Indian affairs.336 But it also 
reflected the fact that, as at the Convention, ratification debates over 
Indians focused on the question of treaties. 
 
 334. Sydney, supra note 330, at 1158. Yates also mentioned the limitation on states’ laying of 
duties on imports and exports. Id.  
 335. Lynd, supra note 237, at 225 n.9. 
 336. See, e.g., Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, Letter I (Nov. 8, 1787), reprinted in 
14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 14, 24 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (“Let the general government[’s] . . . powers extend exclusively 
to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the seas, to commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian 
affairs, peace and war . . . leaving the internal police of the community, in other respects, 
exclusively to the state governments . . . .” (emphasis added)); The Dissent of the Minority of the 
Pennsylvania Convention, PA. PACKET, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 7, 21 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1984) (endorsing “a confederation of republics, possessing all the powers of internal 
government; but united in the management of their general, and foreign concerns”). 
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The Federalists repeatedly bemoaned treaties’ ineffectiveness 
under the Articles. As Alexander Hamilton noted, “The treaties of 
the United States under [the Articles] are liable to the infractions of 
thirteen different legislatures.”337 This view extended to those on the 
frontier. The inhabitants of Schenectady, New York, despaired of the 
collapse of their once booming Indian trade and blamed the 
continued British occupation of the western posts. “The tracing the 
Cause of our Wretchedness, points out the Remedy: Give Powers to 
your own Representatives which will be sufficient to compel the 
Performance of Treaties as well as to make them.”338 
For Federalists, one important solution to the problem of state 
interference was the creation of federal courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court, which would avoid contradictory interpretations and 
local bias in enforcing treaties.339 Another was to include federal 
treaties within the Supremacy Clause, thereby compelling 
compliance. “Is it not necessary that [treaties] should be binding on 
the States?” delegate Francis Corbin asked at the Virginia ratifying 
convention.340 “Fatal experience has proved, that treaties would never 
be complied with, if their observance depended on the will of the 
States; and the consequences would be constant war. . . . Do not 
Gentlemen see the infinite dangers . . . if a small part of the 
community could drag the whole Confederacy into war?”341 
The inclusion of treaties within the Supremacy Clause was 
particularly contentious in Virginia, where the state’s western 
residents were deeply hostile to the Jay–Gardoqui Treaty of 1786, 
which closed the Mississippi River to American navigation.342 This 
debate quickly expanded to include Indian treaties. Arthur Campbell, 
 
 337. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 53, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 338. SCHENECTADY FARMER, TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE DISTRICT OF SCHENECTADY 
(1788), reprinted in 21 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK, 1402, 1402 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2005). 
 339. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 53, at 150–51 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 340. Virginia Convention Debates (June 19, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA 1387, 1392 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare 
J. Saladino eds., 1993); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 53, at 150 (“The treaties of 
the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land.”). 
 341. Virginia Convention Debates, supra note 340, at 1392. 
 342. See MAIER, supra note 8, at 276–79; see also infra notes 363–367 and accompanying 
text. Many of these residents lived in Kentucky, which depended on the Ohio River to transport 
goods to market. MAIER, supra note 8, at 238, 279. Kentucky remained part of Virginia until it 
gained statehood in 1792. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 1-249.  
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a delegate to the House of Burgesses from backcountry Virginia,343 
questioned in print why “treaties should be made the supreme law of 
the land.”344 He singled out for attack the treaties made by the 
congressional commissioners with “different nations of Savages” 
since 1776.345 
[S]ome of them if considered as law, will destroy the private rights of 
individuals without an hearing; infringe the sovereignty of States, 
are contradictory one with another; and in not a few instances 
manifestly unjust. . . . What embarrasments must the Judges of the 
fœderal courts be under, when they come to pronounce, what is the 
supreme law of the land. They are either to be accessaries to a 
multiplicity of wrongs, or endure the imputation of trifling with the 
obligations of a solemn oath.346 
Campbell also proposed revisions to the Constitution on behalf of a 
nebulous Society of Western Gentlemen, which advocated approval 
of treaties by two-thirds of both houses and the removal of treaties 
previously “made” by the United States from both the Supremacy 
Clause and federal judicial jurisdiction.347 The Society also argued for 
deleting the Property Clause altogether.348 
Campbell claimed to speak for a coalition of westerners who 
feared that the combination of federal Indian treaties, the Supremacy 
Clause, and federal court enforcement would undermine the security 
of western land title. These issues reappeared at the Virginia ratifying 
convention, at which earlier Indian purchases were, according to 
Madison, one of the “principal topics of private discussion & intrigue, 
as well as of public declamation,” alongside British debts and 
navigation of the Mississippi.349 Leading Anti-Federalist Patrick 
 
 343. See HARTWELL L. QUINN, ARTHUR CAMPBELL: PIONEER AND PATRIOT OF THE “OLD 
SOUTHWEST” 124 (1990). 
 344. Many, Essay, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 18, 1788, reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, at 1638, 1638–39.  
 345. Id. at 1639. 
 346. Id.  
 347. Society of Western Gentlemen, The Federal Constitution Amended: Or, an Essay To 
Make It More Comfortable to the Sense of a Majority of the Citizens of the United States, VA. 
INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 30 & May 7, 1788, reprinted in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA, 769, 777, 779 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare 
J. Saladino eds., 1990). 
 348. Id. at 778. 
 349. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (June 13, 1788), in 6 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 329, 329 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1997). 
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Henry350 raised this specter of land purchases in a speech on the 
federal judiciary; he feared that “citizens . . . who have made large 
contracts under our present Government” would later be “called to a 
Federal Court, and tried under retrospective laws.”351 “[W]hat is to 
become of the purchases of the Indians?” he queried pointedly.352 
“Those unhappy nations who have given up their lands to private 
purchasers—who by being made drunk, have given a thousand—nay, 
I might say 10,000 acres, for the trifling sum of six pence?”353 Like 
Campbell, Henry feared that earlier land transactions would not 
withstand careful scrutiny in the new federal courts. 
Henry’s Federalist opponents mocked this specter of “Indian 
purchases” as a “bugbear[] and hobgobling[].”354 One seized the 
opportunity to discourse at length on “the Indian countries,” and 
ended by mockingly suggesting that, if Henry did “not like this this 
Government, let him go and live among the Indians; I know of several 
nations that live very happy.”355 Federalist delegate George Nicholas 
noted that, although the Virginia Assembly had already resolved land 
companies’ Indian claims, there were nonetheless “Gentlemen who 
have come by large possessions, that it is not easily to account for.”356 
Henry, an extensive speculator in western lands,357 viewed this 
statement as a thinly veiled jab and interrupted that he hoped 
Nicholas “meant nothing personal”; Nicholas replied, “I mean what I 
say, Sir.”358 The two delegates bickered until the convention president 
instructed the delegates to “not be personal” and cooperate “in a 
peaceable manner”; after the two men exchanged halfhearted 
apologies, the convention moved on.359 
As this outburst underscored, little of the debate over federal 
supremacy over Indian affairs occurred on the high-minded territory 
 
Madison refers here to the “Indiana claim,” a large tract of western land claimed by a purported 
Indian sale that had been rejected by the Virginia legislature. Id. at 329 n.2. 
 350. See generally THOMAS S. KIDD, PATRICK HENRY: FIRST AMONG PATRIOTS 183–211 
(2011). 
 351. Virginia Convention Debates (June 23, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, at 1464, 1466. 
 352. Id.  
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 1467. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 1468. 
 357. KIDD, supra note 350, at 72. 
 358. Virginia Convention Debates, June 23, 1788, supra note 351, at 1468. 
 359. Id. at 1468–69. 
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Madison and Yates marked out. Madison’s brief for centralization 
gained little traction; proponents of the Constitution subsumed the 
issue into the larger question of treaties’ status under the new regime. 
The Constitution’s critics shared this perspective, but latched onto 
Indian treaties as a compelling argument against granting the national 
government the power to make and enforce treaties as the supreme 
law of the land. Federalists regarded this objection as mere venality, 
but, though significant financial interests were at stake, these 
complaints also reflected the widespread commitment to western 
expansion that pervaded Anglo-American society. Federalists 
appealed to this commitment as well, but they invoked a different set 
of concerns. 
B. Hamiltonian Ratification 
The Federalists recognized that ratification would be a difficult 
and hard-fought struggle. The Federalists’ desire for a state with 
expanded military and financial powers confronted a powerful 
antistatist tradition hostile to centralized authority. But Secretary at 
War Henry Knox argued at the close of the Convention that success 
would be assured if the “majority of the people . . . reflect[ed] 
maturely on their present situation,” and recognized “[t]hat the 
gover[n]ment at home is . . . without money & without credit—unable 
either to resist the smallest faction within [or] to chastise the 
despicable bands of murdering savages on the frontiers.”360 
Knox’s invocation of “murdering savages” to justify a stronger 
federal government became a common trope in Federalist arguments 
for ratification.361 This rhetoric of savagery gained currency for two 
reasons. First, the most effective counterargument to Anti-Federalists 
was the seriousness of external threats that required a more powerful 
state to meet them. As recent histories have underscored, the 
Constitution’s advocates were keenly aware of and anxious about 
 
 360. Draft Letter from Henry Knox (Sept. 1787), in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 320, at 26, 27 (third and fourth 
alterations in original). 
 361. Cf. EDLING, supra note 23, at 122 (“The idea that the national government would be 
able to develop the West by pacifying the Indian tribes in the Ohio country through war or 
treaty was a very common theme in Federalist rhetoric. So, too, was the claim that Britain and 
Spain had interests in the American interior and that they supported and stirred up the Indian 
nations against American settlers.”) 
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American status on the international stage.362 Convinced that the 
Articles’ weaknesses had undermined American credibility abroad, 
they looked to a strengthened federal government to establish the 
country as a “respectable nation” in the eyes of the world.363 
Although focused on European scrutiny, this anxiety extended to 
the powerful Native nations on the borderlands watching the failure 
of the American experiment. “[I]f we are to be much longer 
unblessed with an efficient national government, destitute of funds 
and without public credit, either at home or abroad,” New Hampshire 
Federalist Nicholas Gilman wrote, “I fear we shall become 
contemptible even in the eyes of savages themselves.”364 A 
Pennsylvanian Federalist similarly lamented the nation’s “weak and 
shattered government, which brings on us the contempt of every 
surrounding tribe and the reproach and obloquy of every nation.”365 
The outward-looking Federalists thus recognized that American 
success required impressing Native as well as European nations with 
strengthened national power. 
The second reason was more cynical. Ratification faced 
substantial hurdles in the West, where Anglo-American settlers were 
well aware that many Federalists despised them as “white Savages.”366 
They were thus deeply suspicious that a strengthened federal 
government designed to ensure rule by a political and cultural elite 
would privilege eastern interests at their expense.367 As evidence, 
many pointed to the abortive Jay–Gardoqui Treaty of 1786, which  
had bargained away rights to navigate the Mississippi River that 
westerners, particularly Kentuckians, relied on to export their 
 
 362. GOULD, supra note 18, at 130–32; SADOSKY, supra note 18, at 119–47. See generally 
Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 18. 
 363. See MAIER, supra note 8, at ix. 
 364. Letter from Nicholas Gilman to President John Sullivan (Nov. 7, 1787), in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: DELAWARE, NEW 
JERSEY, GEORGIA AND CONNECTICUT 261, 261 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978). 
 365. Pennsylvania Assembly Proceedings (Sept. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: PENNSYLVANIA 65, 77 (Merrill Jensen 
ed., 1976). 
 366. Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 220, at 599; see SMITH-
ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 214–16. 
 367. Saul Cornell, Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism, 76 J. 
AM. HIST. 1148, 1156–68 (1990). The long-standing Progressive/neo-Progressive interpretation 
of the Constitution argues that these settlers’ fears were well-grounded. For works 
representative of this historiographical approach, see BEARD, supra note 306; TERRY BOUTON, 
TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007); HOLTON, supra note 300.  
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goods.368 The treaty and its seemingly naked betrayal of western 
interests gave westerners little confidence that the new government 
would benefit them. 
But the West was also engulfed in ceaseless cycles of violence 
between Indians and white settlers, and Federalists could portray the 
strengthened federal government as the savior of Anglo-American 
victims of Native violence. Invoking the horrors of Indian attack to 
criticize political opponents for their purported complicity was a well-
worn tack in early America, one that historians have labeled the 
“anti-Indian sublime.”369 Observers at the time recognized this: as 
Abraham Yates, Jr. wrote in critiquing the Federalists, “The Dread of 
an Indian war, from the Barbarous Manner it is carried on, has ever 
been alarming, and as such a great handle for sinister purposes to 
politicians, both under the former and the present government.”370 
Thus, though Federalist horror over Indian “cruelties” and 
“devastations” was likely sincere, the decision to embrace the rhetoric 
of “savagery” also reflected political expediency. Although most 
Federalists felt little kinship with backcountry settlers, pandering to 
their hatred of Indians provided a compelling argument in a bitter 
and divisive political contest. 
This strategy meant that the specter of “murdering savages” took 
its place among the parade of dangers Federalist delegates routinely 
rehearsed at state ratification conventions. At the Pennsylvania 
convention, Thomas McKean insisted that only the federal 
government was “capable of collecting and directing the national 
strength against foreign force, Indian depredations, or domestic 
 
 368. See MAIER, supra note 8, at 276–79; Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the 
General Good, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 318, at 261, 263–68, 280–83. 
 369. SILVER, supra note 13, at xx. As Professor Peter Silver notes, the most important use of 
the anti-Indian sublime was as “a standard of loyalty . . . nearly always applied to people who 
were not Indian at all.” Id. at xxi–xxii. “[M]any of the bitterest arguments between groups came 
to depend on tying enemies to Indians,” he argues. Id. at xxii. “The mid-Atlantic’s Indians were 
nearly always co-bogeymen: they were seldom discussed as having the initiative to do much 
harm apart from the aid, comfort, and direction that they were presumably provided by a 
European villain of the moment.” Id. at xxii–xxiii.  
 370. Lynd, supra note 237, at 241 n.41. Thomas Jefferson later expressed a similar 
understanding of the strategic invocations of the Indian threat. See Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Monroe (Apr. 17, 1791), in 20 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MAIN 
SERIES 234, 236 (Julian Boyd ed., 1982) (“Every rag of an Indian depredation will . . . serve as a 
ground to raise troops with those who think a standing army and a public debt necessary for the 
happiness of the U.S. and we shall never be permitted to get rid of either.”). 
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insurrection.”371 Robert Livingston saw enemies all around New York 
during that state’s debates; to the northwest he feared “the British 
posts and hostile tribes of savages.”372 Virginia Governor Edmund 
Randolph similarly outlined numerous “point[s] of weakness” to 
argue that the new government was “necessary” for the state’s 
safety.373 “Cast your eyes to the Western Country,” he urged the 
state’s delegates, “that is inhabited by cruel savages, your natural 
enemies; besides their natural propensity to barbarity, they may be 
excited by the gold of foreign enemies to commit the most horrid 
ravages on your people.”374 And in Massachusetts, John Carnes 
observed that “the probability of an Indian war, &c. evinced the great 
necessity of the establishment of an efficient federal government, 
which will be the result of the adoption of the proposed 
Constitution.”375 As one Virginian delegate succinctly stated, “Much 
has been said on the subject of war by foreigners, and the 
Indians . . . .”376 
Anti-Federalists dismissed this rhetoric as mere fear mongering. 
Virginian Anti-Federalist delegate William Grayson tired of these 
“imaginary” and “ludicrous” dangers.377 “Horrors have been greatly 
magnified since the rising of the Convention,” he argued.378 In the 
rhetorical world of the Federalists, Barbary pirates would sail up the 
 
 371. Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 365, at 382, 415.  
 372. New York Convention Debates (June 19, 1788), in 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK 1681, 1685 (John P. Kaminski et al. 
eds., 2008) (footnote omitted). 
 373. Virginia Convention Debates (June 6, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 347, at 970, 977.  
 374. Id. at 977. 
 375. Massachusetts Convention Debates (Jan. 15, 1788), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MASSACHUSETTS 1187, 1204–05 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000); see also Harrison Gray Otis Oration (July 4, 1788), 
in 18 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
19, at 224, 228 (“[T]he union of the entire strength of the several members, is essential to the 
safety and perfection of a political confederacy . . . . Hostile tribes of Indians make daily 
incursions upon our frontier, and are supplied by Spaniards and by Englishmen, with the 
apparatus of modern war.—Thus the horrours of savage ferocity are increased by the 
contribution of civilized malice.”).  
 376. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 640 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891). 
 377. Virginia Convention Debates (June 11, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 347, at 1142, 1167. 
 378. Id. 
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Chesapeake, South Carolinians “mounted on alligators” would come 
“and eat up our little children,” and “[t]he Indians [would] invade us 
with numerous armies on our rear, in order to convert our cleared 
lands into hunting grounds.”379 Patrick Henry also objected to 
Federalists’ claims that “the savage Indians are to destroy us,” 
arguing that, in light of superior Anglo-American numbers, “we have 
nothing to fear from them.”380 
But Indians were different from alligator-mounted South 
Carolinians; Indian war was real. Many agreed with the 
pseudonymous writer Agricola that “the recent hostilities of the 
savages . . . evince the necessity of a spirited, energetic government, to 
ward off the calamities of war.”381 “[S]hould the constitution be 
rejected,” one South Carolinian wrote, “how long can we flatter 
ourselves to be free from Indian cruelties and depredations . . . if at 
this moment warded off from us, ‘tis principally owing to the dread of 
an efficacious union of the states by the adoption of the federal 
constitution.”382 James Madison echoed these points when he noted 
that the “new Govt and that alone” would be able to end British and 
Spanish “instigat[ion]” and “encourage[ment]” of the Indians, 
“considerations” Madison thought would carry “great weight with 
men of reflection.”383 
These views resonated with Anglo-American settlers on the 
frontier. Inhabitants of the frontier towns of Schenectady and 
Pittsburgh lamented the “weakness of Congress” to prevent British 
and Spanish intrigues, on which they blamed “the incursions of the 
savages.”384 Pro-Constitution forces in Kentucky welcomed the Fourth 
 
 379. Id.  
 380. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, supra note 376, at 150, 155.  
 381. P. Valerius Agricola, An Essay, On the Constitution Recommended by the Federal 
Convention to the United States, ALBANY GAZETTE, Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in 19 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK, supra 
note 334, at 361, 362. 
 382. Letter to the Publisher, A Steady and Open Republican, ST. GAZETTE OF S.C., May 5, 
1788, reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 387, 387 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995). 
 383. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 18 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at 24, 
29.  
 384. SCHENECTADY FARMER, supra note 338, at 1402; John Gibson, Resolution of the 
Inhabitants of Pittsburgh, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE 
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of July, 1788, with the toast, “May the Savage enemies of America, be 
chastised by Arms.”385 
In short, war with the Indians, far from an imaginary threat, was 
a potent reminder of the Articles’ failings. As one French diplomat 
observed, “[The] hostilities carried out by the Savages of Ohio 
support the efforts of Federalists and favor Consolidation.”386 He 
suggested that clever Federalists should instigate more conflicts 
against “these turbulent neighbors” out of self-interest.387 “[T]he noise 
of guns,” he dryly noted, “would stifle the powerless cries of 
Democrats [that is, the Anti-Federalists].”388 
Invoking the Indian threat proved particularly valuable in 
debates over the creation of a standing army.389 Republican ideology 
regarded standing armies as a prerequisite for tyranny, and so the 
Anti-Federalists harped on this provision as evidence of the 
corruption lurking behind the Constitution.390 Many Federalists 
countered that standing armies were “essentially necessary” not 
because of the threat of “an European war”—“[t]his I think is not 
very probable, provided the Fœderal Government is established,” 
wrote one Federalist—but because of the “peculiar situation of the 
United States,” surrounded by Indian nations.391 The early American 
frontier had always been violent. As one commentator noted, because 
of Indian wars, Anglo-Americans had not had “six years of peace 
 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 365, at 
286, 286.  
 385. Lexington Celebrates the Fourth of July, KY. GAZETTE, July 5, 1788, reprinted in 10 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, 
at 1730, 1731.  
 386. Letter from Louis-Guillaume Otto to Comte de Montmorin (Aug. 16, 1788), in 18 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at 333, 
334. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. 
 389. See Miller, supra note 9, at 155–56 (“The tribes provided the main justification for the 
federal government’s need for armed forces.”).  
 390. See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE 
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 31 (1999).  
 391. Letter from a Well-Informed Correspondent, to His Friend in this City, on the Subject 
of the Proposed Fœderal Constitution, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 8 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 177, 180 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988). 
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since the first settlement of the country, or shall have for fifty years to 
come.”392 
This was a central theme in Federalist Nos. 24 and 25, in which 
Alexander Hamilton defended the Constitution’s provision for a 
standing army. He acknowledged that a “wide ocean” divided the 
country from Europe, but counseled against “an excess of confidence 
or security.”393 “The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian 
nations . . . encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia.”394 From their 
western footholds, the British and Spanish would be constantly 
intriguing against the United States. In this struggle, “[t]he savage 
tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural 
enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us, 
and most to hope from them.”395 These threats warranted a national 
military under federal authority. At the very least, “there has been a 
constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western 
frontier.”396 These posts would “continue to be indispensable, if it 
should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians.”397 
And the states were inadequate for that task, for they could neither 
afford nor be trusted with maintaining separate armed forces.398 
Opponents of ratification balked at these claims. Although some 
Anti-Federalists, unlike Grayson and Henry, were willing to concede 
the threat of Indians,399 they argued that present arrangements were 
adequate to address it. Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists rebutted 
Federalist claims that existing forces along the Ohio River 
demonstrated “the propriety of a standing army” by insisting that 
these soldiers were “a mere occasional armament for the purpose of 
 
 392. Marcus IV, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution, Recommended 
by the Late Convention at Philadelphia, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J. (Va.), Mar. 12, 1788, 
reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 379, 387 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 53, at 165 
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that “Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would 
always be at hand,” even after ratification). 
 393. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 53, at 160 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 394. Id. NO. 25, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 395. Id. NO. 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. NO. 25, at 162–63. 
 399. See A Democratic Federalist, Essay, PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 365, at 
193, 197 (describing the Indians as “inhuman butchers of their species” with whom “we are 
always . . . in a state of war”). 
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restraining divers hostile tribes of savages”400 and would be disbanded 
“[a]s soon as the danger is over.”401 Another Anti-Federalist opined 
that it was not “prudent for Congress ever to raise an army merely to 
subdue Wabash Indians or any one single tribe. Should there be a 
general combination of all the tribes . . . Congress by our present 
Articles of Confederation are vested with full powers to draw out the 
military force of the states.”402 
The Federalists were less sanguine about the Indian threat and 
the adequacy of the Articles to redress it. To counter Anti-Federalist 
arguments, they stressed that, even as Indian war threatened, “we are 
destitute, of the means of defence, without an army . . . without 
money to raise and maintain an armament, and without that credit 
which might enable us to make use of foreign resources.”403 The 
frontier must be garrisoned, and only Congress could adequately raise 
forces for this purpose.404 A writer in the Virginia Chronicle insisted, 
in florid prose, on the need “to protect our defenceless frontiers from 
indiscriminating cruelties and horrid devastations of the savages, to 
which, from its extent, it is so peculiarly exposed.”405 “Let a man 
reflect a moment on the promiscuous scenes of carnage committed by 
Indians in their midnight excursions,” the author continued, “and he 
must have a heart callous indeed, if he would object to an army 
supported for the benevolent purpose of preventing them.”406 
 
 400. Centinel II, To the People of Pennsylvania, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, 
reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 457, 463 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981). Prominent Federalist James Wilson had pointed to these forces 
in defending standing armies during an influential early speech defending the Constitution. See 
James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia, PA. HERALD, Oct. 9, 1787, reprinted 
in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 
337, 337–44. 
 401. A Democratic Federalist, supra note 399, at 197. 
 402. Letter from Massachusetts, CONN. J., Oct. 17 & 24, 1787, in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION supra note 364, at 373, 378 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 403. Agricola, supra note 381, at 362. 
 404. See ALBANY FED. COMM., AN IMPARTIAL ADDRESS, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE CITY 
AND COUNTY OF ALBANY: OR, THE 35 ANTI-FEDERAL OBJECTIONS REFUTED (1788), reprinted 
in 21 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
338, at 1388, 1392–93 (“Our frontiers must be garrisoned in time of peace; and, should Congress 
not have power to hire men to do this duty, the militia must be dragged from their families for 
the purpose.”). 
 405. Letter from a Well-Informed Correspondent, to His Friend in this City, on the Subject 
of the Proposed Fœderal Constitution, supra note 391, at 180. 
 406. Id. 
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According to Federalists, then, Anti-Federalists’ opposition to a 
standing army made them complicit in the inhumane violence of the 
“savages” on the frontier. 
The dominance of Federalist arguments based on Indians’ 
purported savagery demonstrates how ratification—which was, at 
base, a populist political campaign rather than a high-minded 
exposition of constitutional theory—shaped constitutional meaning. 
Hamilton, Randolph, and other, lesser-known Federalists who 
invoked the terrors of Indian war likely also shared Madison’s views 
that the abuses of expansionist states and squatters were equally to 
blame for frontier violence.407 Yet they were also seasoned politicians 
who recognized the potency of anti-Indian rhetoric in early America, 
and so carefully selected their arguments in selling the Constitution. 
Unlike the speculative horrors of European invasion or internecine 
violence among the states—which ratification’s opponents easily 
mocked—Indian warfare was happening even as ratification was 
debated. Anti-Federalist attempts to downplay the Indian threat thus 
rang hollow, a fact Federalists recognized and exploited by portraying 
their opponents as complicit in Indian violence. 
The Federalists’ choices had consequences. Their approach 
abandoned any consideration of the causes of Indian violence, instead 
depicting Natives as perpetual enemies of the United States who 
would always be aggressors on the frontier. This narrative of Anglo-
American victimization provided a powerful justification for western 
expansion. The rhetoric also had political effects. Many were 
seemingly unpersuaded by Federalist invocations of the Indian threat: 
western Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and North Carolina remained 
largely and stubbornly anti-Federalist.408 But several prominent 
 
 407. Hamilton, for instance, would later urge federal supremacy and diplomacy with Indian 
nations to the Governor of Georgia. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Mathews 
(Sept. 25, 1794), in 17 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 270, 272–75 (Harold Syrett ed., 
1972). And both Randolph and Hamilton became prominent members of the Washington 
administration, which adopted an Indian policy focused on restraining frontier settlers where 
possible. See NICHOLS, supra note 8, 98–202 (describing the Federalists’ vision that “[o]n the 
Trans-Appalachian frontier, officials would use courts, armies, and regulated land sales to curb 
white frontiersmen’s appetite for Indian land and Indian blood”). 
 408. See Terry Bouton, The New and (Somewhat) Improved Frontier Thesis, 35 REVS. AM. 
HIST. 490, 493–94 (2007) (reviewing GRIFFIN, supra note 35); Cornell, supra note 367, at 1149–
50. Professor Patrick Griffin challenges the association between westerners and Anti-
Federalism claimed by Professors Terry Bouton and Saul Cornell, arguing that “[g]iven the 
conditions with which they struggled, westerners tended to view broader issues that affected 
them and all Americans, such as the debate over the Constitution, through the all-encompassing 
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backcountry representatives—including William Blount, the one-time 
opponent of the Treaties of Hopewell—cast their lot with the new 
government.409 And in one instance, the Federalists’ self-serving 
rhetoric succeeded, perhaps too well, and became an important part 
of the Constitution’s meaning for expansionist states. 
C. The Lesser of Two Evils: Ratification in Georgia 
Georgia was an unlikely place to support ratification. Delegates 
to the Continental Congress regarded it as such an 
“unworthy . . . State . . . that had not taken a single foderal measure” 
that they “very seriously talked of” voting the state “out of the 
Union” altogether.410 Abraham Baldwin, one of the state’s delegates 
at the Convention, observed that Georgia had little to gain from any 
new government.411 North Carolina, demographically and 
economically similar to Georgia and one of the last states to consider 
the Constitution, initially rejected adoption by a margin of over two 
to one.412 Yet Georgia not only ratified but did so unanimously, only 
three months after the end of the Convention. This sudden and 
dramatic conversion in favor of federal power was due largely to the 
threat of Indian war.413 
 
lens of protection. . . . [T]he terms ‘anti-federalist’ and ‘federalist,’ as they are conventionally 
understood, made little sense for the West.” GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 195–96.  
 409. Andrew R.L. Cayton, “Separate Interests” and the Nation-State: The Washington 
Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West, 79 J. AM. HIST. 
39, 58–59 (1992).  
 410. Letter from William Houstoun to Samuel Elbert (Apr. 2, 1785), in 22 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 142, at 300, 301; see also MAIER, supra note 
8, at 123 (“The state’s strong consent to the Constitution stands in stark contrast to its previous 
disregard for the Confederation: Its delegates to Congress were notable mainly for their absence 
from its sessions, and Georgia never paid even the relatively small requisitions Congress levied 
on it.”). 
 411. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 372 
(“That State [Georgia] has always hitherto supposed a Genl Govermt to be the pursuit of the 
central States who wished to have a vortex for every thing — that her distance would preclude 
her from equal advantage — & that she could not prudently purchase it by yielding national 
powers.”). 
 412. See MAIER, supra note 8, at 422; see also NICHOLS, supra 8, at 95 (arguing that “if 
Georgians had not faced an emergency,” the state might “have taken the same course” as North 
Carolina and rejected the Constitution). North Carolina did not refuse to ratify altogether, but 
demanded a bill of rights and a new constitutional convention before it would ratify. MAIER, 
supra note 8, at 421. 
 413. For discussion of historians’ debates over Georgia’s motivations to ratify, see infra note 
425. 
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By the time Georgians began debating ratification, the state’s 
governor was convinced that war with the Creeks was 
“unavoidable.”414 The state, the governor lamented, was woefully 
unprepared.415 The Creeks could field an estimated six thousand 
riflemen, well supplied with ammunition by the Spanish.416 By 
contrast, the Georgians, hobbled with a rapidly depreciating paper 
currency, struggled to recruit soldiers.417 The state assembly called for 
three thousand troops, but could not afford to arm them.418 
Acknowledging that the “aid of the Union will be required,” Georgia 
appealed to the national government it had earlier spurned.419 
Like the legislature, elite Georgians turned to the stronger 
government proposed in the Constitution as their potential savior. 
Baldwin believed war would hasten resolution of “the great political 
question” of ratification.420 Joseph Clay, an influential Savannah 
merchant, wrote: 
We have too much reason to apprehend we are involved in a general 
Indian war. Many have been killed on both sides. Should it continue 
it must be attended with the most ruinous consequences to this 
state. . . . The new plan of government for the Union I think will be 
adopted with us readily; the powers are great, but of two evils we 
must chose the least. Under such a government we should have 
avoided this great evil, an Indian war.421 
 
 414. Letter from Governor George Mathews to the Speaker of the Assembly (Oct. 18, 
1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 364, at 225, 226. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Letter from James White to Thomas Pinckney (May 24, 1787), in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 20, 21. 
 417. Id.; see also Letter from Governor George Mathews to the Speaker of the Assembly, 
supra note 414, at 225 (“The want of public faith is so fully shown from the depreciation of our 
currency . . . .”). 
 418. Letter from Governor George Mathews (Nov. 15, 1787), in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 23, 23. 
 419. Id.; see also Letter from Governor George Mathews to William Pierce (Oct. 16, 1787), 
in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
364, at 224, 224 (reporting that Matthews, Governor of Georgia, had written to Knox for “arms 
and military stores” because the state was “engaged in a war without the means requisite to 
prosecute it”). 
 420. Letter from Abraham Baldwin to Nicholas Gilman (Dec. 20, 1787), in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 
262, 262.  
 421. Letter from Joseph Clay to John Pierce (Oct. 17, 1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 232, 232; see also 
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Outside commentators agreed that calamity would convert the 
Georgians into acolytes of federal power. George Washington 
believed Georgia’s precarious situation assured ratification: “[I]f a 
weak state, with powerful tribes of Indians in its rear and the 
Spaniards on its flank, do not incline to embrace a strong general 
government, there must, I should think, be either wickedness or 
insanity in their conduct.”422 A visiting French diplomat observed, 
“The troubles that Georgia has to fear from the restless nature and 
ferocity of these Savages will make it fervently desire the 
establishment of a more effective Government.”423 
These predictions proved right. Georgia became the fourth state 
to ratify when its convention unanimously endorsed the Constitution 
on December 31, 1787, after merely three days of discussion. One 
delegate speculated that the convention refrained from ratifying the 
first day only to avoid appearing overhasty.424 
Scholars have debated whether Georgia’s easy ratification should 
be attributed to the looming Indian war, as the evidence would seem 
to suggest.425 For Georgians, the answer was clear. Three years after 
ratification, the Georgia House of Representatives wrote: 
 
Letter from Joseph Clay to John Williams (Nov. 13, 1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 234, 234 (“The want of 
sufficient energy in our government generally is also no small evil, which (at least a large part 
of) the considerate part of our community hope the new federal system, if adopted, will in part 
remove.”). 
 422. Letter from George Washington to Samuel Powel (Jan. 18, 1788), in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 
263, 263; see also Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox (Jan. 10, 1788), in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 
263, 263 (“[I]n the situation Georgia is, nothing but insanity, or a desire of becoming the allies of 
the Spaniards or savages, can disincline them to a government which holds out the prospect of 
relief from its present distresses.”). 
 423. Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 5, 1788), in 18 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at 151, 
152. Even the Anti-Federalist William Grayson, contradicting his later sarcastic comments at 
the Virginia convention, conceded that Georgian ratification was “highly probable as [Georgia] 
is at present very much embarrassed with an Indian war, and in great distress.” Letter from 
William Grayson to William Short (Nov. 10, 1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 262, 262. 
 424. Letter from Joseph Habersham to John Habersham (Dec. 29, 1787), in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 
272, 272–73. 
 425. Compare Edward J. Cashin, Georgia: Searching for Security, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 318, at 93, 111–12 (“In his own way, the Creek chieftain Alexander 
McGillivray may well have been the most important promoter of the cause of the Constitution 
in Georgia.”), and Albert B. Saye, Georgia: Security Through Union, in THE CONSTITUTION 
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Exposed to the depredations of the Indians, and suffering under 
many other inconveniences from being a frontier state, it was the 
policy of Georgia at an early period to adopt the foederal 
Government—And we not only find her among the foremost, but 
Unanimous in acceeding to the Confederation anticipating those 
advantages which would naturally be derived from an efficient 
General Government . . . .426 
Georgia representative James Jackson echoed these sentiments when, 
demanding federal assistance against the Creeks, he informed 
Congress that, “[i]n full confidence that a good, complete, and 
efficient Government would succor and relieve them, [the Georgians] 
were led to an early and unanimous adoption of the Constitution 
under which we deliberate.”427 For Georgians, then, arguments about 
the Indian threat were more than rhetorical hobgoblins, as Anti-
Federalists claimed. As Georgia reaped what it had sown, Creek 
power and state weakness transformed it from a stubborn opponent 
of Congress into one of the “foremost” proponents of a strengthened 
federal government. 
Georgia’s decision had important national consequences. 
Ratification, which required nine votes,428 was hard fought and highly 
contingent. Proponents and critics alike knew how much rested on 
events in other states, which they followed closely: one common 
image represented the states as a series of domino-like pillars 
reflecting the progress of ratification.429 Georgia’s early ratification 
built momentum. If Georgia had followed North Carolina’s lead and 
refused to ratify the Constitution as written, the results would have 
been unpredictable, particularly for two crucial states—Virginia and 
 
AND THE STATES 77, 80 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1988) (“In essence, 
Georgia wanted a stronger central government to assist the states . . . against the Indians . . . .”), 
with MAIER, supra note 8, at 124 (questioning whether “Georgia ratif[ied] because it 
desperately needed federal help in fighting attacks by Creek Indians”). The most nuanced 
discussion of Georgia’s decision to ratify notes that Georgians likely ratified because they were 
anxious to secure federal military support, but did not thereby endorse federal supremacy over 
Indian affairs. See Introduction to The Ratification of the Constitution by Georgia, in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 
201, 210–11. 
 426. Letter from the Georgia House of Representatives to Governor Edward Telfair (June 
10, 1790), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 364, microfilm supp. no. 59, doc. 50, at 178, 179.  
 427. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 696 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Jackson). 
 428. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 429. Robert L. Alexander, The Grand Federal Edifice, 9 DOCUMENTARY EDITING, June 
1987, at 13, 13–17. 
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New York—that held late conventions.430 In both states, the weight of 
prior ratifications played a critical role in securing approval; 
nonetheless, in both states, the vote in favor of ratification was 
extremely close.431 Absent Georgia’s ratification, Anti-Federalists’ 
arguments to condition ratification on a second constitutional 
convention to adopt proposed amendments would have had a much 
better chance for success.432 
Georgian ratification also demonstrated the effect of the 
Federalists’ arguments. By emphasizing the power of the federal 
government to counter the Indian threat and downplaying federal 
supremacy over Indian affairs, the Federalists secured ratification by 
offering the Georgians all carrot and no stick. As one French 
diplomat wrote, “Attacked by Indians, it was in [Georgia’s] interest to 
appear federally inclined in order to obtain help from the present 
Union. But if Georgia preceded the other Southern States in the 
adoption of the new Constitution, it can hardly be expected from 
eagerness to execute it.”433 Ratification on these terms meant that 
Georgia’s support for the federal government extended only as far as 
self-interest dictated. 
D. Ratification as Compact and Its Legacy 
Many western settlers, particularly south of the Ohio River, 
shared Georgia’s attitude toward the newly created federal 
government. They viewed the national state instrumentally: they were 
willing to offer loyalty and obedience as long as the government 
fulfilled what they considered its most basic function of protection.434 
And although some settlers had flirted with secession or alliance with 
Spain, the strengthened federal government was the region’s most 
 
 430. MAIER, supra note 8, at 255–319, 342–97.  
 431. In Virginia, the vote was eighty-nine to seventy-nine. Id. at 305. In New York, it was 
even closer; the vote to ratify was thirty to twenty-seven, id. at 396, while the effort to condition 
ratification on a later convention failed by two votes. Id. at 393.  
 432. This effort retained considerable force even after defeats in New York and Virginia, 
especially when North Carolina refused to ratify. Id. at 425–29. 
 433. Letter from G.J.A. Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 
283, 283.  
 434. See GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 166 (“[O]ne idea that ran through all emerging facets of 
a popular frontier commonwealth vision and lent them all meaning was the hatred of Indians.”); 
id. at 174 (“If government failed to protect and, just as significant, failed to decimate Indians—
the form that people insisted sovereignty had to take—the people owed no obedience.”). 
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promising guardian.435 Many backcountry leaders, then, supported the 
new Constitution based on the self-interested calculation that the new 
federal government would fulfill the Federalists’ promises and defend 
them against “murdering savages.”436 
This strain of thinking, in short, interpreted ratification as quid 
pro quo: allegiance in return for military support to eradicate the 
Indian threat.437 Soon after George Washington was sworn in as 
president, appeals arrived from western settlers professing their 
loyalty, decrying state protection as insufficient, and “implor[ing]” the 
federal government to send “an army . . . into the heart of [Indian] 
Country Sufficient to extirpate their whole Savage race.”438 Georgia 
had similar expectations. One congressional delegate sardonically 
 
 435. See Cayton, supra note 409, at 58 (“The great advantage of the federal Union 
established by the Constitution of 1787 was that it was the most promising candidate to 
accomplish those goals [of securing protection]. Clearly, North Carolina was not up to the task; 
neither was Georgia.”). 
 436. See id. at 59 (noting that backcountry leaders “became federalists . . . not because they 
were deeply attached to the Union, not because they had a profound commitment to strong 
government . . . but because, simply put, their interest in finding a protector had intersected with 
the emergence of a (theoretically) more powerful American government”). On the trope of 
“murdering savages,” see supra Part III.B. 
 437. Cf. GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 241–44 (describing the creation of the Revolution 
settlement in the West as a Hobbesian “covenant to create commonwealth” in which “Indian 
hatred . . . became a lasting foundation of the nation”). 
 438. Letter from the Citizens of Mero District, North Carolina, to George Washington 
(Nov. 30, 1789), in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 345, 347 
(W.W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1993); see also id. at 346 (decrying that the citizens of the 
Mero District—located in present-day central Tennessee—lacked “the most distant prospect of 
any further assistance from the legislative body of the State” to protect against Indian attacks); 
Letter from Harrison County, Va., Field Officers to George Washington (Feb. 2, 1790), in 5 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, at 93, 94 (Dorothy Twohig, 
Mark A. Mastromarino & Jack D. Warren eds., 1996) (“[I]n the name and behalf of our 
Suffering fellow Citizens over whome we preside as field Officers of the militia, [we] pray that 
Your Excellency would take our distressed Situation under your Parential Care and grant us 
Such Releife as you in your Wisdom shall think proper . . . .”); Letter from the Officers of the 
Mero District (Aug. 1, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL 
SERIES, at 397, 397 (Dorothy Twohig & Mark A. Mastromarino eds., 1999) (“We implore Your 
interposition, fully hoping to meet with a more ample Protection than we have hertofore receivd 
from the State of North Carolina—the expectation of which was a Powerful incentive inducing 
us to use Our utmost influence to obtain the Act of Cession.”); Letter from the Representatives 
of Monongahela, Harrison, and Randolph Counties, Virginia, to George Washington (Dec. 12, 
1789), in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra, at 397, 397–
98 (“beg[ging]” that defensive measures “be continued in our country until it may be thought 
necessary to carry on offensive war into the enemy’s country as to bring about a lasting peace,” 
and asking President Washington to “suffer us further to assure you, that we, on the behalf of 
our bleeding country look up to you, and to you only, for that assistance that our necessities 
require”).  
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observed, “[A]ltho the USA have already expended as much to 
defend Georgia, as the whole State upon a fair valuation would sell 
for, She . . . expects the USA go on conquering, more Indian Lands 
for her emolument.”439 
In one sense, Georgia’s strategic ratification worked. “[T]he new 
government,” Creek leader Alexander McGillivray reported, “is 
established on a basis which renders it capable of making war on us in 
a fashion that would assure them a complete success.”440 Rather than 
confront this strengthened federal military, McGillivray opted to 
negotiate.441 The resulting Treaty of New York, the first treaty ratified 
under the new Constitution, promised an end to hostilities.442 
But by invalidating several state purchases and guaranteeing 
Creek lands,443 the treaty outraged the Georgians, who regarded the 
Washington administration’s decision to negotiate with rather than 
fight the Creeks as a betrayal of their understanding of ratification as 
a reciprocal bargain. Infuriated Georgians turned on the federal 
government they had recently supported; hostile newspaper articles 
questioned whether the administration had breached the “compact 
which makes Georgia a part of the Union,” thereby releasing the 
state from its obligations.444 
For the next forty years, Georgia fought the federal government 
for control over Indian affairs. “[T]he United States are at peace with 
all the world except the state of Georgia,” Washington reportedly 
exclaimed in the face of such intransigence.445 In flagrant violation of 
federal treaties, statutes,446 and, in Thomas Jefferson’s opinion, the 
 
 439. Letter from Samuel A. Otis to James Warren (Feb. 6, 1788), in 24 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 158, at 636, 636–37. 
 440. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Carlos Howard (Aug. 11, 1790), in CAUGHEY, 
supra note 166, at 274.  
 441. See id. (“These motives have led me to agree to . . . articles of peace to end our 
disputes.” (footnote omitted)). 
 442. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35, 36 [hereinafter 
Treaty of New York]; see NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 121–24. 
 443. Treaty of New York, supra note 442, arts. IV–V. 
 444. David A. Nichols, Land, Republicanism, and Indians: Power and Policy in Early 
National Georgia, 1780–1825, 85 GA. HIST. Q. 199, 216 (2001); see also Cayton, supra note 409, 
at 61–64 (explaining southern disillusionment in federal power after the failure to commit 
military forces to the South). 
 445. Introduction to The Ratification of the Constitution by Georgia, supra note 425, at 211 
(quoting Marius, Editorial, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Dec. 24, 1791). 
 446. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, enacted by the First Congress, prohibited the 
sale of Indian lands “unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, 
held under the authority of the United States.” Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 138. 
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provisions of the Constitution,447 the state sold speculators land 
guaranteed to the Creeks and Cherokees.448 Subsequent treaty 
negotiations replayed earlier farces at Fort Stanwix and Hopewell, 
with open hostility between federal and Georgian commissioners.449 
One informant wrote Washington that frontier Georgians “now 
consider the troops and servants of the United States . . . nearly as 
great Enemies as they do the Indians and for no other reason than 
that they recommend moderation and a compliance with the laws of 
the land.”450 In 1802, Georgia became the last state to cede its lands to 
the national government, in return for a federal promise to extinguish 
Indian title as quickly as possible.451 But the federal government did 
not act quickly enough to satisfy the Georgians, who resumed open 
defiance of federal treaties; in the 1820s, the state’s governor even 
mobilized the militia to forestall a federal threat to use the army to 
enforce a federal Indian treaty.452 
This struggle culminated with Indian removal and Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia,453 where the 
Supreme Court invalidated the state’s unilateral effort to assert 
jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation.454 Marshall read the war 
 
 447. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Certain Georgia Land Grants (May 3, 1790), in 16 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MAIN SERIES 406, 407 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961) (arguing that 
Georgia’s land grants were invalid because “[t]he[] paragraphs of the Constitution, declaring 
that the general government shall have, and that the particular ones shall not have, the rights of 
war and treaty, are so explicit that no commentary can explain them further, nor can any explain 
them away”); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox (Aug. 10, 1791), in 7 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 226, 226–27 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (“[N]either 
under the present constitution, nor the ancient confederation, had any State or person a right to 
treat with the Indians, without the consent of the General Government . . . .”). 
 448. MAGRATH, supra note 17, at 2–6. 
 449. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 590–94; see also 
SADOSKY, supra note 18, at 171 (“Within hours of their coming into contact with one another, 
agents of the state of Georgia and the federal government were engaged in a vitriolic 
correspondence about Indian treaty protocols. . . . [T]he key question was, ‘Who is in charge?’ 
The Federalists believed that the Constitution gave one answer (the federal government), but 
Georgia could, and did, claim that they retained a role in the treaty-making process.”). 
 450. Letter from James Seagrove to George Washington (July 27, 1792), in 10 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 577, 578 (Philander D. Chase, Robert F. 
Haggard & Mark A. Mastromarino eds., 2002). 
 451. Act of Apr. 24, 1802, No. 35, 1802 Ga. Laws 48; see FORD, supra note 17, at 25; 
MAGRATH, supra note 17, at 34–36. 
 452. See ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS, GEORGIA AND STATES RIGHTS: A STUDY OF THE 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR, WITH 
PARTICULAR REGARD TO FEDERAL RELATIONS 15–86 (1902). 
 453. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 454. Id. at 561–63. 
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power, the treaty power, and the Indian Commerce Clause to create 
exclusive federal authority over Indian affairs.455 The ruling went 
famously unenforced, as President Andrew Jackson implicitly 
endorsed Georgia’s refusal to comply with the Court’s decision.456 But 
the crisis represented more than the rejection of the rule of law or the 
judicial supremacy of the Supreme Court, as it is usually read.457 It was 
a clash between two divergent constitutional strains of thought. 
Marshall embraced the Madisonian emphasis on federal supremacy 
and restraint, but the Georgians, as well as many southern state 
supreme courts, could justly point to an alternate constitutional 
tradition committed to expansion and dispossessing Indians.458 
Notwithstanding the cries of Whigs and later commentators, their 
 
 455. Id. at 558–60. In the decision, Marshall delved into the history of Indian affairs under 
Article IX of the Articles, noting that its “ambiguous phrases . . . were so construed by the states 
of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the power itself.” Id. at 559. But, Marshall continued, 
the correct construction of Article IX was not before the Court because of the “adoption of our 
existing constitution.” Id. “That instrument,” he wrote,  
confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of 
regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our 
intercourse with the Indians. . . . The shackles imposed on this power, in the 
confederation, are discarded. 
Id. Marshall thus adopted Madison’s reading that the shift in language from the Articles was 
intended to grant exclusive power over Indian affairs. 
 456. See NORGREN, supra note 17, at 122–30. See generally Anton-Hermann Chroust, Did 
President Andrew Jackson Actually Threaten the Supreme Court of the United States with 
Nonenforcement of Its Injunction Against the State of Georgia?, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 76 (1960). 
 457. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 22–
31, 66–67, 71 (2010) (describing Worcester as exemplifying the limits of Supreme Court power); 
DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 4 (2007) (arguing, in the context of the Cherokee cases and Indian 
removal, that “[t]he rule of law obtained only in places and on subjects where local majorities 
supported it”); KRAMER, supra note 26, at 182–83 (interpreting the Cherokee cases in the 
context of contests over the judicial supremacy of the Supreme Court). 
 458. See generally TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE 
SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS (2002) 
(tracing three southern supreme court decisions rejecting Worcester and arguing that they “did 
not change the law” but “reflected the majority view of American lawyers and legislators and, 
indeed, the white American public, and that view was that the tribes were not sovereign 
nations”). Marshall himself had arguably endorsed the expansionist states’ reading when he 
concluded that Indians’ right of occupancy did not preclude the sale of underlying title. See 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603 (1823); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 
87, 146 (1810). This position conflicted with the Washington administration’s earlier 
interpretation that grants of Indian land guaranteed by federal treaties were unconstitutional. 
See supra note 447; see also BANNER, supra note 35, at 150 (“In the early 1790s, American 
lawyers and government officials considered the Indians the owners of their land. By 1823, 
however . . . the United States Supreme Court declared . . . that the Indians were in fact not the 
owners of the land but had merely a ‘right of occupancy.’”). 
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resistance to the Court was not simple lawlessness.459 Instead, they 
insisted on the sanctity of the bargain they believed ratification 
represented. Indian removal, Jackson informed Congress in 1830, was 
“a duty which this Government owes” the states, as it “was 
substantially a part of the compact which made them members of our 
confederacy.”460 In the end, this interpretation prevailed and the 
Indians were removed. In the antebellum United States, it proved to 
be the Georgians, not Marshall, who determined what the 
Constitution meant.461 
IV.  LEGACIES AND IMPLICATIONS 
Soon after ratification, word of the new Constitution spread 
throughout Indian country. “Our Union, which was a child, is grown 
 
 459. An increasing body of literature has challenged the elite depiction of backcountry 
settlers as merely “lawless,” and focused on their construction of “quasi-legal” norms, often at 
odds with state-constructed legal orders. See, e.g., HULSEBOSCH, supra note 8, at 101–04; 
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 55–76. Professor Lisa Ford offers a particularly insightful discussion 
of “legality and lawlessness” on the Georgia frontier. FORD, supra note 17, at 85–107. As she 
notes, “Settler violence . . . was clothed in law—a law which, in important respects, settlers 
constituted and controlled. . . . [S]ettlers used their control of legal discourse, legal evidence, 
and juries to ensure that common law served the interests of plurality in early Georgia . . . .” Id. 
at 85–86. For the most influential statement on the meanings of “law” within a pluralist system 
with competing sources of authority, see generally Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 
WIS. L. REV. 899.  
 460. 7 REG. DEB. app. at x (1830). 
 461. Cf. FORD, supra note 17, at 195 (“The juridical solution to Georgia’s sovereignty 
problems lay not in the Supreme Court’s pallid defense of Indian sovereignty and 
jurisdiction . . . but in the legislatures and the courts of the South . . . [which created] a powerful, 
efficacious and new practice of sovereignty that harried the Cherokee over the 
Mississippi . . . .”). Long after what Ford terms “perfect settler sovereignty,” id. at 183, had been 
established over the trans-Appalachian West—after, that is, the federal government had largely 
dispossessed and removed the region’s Natives—Marshall was arguably vindicated, as 
Worcester’s “broad principles . . . came to be accepted as law.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 
219 (1959). Indeed, Whigs-cum-Republicans cited Worcester to justify the reshaping of 
federalism in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Magliocca, supra note 17, at 929–37. Now, 
however, the case’s canonical status is often honored largely in the breach. See Nevada v. Hicks, 
533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (observing while citing Worcester that “it was ‘long ago’ that ‘the Court 
departed from Chief Justice Marshall’s view that “the laws of [a State] can have no force” within 
reservation boundaries’” (alteration in original) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980))); Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 257 (1992) (noting, in discussing Worcester, that “[t]he 
‘platonic notions of Indian sovereignty’ that guided Chief Justice Marshall have, over time, lost 
their independent sway” (quoting McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 
(1973))); see also Frickey, supra note 11, at 418–26 (arguing that the Supreme Court has “moved 
away from Chief Justice Marshall’s model [in Worcester] in dramatic fashion”). 
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up to manhood,” federal commissioners told the Creeks.462 Now that 
“[o]ne great council is established, with full powers to promote the 
public good,” the United States would ensure “justice” for the Native 
nations within its borders.463 The Indians took them at their word. 
“We rejoice much to hear that the great Congress have got new 
powers, and have become strong,” the Cherokees wrote the new 
federal government.464 “We now hope that whatever is done hereafter 
by the great council will no more be destroyed and made small by any 
State.”465 The Six Nations expressed similar sentiments in a letter to 
George Washington466; when New York emissaries demanded yet 
another land cession, Iroquois leaders waved copies of the federal 
statute barring state purchases of Indian lands in front of them.467 
The sale happened anyway, a recurring pattern that quickly 
dashed Native hopes for the new government.468 Federal officials 
spoke the Madisonian language of paternalism, but their efforts at 
restraint were halfhearted and ineffectual.469 Georgia’s defiance of 
federal authority was especially brazen, but not unique: many states 
claimed and exercised a constitutional right to govern Indians until 
well after the Civil War.470 By contrast, the Hamiltonian Constitution 
 
 462. Abortive Negotiations at Rock Landing (Sept. 1789), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 547, 550. 
 463. Id. 
 464. Letter from Representatives of the Cherokee Nation to George Washington, President 
of the U.S. (May 19, 1787), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 
56, 57.  
 465. Id. 
 466. Letter from the Five Nations at Buffalo Creek to George Washington (June 2, 1789), in 
18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 517, 517.  
 467. See TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 231–34, 302–07. 
 468. Id. 
 469. This is the dominant theme in the works of Father Francis Paul Prucha, whose two-
volume study on federal Indian policy remains foundational. See generally FRANCIS PAUL 
PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
INDIANS (1984). Prucha argues that federal officials “sought to treat the Indians honorably, 
even though they acted within a set of circumstances that rested on the premise that white 
society would prevail. The best term for this persistent attitude is paternalism . . . .” 1 id. at 
xxviii. 
 470. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 4, 1791), in 8 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 438, at 57, 58 
(complaining in the context of Indian affairs that “the States individually are omitting no 
occasion to interfere in matters which belong to the general Government,” and that “the 
interferences of States, and the speculations of Individuals will be the bane of all our public 
measures”); see also GARRISON, supra note 458, at 103–24, 151–68, 198–247; LAURENCE M. 
HAUPTMAN, CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS: IROQUOIS DISPOSSESSION AND THE RISE OF NEW 
YORK STATE 61–64, 209–12 (1999); DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE 
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functioned as the Federalists had promised. Indians turned out to be 
the substantial threat they invoked: the first military expeditions 
against the western Indian confederacy, in 1790 and 1791, suffered the 
worst defeat “Indians ever inflicted on the U.S. Army in its entire 
history.”471 But, after tripling the size of its army and spending $5 
million—five-sixths of all federal expenditures from 1790 to 1796472—
the United States ultimately prevailed, seizing most of present-day 
Ohio.473 War between the United States and Native nations remained 
a near constant for the next century, but the outcome was never again 
so close.474 The fiscal-military state the Constitution created proved its 
most enduring legacy in Indian country, and made Natives among the 
biggest losers of ratification.475 
This is not to suggest that Native dispossession was the simple 
result of federal military conquest. Just as significant as federal 
financial and military support for expansion was the entrenchment of 
a militaristic paradigm that cast Anglo-American settlers as victims 
and force against “savages” as both justified and necessary. Although 
Madisonians had hoped the new government would keep “both 
[whites and Natives] in awe by a strong hand, and compel them to be 
moderate and just,” in practice the constitutional structures of 
popular sovereignty and federalism ensured that the federal 
 
LAW: SOVEREIGNTY, RACE, AND CITIZENSHIP, 1790–1880, at 51–79 (2007); TAYLOR, supra 
note 114, at 231–34, 302–07. See generally Cynthia Cumfer, Local Origins of National Indian 
Policy: Cherokee and Tennessean Ideas About Sovereignty and Nationhood, 1790–1811, 23 J. 
EARLY REPUBLIC 21 (2003). 
 471. WOOD, supra note 16, at 130. Other accounts of the war may be found in HORSMAN, 
supra note 12, at 84–95; RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE 
CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783–1802, at 91–127 (1975); 
WHITE, supra note 1, at 454–55 (1991). 
 472. TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 238. See generally Gerard Clarfield, Protecting the 
Frontiers: Defense Policy and the Tariff Question in the First Washington Administration, 32 
WM. & MARY Q. 443 (1975) (describing the vituperative political battles over the financing of 
the Northwest Indian Confederacy War). I am indebted to Andrew Fagal for bringing the 
Clarfield citation to my attention.  
 473. WOOD, supra note 16, at 130–31. 
 474. R. DOUGLAS HURT, THE INDIAN FRONTIER, 1763–1846, at 103–36, 164–88 (2002). 
 475. See, e.g. EDLING, supra note 23, at 140 (“The army had been brought into existence to 
deal with western expansion and to coerce the Indians.”); ERIC HINDERAKER, ELUSIVE 
EMPIRES: CONSTRUCTING COLONIALISM IN THE OHIO VALLEY, 1673–1800, at 226 (1997) (“In 
the end, national leaders and western settlers established a complicated pattern of mutual 
support, which served as the foundation for a new relationship between state and society in the 
west—one that sapped, with remarkable speed, Native American autonomy and power.”); 
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 199 (“[T]he federal government, which [Henry] Knox had hoped 
would shield the Indians from the ill effects of American expansion, was instead becoming the 
foremost agent of their dispossession and removal.”). 
ABLAVSKY IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2014  10:45 AM 
2014] THE SAVAGE CONSTITUTION 1079 
government’s “legal coercive power” ran largely one way.476 The 
specter of the “sword of the Republic” undergirded all laws and 
treaties regulating Native interactions with the United States, often 
obviating actual bloodshed.477 Through this alchemy, “lawless” 
violence was refined into the purer stuff of constitutional liberty and 
order.478 
This postratification history of Indian affairs was neither 
inevitable nor accidental; it was, in a certain sense, the deliberate 
choice of the Constitution’s proponents. Though the Madisonians 
should not be anachronistically valorized as racial egalitarians—their 
paternalism reflected their own imperialist aims and disdain for 
Natives479—they were sincerely committed to using the new 
government to secure Indians what they repeatedly termed justice. 
But the Federalists, though they likely shared Madison’s 
humanitarian impulses, nonetheless prioritized the heightened power 
of the United States to control the borderlands and defeat Native 
nations when selling the Constitution’s virtues. Their implicit bargain 
helped ensure that, instead of checking expansionist states and 
settlers, the federal government proved their valuable ally, 
engendering a perverse form of cooperative federalism at Natives’ 
expense.480 As French observer Alexis de Tocqueville perceptively 
noted in the era of Indian removal, 
The Union treats the Indians with less cupidity and violence than 
the several States, but the two governments are alike deficient in 
 
 476. Report of the Secretary at War to Congress, supra note 209, at 31–32. 
 477. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (July 7, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, at 134, 136 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989). 
 478. See Paul Frymer, Building an American Empire: Territorial Expansion in the 
Antebellum Era, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 913, 917–19 (2011) (stressing the importance of non-
military exercises of federal power in facilitating western expansion, particularly through “the 
legitimating power of law”); cf. HULSEBOSCH, supra note 8, at 11 (“[Americans] conquered the 
continent less with violence than with the confidence with which they carried forward their 
notions of constitutional liberty.”). For a thoughtful consideration of violence in Native 
experiences of imperialism, see generally NED BLACKHAWK, VIOLENCE OVER THE LAND: 
INDIANS AND EMPIRES IN THE EARLY AMERICAN WEST (2006).  
 479. Subsequent events also proved that paternalism and exclusive federal power did not 
necessarily lead to more humane or just outcomes for Natives. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 35, 
at 258–92 (depicting the harms caused by allotment). See generally FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A 
FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880–1920 (1984) (describing 
the deleterious effects of the federal government’s paternalist assimilation campaign). 
 480. See ROSEN, supra note 470, at 78–79 (“The common goal of the state and federal 
governments with regard to Indians was control of Indians and Indian lands. . . . [T]hey acted in 
tandem to achieve that goal.”). 
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good faith. . . . [T]he tyranny of the States obliges the savages to 
retire; the Union, by its promises and resources, facilitates their 
retreat; and these measures tend to precisely the same end.481 
The history presented here revises some of our understandings of 
the Constitution. For certain constitutional provisions, the context of 
Indian affairs is critical. As this Article has demonstrated, relations 
with Indians were a central site for early debates over federalism. 
Moreover, works that purport to expound the original understanding 
of the treaty or war power—without acknowledging that in its first 
decade the federal government entered six “foreign” and eleven 
Indian treaties,482 or that the U.S. Army fought two “foreign” and at 
least ten Indian wars before the Civil War483—present a partial 
perspective.484 As one example, some scholars have argued that the 
drafters of the Constitution anticipated that “treaties that sought to 
have a domestic, legislative effect” would require subsequent 
legislative enactment.485 But this conclusion is difficult to reconcile 
with the reality that Indian treaties—perhaps the paradigmatic 
instance of treaties having domestic legislative effects, as resistance 
 
 481. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 452–53 (Francis Bowen ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., N.Y., The Century Co. 1898) (1835).  
 482. This includes treaties from 1789 through 1799; single treaties concluded with multiple 
Indian nations were each counted as only one treaty. If each agreement with a separate Indian 
nation is considered a distinct treaty, then the number of treaties concluded with Indian nations 
in the decade rises to thirty-one. Compare 7 Stat. 28–62 (recording treaties with Indian nations), 
with 8 Stat. 116–177 (recording treaties with “foreign” nations).  
 483. The two “foreign” wars were the War of 1812 and the Mexican–American War, both of 
which also involved fighting with Indian nations. Because Indian wars were rarely formally 
declared, counting them is more challenging: I have included the war against the Northwest 
Indian Confederacy (1790–95), Tecumseh’s War (1810–13), the Creek War (1813–14), the Black 
Hawk War (1832), the Creek War of 1836, the First (1814–19), Second (1835–43), and Third 
(1855–58) Seminole Wars, the Cayuse/Yakima/Rogue River War (1847–58), and the Paiute War 
(1860). See generally HURT, supra note 474. 
 484. Articles on these topics that offer otherwise careful considerations of constitutional 
history but omit serious discussion of Indian affairs include Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001); William Michael 
Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power To Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1996); 
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996). Professor John Yoo considers the Washington 
administration’s war against the Northwest Indian Confederacy more fully, but ignores the role 
of Indians in shaping the constitutional war powers, even though the sources from ratification 
he cites repeatedly mention Indians. See id. at 271–72, 290–91. 
 485. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2074 (1999); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 410–17 (1998) (arguing based in 
part on constitutional history for federalist limitations on the treaty power). 
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under the Articles underscores—were considered self-executing.486 
Yet even scholars who have used constitutional history extensively to 
critique this position and advance a nationalist interpretation of the 
treaty power have similarly ignored Indian treaties, even though the 
history recounted here powerfully supports their arguments, and even 
when the sources they cite specifically mention Indians.487  
More fundamentally, focusing on Indian affairs challenges 
traditional conceptions of what the Constitution was. Legal scholars 
understandably privilege a view of the “Founding” as a legal and 
intellectual event: a serene gathering of statesmen, well-versed in 
European political philosophy and English legal thought, who 
translated these abstractions into the foundation of a new 
government intended to curb past abuses through a new American 
“science of politics.”488 This vision stresses the document’s restraining 
function through the mechanistic “checks and balances”489 that have 
 
 486. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A 
POLITICAL ANOMALY 70–79 (1994). Congress generally appropriated money for treaty 
purposes before a treaty was held and subsequently ratified any treaty; no further legislation 
was required. See id. 
 487. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause 
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 616–19 (2008) (discussing the 
inclusion of treaties within the Supremacy Clause as a response to the failures of the Articles, 
but omitting Indian treaties). See generally, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical 
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2095 (1999) (critiquing Yoo’s historical claims, see Yoo, supra note 485, without discussing 
Indian affairs); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of 
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (1999) (providing a 
lengthy historical argument for a nationalist treaty power without mentioning Indian affairs). At 
several points in Professor David Golove’s article, his sources explicitly discuss Indian treaties, 
but he passes over this fact in silence. See Golove, supra, at 1167 n.278, 1178 n.317, 1179 n.319, 
1243 n.557, 1278 n.695.  
 This issue has received renewed attention as the Supreme Court has heard Bond v. 
United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 2013), which addresses whether the treaty power 
authorizes Congress to criminalize local conduct. Yet even an amicus brief in the case filed by 
professors of international law and legal history arguing in favor of a robust national treaty 
power ignored Indian treaties, even though early Indian treaties routinely contained provisions 
addressing criminal law within state boundaries. Brief for Amici Curiae Professors of 
International Law and Legal History in Support of Respondent, Bond, No. 12-158, available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/12-158bsacProfsIntlLawandLegal
History-FINAL-ok-to-print.pdf; cf., e.g., Treaty of New York, supra note 442, arts. VIII–X 
(addressing criminal law issues). 
 488. This is the predominant perspective and tone of the most influential intellectual history 
of the Constitution of the last century. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969). 
 489. See FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 53, at 322 (James Madison). 
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become shibboleths of our constitutional culture: limited government, 
federalism, enumerated powers, and separation of powers.490 
This perspective, though valid, is partial. Integrating Indians into 
our constitutional histories helps reveal how the Constitution was also 
made outside Independence Hall—in the violent, pluralist 
borderlands, where the United States contested with Native nations, 
European empires, and states and squatters to assert sovereignty over 
vast spaces of the continent. In 1783, the United States’s triumph in 
this “Long War for the West” was, in words of one scholar, “the most 
unlikely scenario of all,” a reality underscored by the disasters of the 
Articles.491 Yet less than seventy years later, the federal government—
having expanded its jurisdiction to the Pacific, incorporated 
seventeen new states, and forcibly removed most Indian nations from 
east of the Mississippi River—was the contest’s undisputed victor.492 
This improbable success owed much to the conscious designs of the 
Constitution’s drafters. All inhabited a world marked by a seemingly 
perpetual crisis of authority on the frontier, and they crafted a 
national government with formidable powers to address this 
challenge: to create the extended republic envisioned by Madison by 
expanding the nation and governing the West.493 From this 
perspective, the Constitution was not a document of restraint, but the 
 
 490. The literature on this topic is vast. For a historical view on the question, see JOHN 
FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 19, 
55–70 (2007). 
 491. François Furstenberg, The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic 
History, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 647, 650 (2008). Professor François Furstenberg convincingly 
argues that “the great problem of North American, and perhaps even Atlantic, history from 
1754 to 1815 [was] the fate of the trans-Appalachian West.” Id. at 648. “[The] primary objective 
[of the United States] after the Revolution was to become an independent nation-state; and as 
many at the time recognized, the greatest obstacles to that ambition lay in the trans-
Appalachian West.” Id. at 659. Furstenberg further notes that “[f]rom 1783 through the end of 
the eighteenth century and beyond,” American sovereignty over the region was very much 
uncertain; it could “be ensured only by overcoming three challenges: the geography of North 
America, and of the Appalachian Mountains in particular; Native American resistance; and the 
ambiguous loyalties of western colonists.” Id. Arguably, success in overcoming all three was 
partially attributable to the new Constitution and the strengthened federal state it created. 
 492. See HOWE, supra note 457, at 852–55. See generally Frymer, supra note 478. 
 493. See FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 53, at 81–84 (James Madison). On the importance 
of federal authority in the early American West, see Bethel Saler, An Empire for Liberty, a State 
for Empire: The U.S. National State Before and After the Revolution of 1800, in THE 
REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 360 (James Horn, Jan 
Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2002). See generally WILLIAM H. BERGMANN, THE 
AMERICAN NATIONAL STATE AND THE EARLY WEST (2012); EDLING, supra note 23; Frymer, 
supra note 478.  
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foundation of what historians have increasingly recognized as a 
powerful early national state, whose authority was strongest on its 
peripheries.494 “[T]he American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains 
of consolidation, is about to convert this country into a powerful and 
mighty empire,” warned Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratification 
convention.495 Henry’s prescience foretold much Native suffering. 
Natives were among the first subjects of this empire, but they 
were not the last. In the creation of the Constitution, as in much of 
early American history, Indian affairs were a central site of American 
state formation, prefiguring later imperial projects.496 The Federalists’ 
strategic deployment of the rhetoric of savagery anticipated future 
debates, as Indians became the stock template for America’s 
subsequent cross-cultural encounters, their supposed primitiveness 
evolving into a free-floating discourse to justify rule over other 
purportedly inferior peoples.497 At the same time, the legal and 
constitutional structures created to dispossess Natives and control the 
West—the national fiscal-military state, federal territorial plenary 
power, the exclusion of subject peoples from the privileges of 
representation and citizenship—became the bases of America’s later 
 
 494. For recent scholarship emphasizing the strength of the early national state, see 
BALOGH, supra note 16; EDLING, supra note 23; Frymer, supra note 478; William J. Novak, The 
Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008). 
 495. Virginia Convention Debates (June 5, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 347, at 943, 959. Empire was a common 
theme in the ratification debates, invoked by both Federalists and Anti-Federalists. For 
thoughtful considerations of this aspect of ratification, see HULSEBOSCH, supra note 8, at 210–
58; JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 77–89 (2002). 
 496. For arguments emphasizing the centrality of Natives to the construction of the 
American national state, see BALOGH, supra note 16, at 151–218; ROCKWELL, supra note 16, at 
1–8; Jeff Pasley, Midget on Horseback: American Indians and the History of the American State, 
COMMON-PLACE (Oct. 2008), http://www.common-place.org/vol-09/no-01/pasley. 
 497. See, e.g., REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 210–12, 239–44 (1981) (describing the use of anti-
Indian rhetoric to justify the conquest and dispossession of Mexicans); Brian Rouleau, Maritime 
Destiny as Manifest Destiny: American Commercial Expansionism and the Idea of the Indian, 30 
J. EARLY REPUBLIC 377, 379 (2010) (“By the nineteenth century, Native Americans . . . became 
a stereotyped frame of reference applied to peoples encountered outside the continental 
context.”). See generally RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-
HATING AND EMPIRE BUILDING 232–401 (1980) (emphasizing the connection between “Indian-
hating” and American imperial projects in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and southeast Asia). 
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global empire.498 Unwittingly and unwillingly, Natives were the 
handmaidens of the United States’s imperial Constitution. 
As this narrative suggests, including Indians in constitutional 
histories also raises questions about the Constitution’s complicity in 
historical injustice. Most scholarship on this issue, unsurprisingly, has 
addressed the Constitution’s paradigmatic moral failure: its 
entrenchment of chattel slavery.499 There are important similarities, 
for the issues of Natives and slavery were closely intertwined. 
Southern states’ land hunger stemmed from the plantation complex’s 
imperative for ceaseless expansion, as Georgia and other states 
rapidly populated formerly Creek and Cherokee land with enslaved 
Africans.500 Moreover, like its entanglement with slavery, the 
Constitution’s commitment to the expropriation of Native lands 
enshrined a practice many at the time considered morally abhorrent 
to secure the more immediate goal of union.501 The delegates 
themselves made a connection: at the Convention, Charles Pinckney 
 
 498. For works emphasizing the links between the laws governing Indians and other 
American imperial projects, see Lauren Benton, Colonizing Hawai’i and Colonizing Elsewhere: 
Toward a History of U.S. Imperial Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 835 (2004) (book review); Sarah 
H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002); Patrick Wolfe, 
Corpus Nullius: The Exception of Indians and Other Aliens in US Constitutional Discourse, 10 
POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 127 (2007). The legal structures of American empire are explored in 
COLONIAL CRUCIBLE: EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE (Alfred 
W. McCoy & Francisco A. Scarano eds., 2009); and GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 
(2004). A thorough examination of the historical connection between American empire and 
military power appears in FRED ANDERSON & ANDREW CAYTON, THE DOMINION OF WAR: 
EMPIRE AND LIBERTY IN NORTH AMERICA, 1500–2000 (2005).  
 499. The literature on this subject is large. For the most recent historical treatments, see 
generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 28–47 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001); 
VAN CLEVE, supra note 240; WALDSTREICHER, supra note 240; Finkelman, supra note 240; Earl 
M. Maltz, The Idea of the Proslavery Constitution, 17 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 37 (1997).  
 500. For discussions of the link between expansionism and the rise of the Cotton Belt in 
former Indian lands, see HOWE, supra note 457, at 125–32; WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK 
DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE COTTON KINGDOM 18–45 (2013); ADAM ROTHMAN, 
SLAVE COUNTRY: AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE DEEP SOUTH 37–72 
(2005); Countryman, supra note 29, at 360–61. Twenty-two years after ratification, as Georgia 
rapidly expanded into Creek and Cherokee territory, the state’s slave population had tripled to 
over 100,000. IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF 
SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 370 tbl.1 (1998). 
 501. Cf. HENDRICKSON, supra note 18, at 240 (“Injustice to African-Americans and 
injustice to Indian nations—a constitutional obligation to protect and even advance the slave 
power, an acknowledged duty to dispossess the Indian nations of the interior—were by this 
powerful logic woven into the inner fabric of their beautiful union.”). 
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of South Carolina deflected a heated attack on the Three-Fifths 
Compromise with the contention that “the Western frontier [is] more 
burdensome to the U.S. than the slaves.”502 
But the constitutional history of Indian affairs also presents 
different challenges for the contemporary Constitution than slavery.503 
Unlike the document’s frequent (albeit oblique) references to slavery, 
nothing in the constitutional text explicitly mandates an imperialist 
Indian policy. For a textualist, this may absolve the document from its 
unpleasant historical associations. Yet in practice this absence has 
made the effects of this history all the more insidious. Although 
slavery’s legacy persists in profound ways, its appearance in the 
Constitution forced the nation to confront African-Americans’ status 
as a constitutional issue; the struggle to repudiate that history yielded 
powerful tools to further an antiracist constitutional agenda. The 
Constitution remains silent, however, on Native struggles to 
overcome our nation’s historical injustices. Even as views on Indians 
have shifted dramatically,504 Native nations remain legally a quasi-
conquered people, subject to the plenary power of a sovereign 
created in part to dispossess them.505 The idea of the “savage” as an 
enemy justifying expansive federal military power survives, too: the 
U.S. Justice Department has claimed that precedent from nineteenth-
century Indian wars legitimizes current practices in the War on Terror 
and the U.S. military codenamed Osama bin Laden “Geronimo,” 
 
 502. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 223. 
 503. The contrast I draw here concerns implications for present-day constitutional doctrine 
and theory, not the ahistorical and unhelpful question of whether slavery or the dispossession of 
Indians constitutes the greater “constitutional evil,” as Professor Mark Graber terms the 
Constitution’s entrenchment of slavery. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006). Moreover, my contrast at the level of doctrine and theory 
should not obscure the now neglected historical reality that chattel slavery was an integral part 
of Native dispossession: enslavement of Indians was a widespread practice in the Euro-
American colonies that persisted into the nineteenth century. See Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, 
Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and 
Its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1463–67, 1515–17 (2011).  
 504. See generally Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 591 (2008). 
 505. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“The ‘central function of the 
Indian Commerce Clause,’ we have said, ‘is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate 
in the field of Indian affairs.’” (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 
192 (1989))). But see Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565–71 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (questioning the doctrine of plenary power based on the purported “original 
understanding” of the Indian Commerce Clause). 
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after the nineteenth-century Apache chief.506 The problem is not that 
federal Indian policy has not changed; prompted by Native activism, 
the federal government has made significant, if incomplete, strides 
toward respecting Native nations as separate, self-governing 
sovereigns.507 But considering the history of Indian conquest and 
dispossession as incidental to the Constitution has allowed doctrines 
crafted to justify this process to endure, as if they could be abstracted 
from their imperial origins.508 These doctrines’ persistence 
underscores that, for Natives, the history traced here has not yet 
ended. 
The other contrast is at the level of constitutional theory. 
Originalists reassure themselves that the Constitution’s entanglement 
with slavery represented a concession to the unfortunate realities of 
the time that has since been expunged from the text, and so need not 
trouble their normative conclusion that the original meaning of the 
Constitution ought to continue to govern.509 This Article does not 
delve into the dense and tangled thicket of constitutional theorizing 
concerning interpretive methods, nor does it examine this account’s 
merits as a description of slavery’s historical and constitutional 
 
 506. Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Peter S. Vicaire, Indian Wars: Old & New, 15 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 201, 223–30 (2012); Karl Jacoby, Op-Ed, Dishonored, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2011, 
at A11; see also DRINNON, supra note 497, at 402–67 (describing the links between the history of 
Indian-hating and the Vietnam War). For a discussion of ongoing uses of tropes of “savagery” in 
current law and policy, see Ann E. Tweedy, “Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws, 
Wolves, . . . Bears . . . Grizzlies and Things Like That?” How the Second Amendment and 
Supreme Court Precedent Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687, 737–54 (2011). 
 507. See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS 177–268 (2006) (tracing the role of Native activism in creating a federal Indian policy 
founded on tribal self-determination). 
 508. This is epitomized by recent Supreme Court doctrine, which has interpreted Marshall’s 
long-ago proclamation of Native sovereigns as “domestic dependent nations,” Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), to impose significant quasi-constitutional restrictions on 
Natives’ exercise of sovereignty. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–67 
(1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206–08 (1978); cf. Lara, 541 U.S. at 
228 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s “previous understanding of the 
jurisdictional implications of dependent sovereignty was constitutional in nature”). For criticism 
of this line of cases, see generally DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, Jr., LIKE 
A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF 
RACISM IN AMERICA (2005). 
 509. For discussions of the implications of slavery for originalism, see RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 111–12 (2004); 
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 176–77 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007); 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 1693, 1757–64 (2009). 
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implications.  Nonetheless, the history presented here questions the 
empirical foundation for this originalist argument. Slavery was not an 
island of oppression in a sea of liberty. Rather, the creation of a 
democratic republic necessarily rested on the exclusion and 
marginalization of others.510 Particularly in Indian affairs, the 
enforcement of racial and other hierarchies, and the expansion of 
white “civilization” across the American continent, were among the 
fundamental purposes of both the national and local state in early 
America.511 By offering too-easy answers derived from a blinkered 
focus on slavery, then, originalists have failed to grapple with these 
deeper normative questions about their project to employ eighteenth-
century meanings to govern a twenty-first-century nation. 
Expanding focus beyond slavery to include Indian affairs also 
troubles understandings of constitutional history that privilege federal 
power to remedy injustice. The fundamental protection of slavery in 
the Constitution was the protection of state sovereignty and the 
adoption of a limited federal government of enumerated powers.512 In 
a similar vein, conventional accounts posit that federal indifference 
undid the promise of Reconstruction and allowed Jim Crow to 
flourish until the civil-rights movement, when federal power became a 
critical tool for combating racial injustice.513 This narrative elides deep 
 
 510. See, e.g., HINDERAKER, supra note 475, at 268–70 (“[I]t is no accident that the 
exploitation of nonwhite peoples in the United States deepened and intensified before it began 
to be ameliorated. The Revolution liberated white men to pursue their economic and political 
independence.”); EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE 
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 386 (1975) (“Racism became an essential, if 
unacknowledged, ingredient of the republican ideology that enabled Virginians to lead the 
nation.”); SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 1–43, 465–68 (arguing that early American 
national identity was founded “on systematic patterns of exclusion”); JOHN WOOD SWEET, 
BODIES POLITIC: NEGOTIATING RACE IN THE AMERICAN NORTH, 1730–1830, at 3–5, 399–407 
(2003) (exploring how American democracy “was shaped by the legacy of colonial conquest, 
enslavement, and racial domination”); WOOD, supra note 16, at 508–42 (observing that the 
marginalization and racialization of African-Americans “were the strange and perverse 
consequences of republican equality and democracy”); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, 
REVOLUTIONARY BACKLASH: WOMEN AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
180 (2007) (noting that, in early America, “[u]niversal male suffrage was increasingly defined 
against—even predicated on—women’s and blacks’ exclusion from governance”). 
 511. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 457, at 852–54 (identifying as the “primary driving force” in 
the antebellum United States “the domination and exploitation of the North American 
continent by the white people of the United States and their government”). 
 512. See Finkelman, supra note 240, at 443–45 (describing the restriction on federal 
authority as the “ultimate” protection of slavery in the Constitution). 
 513. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877, at 564–612 (1988). 
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federal involvement in perpetuating discrimination against African-
Americans,514 but it is particularly inapposite in the realm of Indian 
affairs, where the federal government was the primary actor in 
marginalizing and dispossessing Native nations. Natives’ experience 
underscores that our racial and constitutional injustices were not 
simply a product of national acquiescence in local prejudices, and 
cannot always be solved by enforcing a national consensus on 
recalcitrant states. 
CONCLUSION 
In August 1788, Josiah Harmar commanded the entire federal 
military—a little over five hundred men, strung out in a series of 
isolated forts along nearly eight hundred miles of the Ohio and 
Wabash Rivers.515 Reduced to eating spoiled bread and short on 
funds, Harmar and his men watched in impotent fury as Natives 
attacked surveyors and squatters who ventured into Indian country.516 
Anxious for relief, Harmar closely followed political events further 
east. On August 7, he wrote his aide that news had at last reached his 
remote outpost: “New Hampshire has adopted the new Constitution, 
which makes the tenth state. I am in hopes the wheels of government 
will now be soon put in motion, in order that we may be enabled to 
extirpate these perfidious savages if they continue committing 
hostilities.”517 
Harmar’s hopes were never quite realized. Natives survived, and, 
for the past half century, have turned to the federal courts to hold the 
government to the treaty promises it made long ago—have invoked, 
 
 514. See generally FEHRENBACHER, supra note 499. 
 515. See William B. Skelton, The Confederation’s Regulars: A Social Profile of Enlisted 
Service in America’s First Standing Army, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 770, 781 (1989) (noting that the 
army averaged 520 men during this period); see also WILLIAM H. GUTHMAN, MARCH TO 
MASSACRE; A HISTORY OF THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1784–
1791, at 1–90 (1975) (describing the federal military during this period); KOHN, supra note 471, 
at 54–72 (describing the weakness and financial difficulties of the Confederation army). 
According to data supplied by the Army Corps of Engineers, the river distance from Fort 
Harmar (present-day Marietta, Ohio) to Post Vincennes (present-day Vincennes, Indiana) is 
782 miles. See Email from John D. Cheek, P.E., Great Lakes and Ohio River Div., U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, to Alvin L. Dong (Sept. 4, 2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 516. OUTPOST ON THE WABASH, supra note 145, at 93–105. 
 517. Letter from Josiah Harmar to John Hamtramck (Aug. 7, 1788), in OUTPOST ON THE 
WABASH, supra note 145, at 99, 100; see also Letter from Brigadier-Gen. Harmar to Henry 
Knox, Sec’y of War (July 23, 1788), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 64, 64 (“I 
sincerely hope that the new government will soon begin to operate, in order that we may be 
enabled to sweep these perfidious villains [the hostile Indians] off the face of the earth.”).  
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in other words, the Madisonian Constitution to remedy injustice. But 
for much of American history, the “wheels of government” proved 
remarkably effective at dispossessing Natives of the continent. In this 
respect, the Constitution functioned just as Harmar, and many others, 
had envisioned. 
 
